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Abstract  
ABSTRACT 
Background 
Opioids are a high-risk medicine, and one of the most frequently reported drug 
classes causing patient harm. In specialist palliative care inpatient services opioids 
are widely used to manage cancer pain and other symptoms. Palliative care inpatients 
are vulnerable to both exposure to, and harm from, opioid errors due to a 
combination of their: advanced age, comorbidities which affect drug metabolism, 
polypharmacy, and the seriousness of their illness. Despite this potential for harm, 
and the frequency of opioid administration in this specialist setting, little is known 
about opioid errors in palliative care. Better understanding the prevalence, patient 
impact and error contributing factors in the specialist palliative care inpatient setting 
will help to strengthen and support safe opioid delivery and minimise opioid error 
harms for this vulnerable population. 
Aim  
The PERISCOPE project aims to identify the: i) burden and characteristics of opioid 
errors; and ii) actions required to support safe opioid delivery within specialist 
inpatient palliative care services. 
Methods 
Research design: The PERISCOPE research project is a two-phase, pragmatic, 
explanatory sequential mixed methods study. This doctoral research project is 
situated within a quality and safety agenda and guided by a multi-incident analysis 
framework, and the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework. The PERISCOPE 
Project employed five discreet but inter-related studies conducted over two-phases. 
During Phase one, a: systematic literature review of opioid errors in palliative care 
services (Study 1); two retrospective reviews of clinical incidents involving opioids 
in palliative care services, one at a jurisdictional level (Study 2) and the other within 
three local specialist palliative care inpatient services in New South Wales (NSW) 
(Study 3) was undertaken. A review of opioid error contributing factors documented 
in clinical incident reports in local specialist palliative care inpatient services was 
also completed (Study 4). Phase two involved a series of semi-structured interviews 
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and focus groups which sought palliative care clinicians’ and service managers 
perceptions of opioid errors in their specialist palliative care inpatient services (Study 
5). Data integration and meta-inference of these data were undertaken following the 
completion of the two study phases, and facilitated a series of individual and 
systems-level recommendations to strengthen safe opioid delivery in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. 
Results 
Phase one: The systematic review revealed a paucity of empirical data, with the 
reported opioid errors limited to deviations from opioid prescribing, and no opioid 
administration errors in the palliative care clinical setting reported. These systematic 
review findings contrasted with the results of the NSW state-wide and local 
retrospective reviews, which found that opioid administration errors accounted for 
three-quarters of reported opioid related incidents. The majority of these opioid 
errors were due to omitted dose errors. While serious patient harm due to error was 
exceedingly rare in palliative care services, half of all palliative inpatients exposed to 
an opioid error experienced iatrogenic harms. Over half of these errors resulted in 
opioid under-dose for the patient, which adversely impacted on their pain 
management. Active failures (i.e., errors made by the palliative care clinician) were 
reported as contributing to two-thirds of these opioid errors, and one-fifth of errors 
were directly attributed to deficits in clinical communication.  
Phase two: The qualitative study with palliative care clinicians confirmed these 
results and identified additional error contributory factors including: the complexity 
and frequency of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services, sub-
optimal skill mix, and the absence of a clinical pharmacist in the palliative care 
service. This study also highlighted that palliative care services’ had substantially 
invested in creating and sustaining a positive safety culture, which drove the 
services’ approach to error mitigation strategies. 
Meta-inference of the integrated data across the five studies revealed four factors that 
are required to support safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services: i) embedding a positive opioid safety culture; ii) enabling optimal skill mix, 
staffing and resources; iii) privileging opioid education in the palliative care service; 
and iv) empowering clinicians to identify, challenge and report opioid errors. 
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Conclusion 
Despite specialist palliative care inpatient services clinicians ordering and 
administering opioids in high frequency, the overall prevalence of opioid errors in 
this setting is low. However, the most prevalent opioid errors that were identified 
were omitted dose errors, which caused unnecessary pain and suffering for affected 
palliative care inpatients. These errors were largely due to human error as a result of 
high workload and sub-optimal skill mix, and the use of paper-based versus 
electronic medication management systems. 
The PERISCOPE Project confirmed that the opioid error contributory and mitigating 
factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services are multifactorial, encompassing 
individual and systems factors. Accordingly, any strategies to reduce opioid errors 
must apply an integrated systems approach in order to be of impact. Pro-actively 
embedding and sustaining a culture of opioid safety is a core component of 
supporting safe opioid delivery and reducing opioid errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. While the PERISCOPE Project identified an overarching positive 
safety culture which encouraged and supported error reporting and facilitated 
organisational learnings to minimise and prevent opioid errors, there are still 
opportunities to reduce the prevalence of opioid errors, particularly missed doses in 
this setting. These strategies include ensuring optimal skill mix and medical/nursing 
ratios each shift, prioritising the transition from paper-based to electronic medication 
management systems, and mandating a minimum ratio of palliative care pharmacist 
hours for all specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
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Glossary of Terms 
Clinical incident Any unplanned event which causes, or has the potential to 
cause, harm to a patient, including when an incident is 
intercepted before causing harm (‘near miss’) (NSW Health, 
2014).   
Clinician A healthcare professional that is directly involved in patient 
care, e.g., physician, nurse, pharmacist. 
Contributing factors  Circumstances or actions that may have played a part in the 
origin or development of the incident (World Health 
Organisation, 2005). 
Drug room A dedicated room for the preparation of drugs prior to 
administration. Controlled drug registers and secure drug 
storage units are located in the drug room (Ministry of 
Health NSW, 2013). 
Drug storage/ 
wastage/security 
The incident involved a problem related to medication 
storage, wastage, or involved a security issue, e.g., incorrect 
storage, loss through leakage, unintentionally discarded, 
tampering, stolen (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019). 
Error type Descriptive classification of error following categorisation 
by ‘problem type’. e.g., wrong dose, wrong drug (National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention, 1998). 
Independent double 
check 
Clinicians separately check (alone and apart from each other, 
then comparing results) each component of prescribing, 
dispensing, and verifying the medicine before administering 
it to the patient (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013). 
Local palliative care 
services  
The three specialist palliative care inpatient services that 
participated in the PERISCOPE project. 
Medication error Any preventable event that may cause or lead to 
inappropriate medication use or patient harm while the 
medication is in the control of the health care professional, 
patient, or consumer (National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 2014). 
Multi-incident 
analysis 
A structures process that enables the simultaneous reviewing 
of multiple clinical incidents with a common theme, to 
identify previously unrecognised patterns and/or trends in 
incident characteristics and contributing factors, which may 
not be apparent when incidents are investigated in isolation 
(Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). 
Narcotic discrepancy The incident involved a discrepancy with a narcotic or a 
controlled drug count, e.g., discrepancy in stock count, 
 xxiv 
incorrect documentation of count (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019). 
Near miss A clinical incident that is intercepted before reaching the 
patient and/or causing patient harm (Ministry of Health, 
2014). 
Opioid delivery The process encompassing opioid prescribing, dispensing, 
preparation for administration, and administering the opioid 
to the patient (Leape et al., 1995) 
Opioid handling 
policy 
Mandated medication handling policy which encompasses 
opioid procurement, storage, supplying, dispensing and 
administration (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013). 
Pro re nata (PRN) Medication administered ‘as required’. 
Problem type 
(medication error) 
Initial categorisation of opioid errors according to where in 
the opioid delivery process the error occurred, e.g., 
prescribing, administration (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019).  
Problem type: 
Administration 
problem 
The incident occurred during the administration process, 
e.g., omission or suspected omission, problem with checking 
procedure, "signing off" or technique, wrong medication, 
dose, timing, route, patient etc. (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019). 
Problem type: 
Dispensing problem 
There was a problem during the dispensing process 
(pharmacy), e.g., problem with labelling, no or delayed 
dispensing, wrong medication, wrong dose/volume (Clinical 
Excellence Commission, 2019). 
Problem type: 
Prescribing problem 
The incident involved a problem with the prescribing of a 
medication, e.g., not prescribed or transcribed when 
indicated, unclear prescription or transcription, wrong 
medication, dose, rate, patient etc. (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019). 
Problem type: 
Presentation problem 
The incident involved a problem with the appearance of a 
medication, e.g., similar colour, size, shape or similarity 
between names (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019). 
Problem type: 
Supply/ordering 
problem 
The incident occurred during the supply or ordering process, 
e.g., stock not ordered or not supplied, incorrect stock 
ordered, insufficient stock ordered or supplied (Clinical 
Excellence Commission, 2019). 
Schedule 8 drug 
register 
A dedicated register where all Schedule 8 medication 
transactions must be recorded, including disposal/destruction 
of expired, unusable or unwanted medications (Ministry of 
Health NSW, 2013). 
 xxv 
Schedule 8 medication 
storage unit 
A separate medication storage unit for Schedule 8 drugs that 
is kept locked when not in immediate use (Ministry of 
Health NSW, 2013). 
Schedule 8 (S8) 
opioid(s) 
Buprenorphine, fentanyl, hydromorphone, methadone, 
morphine, and oxycodone (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013). 
Severity Assessment 
Code (SAC) 
A Severity Assessment Code (SAC) is assigned to all 
reported clinical incidents to direct the level of incident 
investigation and action required, and is informed by the 
consequence of the incident. SAC ratings range from SAC 1 
to SAC 4: 
• SAC 1: serious clinical consequence, e.g., death of a 
patient; extreme risk, must be reported to Ministry of 
Health within 24 hours, triggers root cause analysis 
investigation; 
• SAC 2: moderate to major clinical consequences, e.g., 
patient suffering permanent loss of function unrelated 
to the natural course of their illness; high risk, senior 
management notified, detailed investigation required; 
• SAC 3: minor clinical consequences, e.g., patient 
required increased level of care; medium risk, 
management responsibility specified, practice 
improvement project undertaken; and 
• SAC 4: minimum clinical consequences, e.g., no 
patient injury or increased level of care required as a 
result of incident; low risk, manage by routine 
procedure, practice improvement project undertaken 
(NSW Health, 2014).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the PERISCOPE 
project  
1.1 Overview 
Almost two decades ago, in the seminal report To err is human: Building a safer 
health system, the Institute of Medicine (2000) brought to light the extent of patient 
harm from medication errors in healthcare. Medication errors continue to be one of 
the leading causes of preventable patient harm across all healthcare systems, and 
occur at all steps of the medication delivery process (Australian Commission on 
Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013; Institute of Medicine, 2007). At least one 
quarter of medication error related harms are thought to be preventable (Institute of 
Medicine, 2007). 
In the hospital inpatient setting medication errors occur in approximately one out of 
every five medication doses (Barker, Flynn, Pepper, Bates, & Mikeal, 2002). It is 
estimated that hospital inpatients, on average, experience at least one medication 
error for every admission day, with considerable variations in error rates between  
healthcare facilities (Institute of Medicine, 2007). To date, medication errors remain 
one of the most frequently reported clinical incidents in healthcare in Australia 
(Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019b). 
Research into medication error characteristics, contributing factors, and patient harm 
resulting from medication errors, continues to grow both nationally (Roughead & 
Semple, 2009; Roughead, Semple, & Rosenfeld, 2016), and internationally (Barker 
et al., 2002; Institute of Medicine, 2007; Keers, Williams, Cooke, & Ashcroft, 2013), 
spanning many disciplines and healthcare settings. However, medication error 
research in the palliative care setting continues to be sparse (Currow et al., 2011; 
Dietz, Borasio, Schneider, & Jox, 2010; Dy, 2016), despite the significant 
polypharmacy that is known to occur in this population (Currow, Stevenson, 
Abernethy, Plummer, & Shelby-James, 2007).  
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1.1.2 Palliative care in Australia 
Palliative care is defined as: 
…an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their 
families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, 
through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early 
identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and 
other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual (World Health 
Organisation, 2019, para. 1). 
In Australia, palliative care is provided in all health care settings, including acute 
hospitals, residential aged care and the community (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2018). Despite the plethora of settings in which palliative care can be 
provided, a distinction is often made between palliative care provided in hospitals 
and that provided in the community or in residential aged care (Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare, 2018; Palliative Care Australia, 2018). Palliative care in the 
acute care setting includes care provided in designated hospices, dedicated palliative 
care wards within acute hospitals, and/or outpatient services (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2018; Palliative Care Australia, 2018).  
Patients with palliative care needs requiring management in the acute care setting are 
often cared for by their usual care team (generalist palliative care providers). 
Whereas patients with more complex needs and persistent symptoms that are not 
effectively managed by standard therapies (e.g., pain, swallowing, breathing 
difficulties), are managed by specialist palliative care teams (Palliative Care 
Australia, 2018). The workforce profile of specialist palliative care services differs to 
generalist palliative care services in that care is provided by multidisciplinary teams, 
including medical practitioners, nurse and allied health professionals with specialist 
qualifications and/or skills and experience in palliative care, rather than individual 
medical practitioners. This type of specialist care often takes place within a 
designated specialist inpatient palliative care service (Palliative Care Australia, 
2018).   
 3 
1.1.3 Medication errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services  
Inpatients cared for within a specialist palliative care service are particularly 
vulnerable to exposure to, and harm from, medication errors primarily because they 
are likely to: be older (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018), have 
multiple co-morbidities (Kemp, Narula, McPherson, & Zuckerman, 2009; Myers & 
Lynn, 2001), be living with an advanced illness (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2018), and be receiving numerous medications (Currow et al., 2007; 
Raijmakers et al., 2013). Additionally, the average length of stay for palliative 
inpatients is almost four times longer than for other hospitalisations (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018), which also increases their risk of exposure to 
medication errors (Institute of Medicine, 2007). 
Compounding the risk of harm from medication errors in palliative inpatients is the 
routine use of opioids to manage pain and other symptoms, such as chronic 
breathlessness and cough (Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management Working 
Group, 2013; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018). Opioids are on the 
World Health Organisation’s Model List of Essential Medicines (2017) as they are 
considered the most efficacious, safe and cost–effective medicines for pain and 
palliative care. In Australia, opioids are the cornerstone of pharmacological cancer 
pain management and widely used in the palliative care setting (Australian Adult 
Cancer Pain Management Working Group, 2013; Therapeutic Guidelines Limited, 
2016; World Health Organisation, 2018). Approximately half of Australian palliative 
patients have a diagnosis of cancer (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018) 
and will experience pain during their disease trajectory, including as the disease 
progresses to the terminal phase (van den Beuken-van Everdingen et al., 2007). Half 
the Australian palliative patient population is aged 75 years and over (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018), placing them at increased risk of medication 
error related harms by virtue of their age alone (Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care, 2017; Myers & Lynn, 2001).  
Opioids are classified as ‘high-risk’ medicines as they have a narrow therapeutic 
index and margin of safety (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019d; Cohen, 
Smetzer, Tuohy, & Kilo, 2007). The error rate of high-risk medicines is not 
necessarily higher than with other medicines; however, the patient consequences of a 
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high-risk medicine error can be catastrophic if these medicines are prescribed or 
administered incorrectly (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019d; Institute for Safe 
Medication Practices, 2012). Opioids are one of the most frequently reported drug 
classes involved in medication errors causing patient harm (Colquhoun, Koczmara, 
& Greenall, 2006; Dy, Shore, Hicks, & Morlock, 2007; Prairie Research Association, 
2014), including fatal and serious non-fatal outcomes (Moore, Cohen, & Furberg, 
2007; National Patient Safety Agency, 2008; Phillips et al., 2001). 
Despite the considerable potential for harm with high-risk opioids, in an already 
vulnerable patient population, very little is known about the scope and patient impact 
of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services. The Perceptions, 
Impact and Scope of medication errors with Opioids in Australian specialist 
palliativE care inpatient services project (‘PERISCOPE project’) sought to explore 
opioid errors in this specialist inpatient setting, to address this knowledge gap. This 
chapter describes the impetus for the PERISCOPE project, outlines the structure of 
this thesis, and the key concepts used throughout the thesis.   
1.2 Impetus for the PERISCOPE project  
The PERISCOPE project emerged from the concerns of senior palliative and cancer 
care clinicians (doctors, nurses and pharmacists) from one Australian cancer research 
network in New South Wales (NSW). As part of a larger study (Phillips, Heneka, 
Hickman, Lam, & Shaw, 2017) palliative and cancer care clinicians identified 
reducing opioid errors as a quality improvement priority within their inpatient 
services. Clinicians from within this cancer research network were subsequently 
invited to attend a series of priority setting workshops (‘workshops’) (Sibbald, 
Singer, Upshur, & Martin, 2009) to explore the scope of opioid errors in their 
respective services. This process was undertaken as part of the planning phase for a 
future palliative and cancer care quality improvement project across the cancer 
research network (Heneka, Shaw, Azzi, & Phillips, 2018a). 
These palliative and cancer care clinicians’ perceived that opioid errors were 
occurring regularly in their services and contributed to iatrogenic patient harm, 
warranting targeted quality improvement strategies. However, clinicians 
acknowledged that characterising and quantifying opioid errors was challenging, and 
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suggested that it was unlikely all opioid errors were reported, particularly if the error 
did not reach the patient (Heneka et al., 2018a).  
Clinicians suggested that opioid conversion errors were potentially the most 
prevalent opioid error type, particularly conversions between different routes of 
administration, or between long acting and short acting opioids. Human error, and 
gaps in clinicians’ skills and knowledge were perceived to be key error contributory 
factors. The time consuming nature of opioid delivery itself, (i.e., independent 
double checking, documentation), compared to other non-high risk medicines, was 
also considered an error contributory factor (Heneka et al., 2018a). The priority 
setting exercise highlighted the need for a more in-depth exploration of opioid errors 
in palliative and cancer care services to better understand the magnitude of the 
problem, and to identify areas for targeted interventions to reduce opioid errors in 
these settings.  
While the impetus for the PERISCOPE project was driven by both palliative and 
cancer care clinicians, a pragmatic decision was made to focus on palliative care 
services in the PERISCOPE project. 
Opioid errors in palliative care services  
While a small number of studies have explored medication errors in palliative care 
services, these studies were limited to reporting of medication error rates generally, 
and did not differentiate between the drugs involved in the error (Boyer, McPherson, 
Deshpande, & Smith, 2009; Gibbs, 2007; MacLeod, Fletcher, & Ogles, 2011; Taylor, 
Fisher, & Butler, 2010). At the commencement of the PERISCOPE project, there 
were no systematic reviews examining opioid errors specifically in palliative and/or 
cancer care settings. 
Given the paucity of research in opioid errors in the palliative care context, and the 
insights from clinicians following the priority setting workshops, there was a need to: 
identify opioid error prevalence, patient impact and characteristics; understand the 
individual and systems factors that may be contributing to opioid errors; and 
determine opioid error mitigating factors in this clinical setting. The PERISCOPE 
Project’s program of doctoral research was designed to explore each of these factors, 
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and to develop a series of recommendations to support safe opioid delivery in 
Australian specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
1.3 Project aim 
The PERISCOPE project aimed to identify the: i) burden and characteristics of 
opioid errors, and ii) actions required to support safe opioid delivery within specialist 
inpatient palliative care services. 
1.4 Research questions 
To answer the research aim, the following research questions were employed in the 
PERISCOPE project: 
i) What is the prevalence, patient impact and characteristics of opioid errors 
reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
ii) What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
iii) What are the opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services?; and   
iv) How can specialist palliative care inpatient services support and strengthen 
safe opioid delivery practices? 
1.5 Thesis outline 
To answer the research questions, this doctoral research project employed a two-
phase, pragmatic, sequential explanatory mixed methods research design (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2018), guided by a multi-incident analysis conceptual framework 
(Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012) and the Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors framework (Lawton et al., 2012).  
The PERISCOPE project comprised five discrete but inter-related studies, and to 
date has generated five peer-reviewed journal publications (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, 
Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018c, 2018d, 2019a, 2019b; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, & Phillips, 
2015) and one unpublished report (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 
2018b). Studies 1 and 4 are presented within the thesis as stand-alone chapters; 
Studies 2 and 3 are reported in a single chapter; Study 5 is presented in two chapters. 
Chapters containing the published studies have been lightly edited to minimise 
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repetition and provide a logical flow across the thesis. The structure and content of 
the thesis is presented in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Thesis outline 
Sequence Content Chapter 
Preliminary Introduction to the PERISCOPE project  One 
Phase 1 Study 1: Systematic literature review of opioid error 
prevalence, patient impact and characteristics in 
palliative care and cancer services  
Two 
Research design, conceptual frameworks and methods Three 
Study 2: Retrospective review of clinical incidents with 
opioids reported by palliative and cancer care services 
through a state-wide clinical incident monitoring system   
Four 
Study 3: Retrospective review of reported clinical 
incidents with opioids in local palliative care services 
Four 
Study 4: Retrospective review of reported opioid error 
contributory factors in local palliative care services 
Five 
Phase 2 Study 5: Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
exploring palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of opioid 
error contributory factors  
Six 
 Study 5: Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
exploring palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of opioid 
error mitigating factors 
Seven 
Conclusion and 
recommendations 
Data integration and synthesis  
Recommendations to support safe opioid delivery in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services   
Eight 
 
 
1.6 Key concepts 
This section outlines key concepts used throughout the PERISCOPE project related 
to opioid prescribing and administration.  
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1.6.1 Opioids 
The opioids of interest in the PERISCOPE project were those categorised as 
Schedule 8 medicines (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013), also labelled as strong 
opioids by the World Health Organisation (1996). In Australia these Schedule 8 
opioids (‘opioids’) include: buprenorphine, fentanyl, hydromorphone, methadone, 
morphine, and oxycodone, all of which are classified as high risk medicines (Clinical 
Excellence Commission, 2019d; Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2012).   
1.6.2 Medication handling in NSW Public Health Facilities 
All Australian public health facilities, including NSW palliative care inpatient 
services, must adhere to the mandated medication handling policy, which encompass 
medication procurement, storage, supplying, dispensing and administration (Ministry 
of Health NSW, 2013). There are specific, additional requirements for all Schedule 8 
medicines including opioids (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013, 2015). These 
requirements include: 
• a record of all Schedule 8 medication transactions must be kept in a drug 
register, including disposal/destruction of expired, unusable or unwanted 
medications;  
• all Schedule 8 medications must be stored in a separate Schedule 8 
medication storage unit that is kept locked when not in immediate use; 
• balance checks of the Schedule 8 drug register against the physical balance in 
the Schedule 8 medication storage units must be undertaken at least once 
every 24 hours; 
• a witness to all steps in the Schedule 8 medication transaction (i.e., removal 
of the medication from the S8 storage unit, preparation, discarding, recording 
in the S8 drug register, transfer and administration to the patient) is required;  
• a second person check prior to administration (i.e., confirming patient 
identity, correct drug, dose, device settings and countersigning administration 
on the medication chart), using independent double check principles is 
required; 
• where a second person check or witness is required, the check should be 
undertaken using independent double check principles, i.e., the clinicians 
separately check (alone and apart from each other, then comparing results) 
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each component of prescribing, dispensing, and verifying the medicine before 
administering it to the patient (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013). 
1.6.3 Incident reporting in NSW 
In the NSW public health system, policy mandates that all NSW health services staff 
are responsible for reporting any identified clinical incidents via the services incident 
management system (NSW Health, 2014). A clinical incident is defined as ‘any 
unplanned event resulting in, or with the potential for, injury, damage or other loss’ 
(NSW Health, 2014, p. 3) and includes ‘near misses’ (i.e., when an incident is 
intercepted before causing patient harm) (NSW Health, 2014).  
Statewide clinical incident reporting was implemented in NSW in 2005, and is 
administered by the Clinical Excellence Commission (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019c). The Clinical Excellence Commission is a board-governed 
statutory health corporation, established to promote and support improved clinical 
care, safety and quality in the NSW public health system (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019a). A key role of the Clinical Excellence Commission is the 
provision of clinical incident management reports, based on analysis of incidents 
reported by NSW health services. Reports include the number of clinical incident 
notifications, incident severity and principal incident type. Analysis of incident 
information informs projects and programs developed in response to clinical incident 
reporting to improve patient care (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019c).  
At the time of this project, mandated incident reporting was undertaken using one of 
two electronic incident management/reporting systems in NSW: the Incident 
Information Management System (IIMS) or Riskman. Reported incidents are 
provided by the individual service to the Clinical Excellence Commission, where 
incidents are reviewed and analysed to identify significant issues, risks and trends 
relating to clinical care (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019b; NSW Health, 
2014).  
Incidents are classified according to one of 19 Principal Incident Types (e.g., 
medication/IV fluid, clinical management, fall). Medication related incidents are 
further classified in the electronic system using a pre-defined drop-down ‘problem 
type’ (e.g., prescribing or administration problem). Additional incident details can 
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also be documented in the free-text incident description field at the time of reporting, 
including incident description, patient impact/outcome, error contributing factors, 
and actions taken by the service following the incident. However, apart from incident 
description, completion of the remaining fields is not compulsory (Clinical 
Excellence Commission, 2019b; NSW Health, 2014).  
All incidents are also assigned a ‘Severity Assessment Code’ (‘SAC’) to direct the 
level of investigation and action required (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019b). 
SAC ratings determine the level of incident investigation and action required, and are 
informed by the consequence of the incident (i.e., the degree of patient harm), and 
the action required following the incident: 
• SAC 1: serious clinical consequence, e.g., death of a patient; extreme risk, 
must be reported to Ministry of Health within 24 hours, triggers root cause 
analysis investigation; 
• SAC 2: moderate to major clinical consequences, e.g., patient suffering 
permanent loss of function unrelated to the natural course of their illness; 
high risk, senior management notified, detailed investigation required; 
• SAC 3: minor clinical consequences, e.g., patient required increased level of 
care; medium risk, management responsibility specified, practice 
improvement project undertaken; and 
• SAC 4: minimum clinical consequences, e.g., no patient injury or increased 
level of care required as a result of incident; low risk, manage by routine 
procedure, practice improvement project undertaken (NSW Health, 2014).  
The tables used to determine SAC ratings in NSW Health can be found in Appendix 2. 
1.7 Summary 
Palliative inpatients are at heightened risk of exposure to, and harm from, opioid 
errors. Despite routine opioid use in specialist palliative care inpatient services to 
manage pain and other symptoms, little is known about opioid error prevalence, 
patient impact, or error contributing factors. The PERISCOPE project undertook a 
detailed and systematic examination of opioid errors in the specialist palliative care 
inpatient services context. This research aims to inform future strategies to support 
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safe opioid delivery in the palliative care service delivery context, and ultimately 
reduce the burden of iatrogenic harm for palliative patients.  
As there are many terms used to define the range of medication errors and classify 
the patient consequences of error (Lisby, Nielsen, Brock, & Mainz, 2010) these 
definitions are described in detail at the start of Chapter 2. These definitions are 
described at the outset of the thesis as the PERISCOPE project sought to apply 
standardised definitions of medication error types and patient impact throughout the 
project to guide data collection and analysis (Allan & Barker, 1990; Lisby et al., 
2010). Adopting a standardised definitions of medication error types was considered 
essential as inconsistency in error taxonomy is known to directly contribute to the 
substantial variations in the reported characteristics and patient outcomes of 
medication errors, and limits reliable comparisons of medications error findings 
across studies (Lisby et al., 2010).  
Once these definitions have been presented, the remainder of Chapter 2 reports on 
the first study undertaken in the PERISCOPE project, a systematic review. This 
systematic review sought to quantify the prevalence and patient impact of opioid 
errors in the palliative care setting.  
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Chapter 2: Prevalence, patient impact and 
characteristics of opioid errors in 
adult palliative and cancer care 
settings: A review of the evidence  
2.1 Chapter preface 
Chapter 2 details the standardised definitions used to classify opioid errors and 
patient harm in the PERISCOPE project data. This chapter also reports a systematic 
review of opioid errors in palliative and cancer care settings. 
2.2 Applying standardised definitions of opioid errors and patient 
harm to the PERISCOPE project data 
As noted in Chapter 1, the multiplicity of terms used to define medication errors and 
categorise patient harm following error, contributes to considerable variations in 
reporting practices (Lisby, Nielsen, Brock, & Mainz, 2010). Unlike other 
epidemiological fields in healthcare, no single agreed definition is currently used to 
classify medication errors globally; although, attempts have been made to 
standardise medication error classifications (e.g., the National Coordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (1998) Taxonomy of Medication 
Errors). As such, the PERISCOPE project sought to apply standardised medication 
error taxonomies and classifications of patient harms from error. Throughout the 
project, standardised definitions of:  i) problem type, ii) error type, and iii) patient 
harm, were employed to guide data collection and analysis (Allan & Barker, 1990; 
Lisby et al., 2010). These definitions are described below. 
2.2.1 Problem type  
As detailed in Chapter 1, clinical incidents in NSW are classified into one of 19 
‘Principal Incident Types’ at the time of reporting (Clinical Excellence Commission, 
2019a). For the purposes of the PERISCOPE project, clinical incident data were 
extracted from incidents notified under the principal incident type ‘medication/IV 
fluid’, under which any medication related incidents are reported. Incidents were 
then further categorised into problem type, according to where in the medication 
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delivery process the incident occurred (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019a). 
Definitions of problem types are described below: 
• Prescribing problem: the incident involved a problem with the prescribing of 
a medication, e.g., not prescribed or transcribed when indicated, unclear 
prescription or transcription, wrong medication, dose, rate, patient etc.;  
• Dispensing problem: there was a problem during the dispensing process 
(pharmacy), e.g., problem with labelling, no or delayed dispensing, wrong 
medication, wrong dose/volume; 
• Administration problem: the incident occurred during the administration 
process, e.g., omission or suspected omission, problem with checking 
procedure, "signing off" or technique, wrong medication, dose, timing, route, 
patient etc.;  
• Supply/ordering problem: the incident occurred during the supply or ordering 
process, e.g., stock not ordered or not supplied, incorrect stock ordered, 
insufficient stock ordered or supplied;  
• Near miss: an incident of any problem type listed above, that is intercepted 
before reaching the patient (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019a). 
2.2.2 Error type 
Following categorisation by problem type, a descriptive classification of the opioid 
incident (‘error type’) (e.g., wrong drug, omitted dose, etc.) was undertaken using the 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
taxonomy (‘taxonomy’) (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention, 1998) as outlined in Table 2.1. This taxonomy was 
developed in the United States (US) in the late 1990s, in response to the need for a 
standardised language and structure for medication error reporting (National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 1998). As an 
equivalent Australian taxonomy could not be identified, this taxonomy was used 
throughout the PERISCOPE project. 
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Table 2.1 Classification of error type, adapted from the National Coordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention taxonomy (1998) 
1.  Omitted dose (the failure to administer an ordered dose to a patient before the next 
scheduled dose, if any; this excludes patients who refuse to take a medication or a 
decision not to administer) 
2.  Wrong dose 
2.1 Resulting in overdose 
2.2 Resulting in under dose  
2.3 Extra dose  
3.  Wrong strength/concentration  
4.  Wrong drug  
5.  Wrong dosage form  
6.  Wrong technique  
7.  Wrong route of administration  
8.  Wrong rate  
           8.1 Too fast  
           8.2 Too slow  
9.  Wrong duration  
10.  Wrong time (administration outside a predefined time interval from its scheduled 
administration time, as defined by each health care facility)  
11.  Wrong patient  
12.  Monitoring error (includes contraindicated drugs)  
12.1  Drug-Drug Interaction  
12.2  Drug-Food/Nutrient Interaction  
12.3  Documented Allergy  
12.4  Drug-Disease Interaction  
12.5 Clinical  
13. Deteriorated drug error (dispensing drug which has expired)  
14. Other (any medication error that does not fall into one of the above)  
 
2.2.3 Patient harm 
As described in Chapter 1, all reported clinical incidents are assigned a SAC rating 
informed by the clinical consequence of the incident (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019a). However, SAC ratings do not explicitly identify the nature of 
patient harm as a result of the incident (e.g., patient required monitoring to preclude 
harm from the incident). As a result, the patient impact of opioid errors identified in 
the PERISCOPE project was additionally categorised using the National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention Index for 
Categorising Medication Errors (‘index’) (Hartwig, Denger, & Schneider, 1991). 
This index categorises the degree of patient harm from medication errors 
specifically, using nine categories ranging from circumstances that have the capacity 
to cause error (Category A) to an error occurred that may have contributed to or 
resulted in the patients’ death (Category I), and is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention Index for Categorising Medication Errors (Hartwig 
et al., 1991) 
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Summary 
This section has described the standardised definitions used throughout the 
PERISCOPE project to classify opioid errors and patient harm. The following 
section reports the systematic literature review undertaken as the first study in the 
PERISCOPE project. 
2.3 Systematic review of the literature 
This systematic review was undertaken following the priority setting workshops with 
senior palliative and cancer care clinicians, reported in Chapter 1 (Heneka, Shaw, 
Azzi, & Phillips, 2018), to further explore opioid error prevalence, error type and 
patient harm in palliative and cancer care settings. Both palliative and cancer care 
settings were included in the systematic review as over three-quarters (78%) of 
Australian patients utilising palliative care service have a cancer diagnosis 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014). Additionally, opioids are the 
cornerstone of pharmaceutical cancer pain management and their use is common in 
cancer settings (World Health Organisation, 1996).  
2.4 Publication reference and citations 
This systematic review was published in 2015 in Palliative Medicine, a peer 
reviewed scholarly journal targeting palliative care clinical practice. This chapter 
contains an edited version of the published systematic review (Appendix 1). 
Heneka, N., Shaw, T., Rowett, D., & Phillips, J. (2015). 
Quantifying the burden of opioid medication errors in adult 
oncology and palliative care settings: a systematic review. 
Palliative Medicine, 30(6), 520-532.  
Palliative Medicine: Impact factor: 3.78; ISI JCR Ranking 2017: 15/94 (Health Care 
Sciences & Services), 24/154 (Medicine, General & Internal), 28/180 (Public, 
Environmental & Occupational Health). 
This systematic review has been cited in the following publications/articles: 
1. Yardley, I., Yardley, S., Williams, H., Carson-Stevens, A., & Donaldson, L. J. 
(2018). Patient safety in palliative care: A mixed-methods study of reports to a 
national database of serious incidents. Palliative Medicine, 32(8), 1353–1362.   
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2. Bicket, M. C., Kattail, D., Yaster, M., Wu, C. L., & Pronovost, P. (2017). An 
analysis of errors, discrepancies, and variation in opioid prescriptions for adult 
outpatients at a teaching hospital. Journal of Opioid Management, 13(1), 51. 
3. O'Brien, H., Kiely, F., & Carmichael, A. (2017). Doctor-Related Medication 
Safety Incidents on a Specialist Palliative Medicine Inpatient Unit: A 
Retrospective Analysis of Three Years of Voluntary Reporting. Journal of Pain 
& Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy, 31(2), 105-112.  
4. Müller-Busch, H. C. (2017). (Patient Safety and Critical Incidents in Palliative 
Care). Zeitschrift für Palliativmedizin, 18(04), 194-202. 
2.5 Overview 
Globally, medication errors are one of the leading patient safety risks and the most 
common type of health care error (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). Whilst 
there is great variation across healthcare services and facilities, reported medication 
errors account for approximately 20% of hospital errors (Barker, Flynn, Pepper, 
Bates, & Mikeal, 2002; Thomas & Brennan, 2000). This equates to, on average, at 
least one medication error per inpatient per day (Institute of Medicine, 2007). 
Although medication errors are more likely to result in serious patient harm and 
death than other incident types (Phillips et al., 2001), they are often under-reported 
(Levinson, 2012) or undetected by hospital staff, even in health care settings with 
established incident reporting systems (Westbrook et al., 2015). In a recently 
published study comparing medication errors in acute care, identified by audit versus 
errors reported to an incident system, only 1.2 incident reports per 1000 identified 
prescribing errors were identified (Westbrook et al., 2015). Additionally, there were 
nil incident reports by clinicians for over 2000 clinical administration errors 
identified during direct observation (Westbrook et al., 2015), suggesting the error 
rate above could be even higher than currently reported. 
Medication administration may appear to be a relatively simple process; however, 
there is huge scope for error at each of the more than 30 individual steps involved in 
the delivery of a single dose of medication (Leape, 2006). Whilst there is no 
standardised definition of ‘medication error’ (Lisby et al., 2010), the National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, on their 
website, defines a medication error as: 
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…any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the 
control of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such 
events may be related to professional practice, health care 
products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing, order 
communication, product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature, 
compounding, dispensing, distribution, administration, education, 
monitoring, and use (2014, para. 1).  
As previously described, medication error categories have also been developed to 
help standardise reporting and define the relationship between error type and harm 
(Hartwig et al., 1991; National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention, 1998). Error categories include errors of prescribing, dispensing, and 
administration (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019a), with the relationship 
between error and harm ranging from potential for error (no harm to patient) to 
patient death as a result of an error (Hartwig et al., 1991).   
2.5.1 Medication errors in palliative and cancer care settings 
Numerous patient-related risk factors, such as advanced age, impaired hepatic or 
renal function, cognition, chronic comorbidities and polypharmacy are associated 
with an increased risk of medication error (Lesar, Briceland, & Stein, 1997; Myers & 
Lynn, 2001). Medication errors disproportionally affect patients receiving cancer 
treatments and those nearing the end of life due to frailty, the seriousness of their 
illnesses, the complexity of their treatment regimen(s), and the adverse impact of 
errors on vulnerable patient populations (Myers & Lynn, 2001; Thomas & Brennan, 
2000).  
Although several studies report medication errors in adult cancer care, the majority 
of these errors relate to chemotherapeutic agents, with few studies reporting errors 
due to other commonly used medications to manage cancer symptoms (Butts & Jatoi, 
2011; Ford, Killebrew, Fugitt, Jacobsen, & Prystas, 2006; Muller, 2003; Walsh et al., 
2009). Similarly, there is very little empirical research on medication errors in adult 
palliative care settings (Dietz, Borasio, Schneider, & Jox, 2010).  
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Data from 13 specialist palliative care units in the United Kingdom (UK) reported 
approximately two medication errors per occupied bed per annum across all services 
(Taylor, Fisher, & Butler, 2010). Another UK hospice calculated error rates based on 
estimated total drug administration, reporting an error rate of 0.03% (Gibbs, 2007). 
Medication error rates of 2.3 errors/month and 1.3 errors/month were reported in 
audits of two separate US hospice organisations over an 18 month audit period 
(Boyer, McPherson, Deshpande, & Smith, 2009). A palliative care inpatient facility 
in New Zealand, reported an average of 6.6 medication incidents (actual or perceived 
errors) per month over two years of voluntary reporting (MacLeod, Fletcher, & 
Ogles, 2011). These medication error rates are thought to reflect under-reporting in 
the palliative care setting (Currow et al., 2011; Sirriyeh, Armitage, Lawton, & 
Gardner, 2010), as, in contrast to the error rates reported in the literature, 
approximately two thirds of surveyed palliative care professionals’ perceived 
medication errors to occur moderately often or frequently (Dietz et al., 2013). 
2.5.2 Medication errors with opioids and the potential for patient harm  
In addition to patient-related risk factors, several drug classes are associated with an 
increased risk of medication error.  These drugs are classified as high risk and/or 
high alert medicines because of the heightened risk of causing patient injury or 
catastrophic harm if used in error (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019b; Institute 
for Safe Medication Practices, 2012). Opioids are one example of high-risk 
medicines and are the most frequently reported drug classes in medication errors 
causing patient harm (Colquhoun, Koczmara, & Greenall, 2006; Hicks, 2005). 
Opioid errors have resulted in fatal and serious non-fatal outcomes (Moore, Cohen, 
& Furberg, 2007; National Patient Safety Agency, 2008; Phillips et al., 2001), and 
preventable adverse events leading to patient harm (Smith, 2004). A retrospective 
analysis of opioid errors from an anonymous national medication error reporting 
database identified 644 harmful errors over a seven year period on patient care units. 
Six of these opioid errors resulted in death, with more than half reported as 
administration errors resulting in opioid overdose (Dy, Shore, Hicks, & Morlock, 
2007).  
Opioids are widely used in palliative and cancer care, and are the primary 
pharmacological treatment for cancer pain (Australian Adult Cancer Pain 
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Management Guideline Working Party, 2014; Caraceni et al., 2012; World Health 
Organisation, 1996). In the palliative care setting, opioids are routinely used to 
manage a range of cancer and non-cancer pain and other symptoms, including 
dyspnoea and cough (National Collaborating Centre for Cancer, 2012; Palliative 
Care Expert Group, 2010). In high income countries the majority of patients utilising 
palliative care services have a primary diagnosis of cancer (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2014; Kaasa, Torvik, Cherny, Hanks, & de Conno, 2007; 
National Hospice and Palliative Care Organisation, 2013). Consequently, these 
patients are likely to receive opioids for pain or symptom management during the 
course of their illness.  
Increasingly, the adult palliative and cancer care populations are composed of older 
people (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014) with more than one chronic 
co-morbid disease, which may alter medication pharmacodynamics and 
pharmacokinetics (Kemp, Narula, McPherson, & Zuckerman, 2009; Myers & Lynn, 
2001). This older population is also likely to be taking other medications for 
symptom control, particularly at the end of life (Currow, Stevenson, Abernethy, 
Plummer, & Shelby-James, 2007; Raijmakers et al., 2013). These factors all increase 
this vulnerable groups’ risk of medication error and patient harm (Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2017; Moore et al., 2007; Myers 
& Lynn, 2001). 
The potential for opioid errors in palliative and cancer care populations may also be 
higher due to varying routes of administration (Institute of Medicine, 2007), 
numerous dosage forms with differing potencies, similar drug names (e.g., 
morphine/hydromorphone, oxycodone/OxyContin/MS Contin) and routine dose 
calculation and conversion in the clinical setting (Cohen, Smetzer, Tuohy, & Kilo, 
2007; Dy et al., 2007; Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2012). There is 
emerging evidence that the leading cause of medical error in palliative care is 
associated with drug treatment for symptom control, including opioid prescribing 
and administration (Currow et al., 2011; Dietz et al., 2013; Dietz et al., 2010). 
Notwithstanding the scope for opioid errors in cancer care, few studies report 
medication errors with opioids per se in cancer settings (Butts & Jatoi, 2011).  
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Despite these findings, and the widespread use of opioids, little is known about the 
degree of error reporting, or the prevalence and impact of medication errors with 
opioids (‘opioid errors’) in the palliative and cancer care settings (Currow et al., 
2011; Dietz et al., 2010).  
2.6 Objectives 
The objectives of Study 1 were to: 
i) determine the reported prevalence of opioid errors in adult palliative and 
cancer care settings;  
ii) identify opioid error types reported in these settings; and  
iii) determine the patient impact of opioid errors reported in adult palliative and 
cancer care settings. 
2.7 Method 
Design: Systematic review. 
Reporting of this systematic review was guided by The Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA Statement) (Liberati et al., 2009). 
2.7.1 Eligibility criteria 
Studies were included if they were published in English in a peer-reviewed journal 
and reported empirical data on opioid medication error prevalence, types or impact 
on patients within adult palliative care and/or cancer settings (‘palliative and cancer 
care settings’), including inpatient, ambulatory or community care settings. All non-
empirical studies, such as review articles and case reports were excluded from the 
review. The search was limited to studies published since 1980, reflecting the start of 
significant investment in specialist palliative and cancer care services (Wright, 
Wood, Lynch, & Clark, 2008). 
2.7.2 Information sources and search strategy 
A systematic search of the literature was undertaken between August 1 and August 
31, 2014 using MEDLINE, Embase, Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health 
Literature (CINAHL), the Cochrane Library and Scopus databases. The search 
strategy comprised three sets of terms. Set 1, was designed to capture literature 
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relating to opioid medications. As there is no single, standardised definition of 
“medication error” (Lisby et al., 2010), Set 2 aimed to captured terms relevant to 
‘errors’. A range of search terms relating to medication error, patient safety and 
adverse medication events were employed to capture relevant citations. Set 3 limited 
the papers retrieved to palliative and/or cancer care populations, without limiting 
care settings (i.e., inpatient, ambulatory, community, and home care).  
Terms within each set were combined using the Boolean ‘OR’ operator, and the sets 
were then combined using the ‘AND’ operator. Potential search terms were trialed 
on MEDLINE and mapped to indexed medical subject headings (MeSH). MeSH 
terms and keywords (.mp) identified in MEDLINE were adapted to each database. 
Consultation with a specialist research librarian and subject matter experts from 
palliative care, cancer care, pharmacy and quality and safety, was undertaken to 
ensure the search strategy was appropriate for the proposed review. A full electronic 
search strategy utilising the MEDLINE database is included in Table 2.2. 
Grey literature was searched using Google Scholar, CareSearch Palliative Care 
Knowledge Network, PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) International, The 
Grey Literature Report (New York Academy of Medicine), System for Information 
on Grey Literature in Europe, Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC), 
National Technical Information Service (NTIS), and PsycEXTRA. Additional search 
strategies included hand searching key journals and reference lists of identified 
articles for eligible papers, and searching conference abstracts.  
2.7.3 Data collection process 
A data extraction tool (Higgins & Deeks, 2008) was developed to capture data from 
potentially relevant studies and accommodate the varying methodologies and 
reported outcomes. Fields included: study design; setting; data source/participants; 
medication reported; error definition, measure, prevalence and type; and patient 
outcomes. Data extraction enabled a summary of both quantitative and qualitative 
data and informed the data analysis.   
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Table 2.2 Search strategy example (MEDLINE): conducted August 2014 
1. opioid*.mp. or exp Analgesics, Opioid/ 
2. opiate*.mp. or exp Morphine/ 
3. medication*.mp. 
Set 1 
4. 1 or 2 or 3  
5. error*.mp. or exp Medication Errors/ 
6. adverse event*.mp. 
7. exp Patient Safety/ or safety.mp. or *Safety/ 
Set 2 
8. 5 or 6 or 7  
9. exp Palliative Care/ or exp "Hospice and Palliative Care Nursing"/ or palliative.mp. 
10. "palliative care".mp. 
11. exp Hospice Care/ or hospice*.mp. 
12. exp Terminal Care/ 
13. exp Terminally Ill/ 
14. dying.mp. 
15. death.mp. or *Death/ 
16. "end of life".mp. 
17. cancer.mp. 
18. oncology.mp. or exp Oncology Nursing/ or exp Medical Oncology/ or exp Radiation 
Oncology/ or exp Oncology Service, Hospital/ 
Set 3 
19. 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 
20. 4 and 8 and 19 
21. limit 20 to yr="1980 -Current" 
 
 
2.7.4 Study selection 
The titles and abstracts of all papers were examined by two authors (NH and JP) to 
determine if they met the inclusion criteria. Data from potentially relevant papers 
(n=158) was extracted by one author (NH).  
2.7.5 Bias rating and synthesis of results 
The methodological quality of included studies was assessed by the first author (NH) 
using the “QualSyst” systematic review tool (Kmet, Lee, & Cook, 2004). “QualSyst” 
incorporates two scoring systems to evaluate the quality of both quantitative and 
qualitative research studies. This tool was considered appropriate for critical 
appraisal of the included studies due to the varying study designs. The level of 
evidence for each study was determined using the Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’) evidence hierarchy (Coleman et al., 2009). 
Due to the range of study designs (quantitative and qualitative), synthesis of results 
was guided by the narrative synthesis method of Popay and colleagues (2006). This 
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method provides a framework to systematically and transparently conduct a narrative 
synthesis while minimising the inherent risk of bias inherent in systematic reviews 
which employ a narrative approach to synthesis (Higgins & Green, 2011). 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Study selection 
The initial search of databases yielded 11,351 papers: MEDLINE (n=2970), Embase 
(n=7255), CINAHL (n=644), the Cochrane Library (n=6), Scopus (n=476). No 
papers meeting the inclusion criteria were identified in the grey literature. Removal 
of duplicates resulted in 9521 papers remaining for screening (Figure 2.2). On the 
basis of title or abstract, 9396 papers were excluded leaving 125 papers eligible for 
assessment. Eight additional papers were identified from the eligible papers 
following a hand search of reference lists. Upon further screening, 133 full text 
papers were identified for review, 128 papers were excluded as they did not meet the 
eligibility criteria, leaving five papers (Botterman & Criel, 2011; Dietz, Plog, Jox, & 
Schulz, 2014; Mayahara, Paice, Wilbur, Fogg, & Foreman, 2014; Shaheen et al., 
2010; Turner, Clark, Root, & Hardy, 1994) that reported opioid medication error 
prevalence, type and/or impact in palliative care and/or cancer settings. 
2.8.2 Study characteristics, design and quality 
Five empirical studies reporting opioid errors in palliative care and/or cancer settings 
were included in this review. Methodological quality varied across the studies and 
the heterogeneity of the reported data precluded a meta-analysis from being 
undertaken (Table 2.3). All included studies met level IV evidence criteria as per the 
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Evidence 
Hierarchy (Coleman et al., 2009).  
The majority (n=4) of the studies were published after 2010. All studies were 
undertaken in the Northern Hemisphere, with two studies undertaken in the US and 
one study each from Belgium, Germany and the UK (Table 2.3). These studies 
reported data from: two prospective surveys (Dietz et al., 2014; Shaheen et al., 
2010); a prospective chart audit (Turner et al., 1994), a longitudinal study (Mayahara 
et al., 2014), and a retrospective case series (Botterman & Criel, 2011).  
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Figure 2.2 PRISMA flowchart of studies through the review process 
 
Most studies reported patient data (Botterman & Criel, 2011; Mayahara et al., 2014; 
Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994) with one study reporting palliative care 
clinicians’ perceptions and descriptions of medication error (Dietz et al., 2014). 
Three studies reported chart audit data, respectively assessing general opioid 
prescribing errors in palliative care inpatients and outpatients with cancer pain 
(Shaheen et al., 2010), morphine prescribing errors in cancer inpatients (Turner et al., 
1994), and dosage errors with transdermal fentanyl in newly admitted palliative care 
inpatients (Botterman & Criel, 2011). 
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2.8.3 Settings, participants and opioid medication reported 
Inpatient setting data was reported in the majority of studies (n=3) (Botterman & 
Criel, 2011; Dietz et al., 2014; Turner et al., 1994), with one study reporting both 
inpatient and outpatient data (Shaheen et al., 2010), and another study reporting data 
from the home care setting (Mayahara et al., 2014). Data from all but one study 
(Turner et al., 1994) was generated from the specialist palliative care setting (n=4).  
The vast majority of patients admitted to the palliative care setting had a diagnosis of 
cancer (97%), all of whom had been ordered at least one opioid on or during their 
admission. The home care study (Mayahara et al., 2014) reported data from 
patient/caregiver dyads (n=46), with the majority of patients (63%) having a cancer 
diagnosis.  
Medications were variously described as “opioids” (n=1), which encompassed 
morphine, hydromorphone, methadone, fentanyl and “other” (Shaheen et al., 2010), 
or “analgesic – mild/strong opioid” (n=1) (Mayahara et al., 2014). One study 
explicitly assessed morphine use (Turner et al., 1994), while another study identified 
morphine, diamorphine and fentanyl as opioids of interest, but primarily reported 
data on transdermal fentanyl (Botterman & Criel, 2011). 
2.8.4 Definitions, identification and measure of error  
There were various definitions of “error” employed across the studies, including 
deviations from: opioid dosing strategies from local practice (Botterman & Criel, 
2011), local palliative care prescribing guidelines (Turner et al., 1994); US Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research recommendations (Botterman & Criel, 2011; 
Shaheen et al., 2010), European Association of Palliative Care recommendations 
(Botterman & Criel, 2011; Shaheen et al., 2010), World Health Organisation 
guidelines (Botterman & Criel, 2011; Shaheen et al., 2010), and American Pain 
Society recommendations (Shaheen et al., 2010). In the home care setting, an “error” 
was defined as any deviation by the caregivers from the prescribed analgesic 
medication made by the patient’s health care provider when the analgesic was 
administered (Mayahara et al., 2014). One study examined perceptions of error types 
by palliative clinicians and, as such, did not explicitly define “error” (Dietz et al., 
2014). 
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Table 2.3 Summary of included studies 
Study, 
Year, 
Country 
Design 
 
NHMRC 
level of 
evidence 
(Coleman et 
al., 2009) 
Setting Data source/ 
participants 
Focus Error 
definition 
Error 
measure 
Error prevalence 
(% of patients with 
at least one opioid 
error) 
Quality of 
methods 
(QualSyst) 
(Kmet et 
al., 2004) 
Dietz et al., 
(2014) 
 
Germany 
 
Exploratory, 
cross-
sectional 
survey 
 
IV 
Specialist 
palliative 
care 
institutions 
 
Palliative 
care 
professionals 
(n=46) 
 
Incidents palliative 
care professionals 
perceive as typical 
errors in their 
practice, and 
descriptions of 
events 
Described by 
participants 
 
n/a – 
qualitative 
data only 
reported 
 
n/a – qualitative 
data only reported 
 
20/20a 
Mayahara 
et al., 
(2014) 
 
US 
 
3-day, mixed 
methods 
longitudinal 
study: 
prospective 
survey and 
audit 
 
IV 
Palliative 
care – home 
setting 
 
Patient pain 
and 
medication 
diary 
 
Patient/ 
caregiver 
dyads (n=46) 
Analgesic errors by 
non-professional 
home-hospice 
caregivers 
 
Deviations from 
prescribed 
analgesic 
medication when 
the analgesic was 
administered 
% of 
patients 
where error 
identified 
 
49 
 
18/18b 
 
Botterman 
& Criel, 
(2011) 
 
Belgium 
Retrospective 
chart audit 
 
IV 
 
Specialist 
palliative 
care - 
inpatient 
 
Patient 
charts 
(n=1154) 
 
Patterns of 
transdermal fentanyl 
orders in patients 
admitted to a 
palliative care 
inpatient unit 
Deviations from 
international 
guidelines; frank 
signs and 
symptoms of 
opioid toxicity 
% of 
patients 
where error 
identified 
 
63  
(patients 
prescribed 
transdermal 
fentanyl only) 
15/18b 
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Table 2.3 Summary of included studies (cont.) 
Study, 
Year, 
Country 
Design 
 
NHMRC 
level of 
evidence 
(Coleman et 
al., 2009) 
Setting Data source/ 
participants 
Focus Error 
definition 
Error 
measure 
Error prevalence 
(% of patients with 
at least one opioid 
error) 
Quality of 
methods 
(QualSyst) 
(Kmet et 
al., 2004) 
Shaheen et 
al.,  
(2010) 
 
US 
 
Prospective 
survey 
 
IV 
 
Palliative 
care – 
inpatient 
and 
outpatient 
 
Patient 
charts - 
patients with 
cancer pain 
(n=117) 
 
Identification of 
common errors in 
opioid use through 
assessment of 
clinicians’ opioid 
prescribing practices 
 
Deviations from 
local and 
international 
opioid dosing 
strategies  
% of 
patients 
where error 
identified 
 
70 18/18b 
 
Turner et 
al.,  
(1994) 
 
UK 
 
Prospective 
snapshot 
audit  
 
IV 
 
Specialist 
cancer 
hospital 
 
Patient 
charts 
containing 
morphine 
order 
(N=144) 
 
Pre audit 
(n=73); post 
audit (n=71) 
 
Assessment of the 
quality and quantity 
of clinicians’ 
morphine 
prescribing in 
accordance with 
local palliative care 
unit guidelines, pre 
and post guideline 
review 
Deviations from 
local palliative 
care prescribing 
guidelines 
 
% of 
patients 
where error 
identified 
 
Not defined 
 
7/18b 
 
a Quantitative data scoring system /18; b Qualitative data scoring system /20 
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Three studies identified errors through patient chart audit, either retrospectively 
(Botterman & Criel, 2011) or prospectively (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 
1994). Comparisons of patients’ medication diaries with the analgesic medication 
regimen prescribed by the patients’ health care provider were used to identify errors 
in the home care setting (Mayahara et al., 2014). An anonymous survey asking 
palliative care clinicians’ to describe a typical case in which an error occurred was 
used to identify error types and causes across palliative care institutions (n=168) in 
one state in Germany (Dietz et al., 2014). None of the studies included in this review 
utilised clinical incident reports as a method for opioid error identification or 
employed observations to detect opioid errors in the clinical setting. 
The four studies reporting patient data, reported errors as a percentage of patients in 
which an error was deemed to have occurred, based on comparison to pre-established 
prescribing and dosing criteria. Each study examined differing aspects of opioid use, 
including: general opioid prescribing practices (Shaheen et al., 2010), morphine 
prescribing and administration practices (Turner et al., 1994), fentanyl dose on, and 
during, admission to the palliative care service (Botterman & Criel, 2011), and ‘as-
needed’ (‘PRN’) opioid administration by non-professional caregivers (Mayahara et 
al., 2014). 
2.8.5 Error prevalence 
There was great variation in the reporting of opioid errors across the included studies 
(Table 2.4). One study examined prescribing patterns for patients with cancer pain 
(n=117), incorporating a range of opioids, (i.e., morphine, hydromorphone, 
methadone, fentanyl, oxycodone and “other opioids”) to identify errors in opioid 
prescribing and dosing strategies (Shaheen et al., 2010). This study identified at least 
one incorrect opioid order in 70% of patients with cancer pain over an 80-day audit 
period (Shaheen et al., 2010). Dosage errors were identified in 63% of patients 
(n=199)  prescribed transdermal fentanyl in a study examining patterns of strong 
opioid use in patients newly admitted to a specialist palliative care inpatient unit over 
a seven year period (n=1154) (Botterman & Criel, 2011). Two audits of morphine 
prescribing practices in a specialist cancer hospital were conducted over one day 
each, 13 months apart. The audits were undertaken at baseline (n=73) and following 
changes to the hospital based palliative care departments’ prescribing guidelines 
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(n=71). Whilst the overall prevalence of opioid errors was not directly reported in 
this study, error prevalence by error type ranged from 5% to 81% across both audit 
days (Turner et al., 1994). For non-professional family caregivers in the home care 
setting, administering both strong and mild opioids, an administration error 
prevalence of 49% was reported in a longitudinal study conducted over three 
consecutive days (Mayahara et al., 2014).  
2.8.6 Error type  
The predominant error types in the clinical setting related to deviations from opioid 
prescribing guidelines (Table 2.4). Despite different local and national guidelines 
being utilised across the two studies that audited opioid prescribing strategies for 
patients with cancer (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994), several common 
deviations from opioid prescribing guidelines were identified. These included no 
PRN analgesia ordered for patients with regular opioid orders (17-29% of patients), 
no pre-emptive prescribing of anti-emetics and/or laxatives to treat opioid side- 
effects (15-24% of patients), and incorrect opioid dosing intervals (11-81% of 
patients). One of these studies (Turner et al., 1994) also reported changes in the 
frequency of deviations from opioid prescribing guidelines following a review of 
local guidelines, including errors relating to regular analgesia orders (PRN oral 
morphine only ordered/nil regular analgesia ordered), ordering multiple PRN 
analgesics, and ordering multiple opioids form the same class (Turner et al., 1994). 
A study examining transdermal fentanyl orders prior to admission to a specialist 
inpatient palliative care unit, found patients transferred from hospital or the home 
care setting had been ordered a three-fold higher median oral morphine equivalent 
dose than patients treated with oral, intravenous and subcutaneous morphine 
(Botterman & Criel, 2011). Nearly two thirds (63%) of these patients had signs and 
symptoms of opioid overdose or toxicity noted on or during their admission to the 
palliative care unit (Botterman & Criel, 2011). The majority (70%) of these patients 
had been transferred from hospital to the palliative care unit, and, prior to admission, 
were capable of taking oral analgesia as per opioid administration guidelines, yet had 
been inappropriately prescribed transdermal rather than oral opioids (Botterman & 
Criel, 2011). 
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Table 2.4 Reported opioid error type and prevalence as percentage of patients 
Opioid error type Dietz et al.,  
(2014) 
Mayahara et al.,  
(2014) 
Botterman & 
Criel, (2011) 
Shaheen et al.,  
(2010) 
Turner et al.,  
(1994) 
Deviations from opioid prescribing guidelines % % % % % Pre guideline 
change/ 
% post guideline 
change 
1. No PRN analgesia ordered * * * 17 26/29 
2. PRN oral morphine only ordered/nil regular analgesia * * * * 43/5 
3. Multiple PRN analgesics ordered * * * * 32/* 
4. Opioid side effects not prescribed for * * * 15 24/22 
5. Incorrect dosing intervals * * * 11 81/81 
6. Multiple opioids from same class ordered * * * 10 * 
7. Incident pain not treated * * * 8 * 
8. Incorrect route/ formulation for pain type a * b 8 * 
9. Inadequate trial of initial opioid * * * 5 * 
10. More than one opioid changed at a time * * * 2 * 
11. Inappropriate dose ordered a * 63c * * 
Titration errors % % % % % 
1. Failure to titrate * * * 9 * 
2. Incorrect titration a * * * * 
Opioid conversion errors % % % % % 
1. Incorrect dose conversion for new route a * * 3 * 
2. Incorrect dose calculation for opioid rotation * * * 2 * 
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Table 2.4 Reported opioid error type and prevalence as percentage of patients (cont.) 
Opioid error type Dietz et al.,  
(2014) 
Mayahara    
et al.,  
(2014) 
Botterman 
& Criel, 
(2011) 
Shaheen     
et al.,  
(2010) 
Turner     
et al.,  
(1994) 
Administration errors % % % % % 
1. No analgesic administered * 21 * * * 
2. Too low a dose of prescribed analgesic administered * 9 * * * 
3. Over the counter medication instead of prescribed analgesic administered * 6 * * * 
4. Discontinued prescribed mild opioid administered * 6 * * * 
5. Sedative administered, not prescribed analgesic  * 6 * * * 
6. Too high a dose of prescribed analgesic administered * 3 * * * 
7. Discontinued prescribed strong opioid administered * 1 * * * 
Perceptions of opioid errors % % % % % 
1. Incorrect titration and conversion of opioids a * * * * 
2. Over dosage of opioids caused by fear of the patient’s pain  a * * * * 
3. Inappropriate switch from oral to subcutaneous morphine a * * * * 
Adverse effects % % % % % 
1. “Appearance of adverse drug effects (from opioid over dosage)” a * * * * 
2. “Patient suffers from severe withdrawal symptoms (opioid switching)” a * * * * 
3. Higher pain intensity when analgesic regimen not adhered to * d * * * 
4. Signs and symptoms of opioid overdose or toxicity due to transdermal fentanyl * * b * * 
* Not reported  
a  Qualitative example reported 
b “large majority” - actual numbers not reported  
c Transdermal fentanyl only 
d  Non-professional caregivers’ adherence to analgesic regimen correlated significantly with mean worst pain score: 0.37 (p≤.001) 
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Clinicians involved in a study exploring palliative care professionals’ perceptions 
and experience of error types, acknowledged that wrong route and wrong dose errors 
were common in the palliative care setting; however, these perceived error types 
were not quantified in this study (Dietz et al., 2014). Opioid titration and conversion 
errors were reported in two studies (Dietz et al., 2014; Shaheen et al., 2010), 
accounting for nine percent and five percent of errors, respectively. In the home care 
setting, administration errors by non-professional caregivers were primarily due to 
caregivers withholding opioid analgesia even though it was indicated (21% of 
caregivers), or giving too low a dose of opioid analgesia (9%) (Mayahara et al., 
2014). None of the included studies reported administration errors made by 
clinicians.  
2.8.7 Patient impact 
While patient impact was described in terms of opioid overdose/toxicity and pain 
intensity, none of the studies explicitly rated the degree of patient harm resulting 
from opioid errors. In one study, patients receiving inappropriately high doses of 
fentanyl on admission to a palliative care unit were observed to have frank signs and 
symptoms of opioid overdose or toxicity (details not specified); however, no deaths 
were reported as a result of opioid overdose (Botterman & Criel, 2011). In the home 
care setting, errors with opioid analgesia, administered by nonprofessional caregivers 
occurred in almost half (49%) of all administrations (n=422) over the three day study 
period, with 21% of patients receiving no analgesia when they reported pain 
(Mayahara et al., 2014). This study identified a significant correlation between 
nonprofessional caregiver administration error and mean worst pain score (0.37, 
p≥.001) (Mayahara et al., 2014). Two other studies also noted the importance of 
timely and adequate pain management in patients with cancer pain and how effective 
pain management may be compromised if prescribing guidelines are not adhered to 
(Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994). A qualitative study described palliative 
care professionals’ observations of adverse effects from opioid over dosage and the 
severe withdrawal symptoms caused by inappropriate opioid switching (Dietz et al., 
2014).  
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2.9 Discussion 
Despite the routine use of opioids in palliative and cancer care settings (Australian 
Adult Cancer Pain Management Working Group, 2013; Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, 2014), and the potential for patient harm due to opioid error (Dy et al., 
2007), this review has identified that the scope and patient impact of opioid errors in 
palliative and cancer care settings is an under-explored area of patient safety.  
Opioid error prevalence 
Overall opioid error prevalence in palliative and cancer care settings was difficult to 
ascertain as audit periods in these studies varied, and each study focused on a single 
narrow area of error, such as deviations from local and national opioid prescribing 
guidelines (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994), transdermal fentanyl dosage 
(Botterman & Criel, 2011), or non-professional caregiver opioid administration 
errors (Mayahara et al., 2014). Hence the prevalence of opioid errors in palliative and 
cancer care settings in this review ranged from 17% to 81% .  
While there is also wide variation in reported opioid error prevalence in the acute 
care setting (Carson, Jacob, & McQuillan, 2009; Denison Davies et al., 2011; 
Humphries, Counsell, Pediani, & Close, 1997) these opioid error rates provide the 
best baseline for comparison with the error prevalence rates reported in palliative and 
cancer care settings. A retrospective audit in an acute general hospital in Ireland 
found opioid errors accounted for 12% of all reported medication errors (n=448) over 
a five-year period (Carson et al., 2009). In a  24-hour snapshot audit of medical and 
surgical patients in teaching hospital in the UK, 27% of patient charts with an opioid 
order (n=330) were found to have an opioid error (Denison Davies et al., 2011). In a 
large district general hospital, also in the UK, a prescribing audit of intramuscular 
opioid analgesics over a two week period identified errors in 60% of opioid 
prescriptions (n=120) (Humphries et al., 1997). Outside of acute care, 79% of 
reported analgesic medication errors (n=3949) over a two-year period in US nursing 
homes were related to opioid errors (Desai et al., 2013). Notably, the prevalence of 
opioid errors is often considerably higher in studies where audits of patient charts are 
undertaken (Denison Davies et al., 2011; Humphries et al., 1997) compared to when 
incident reports alone are utilised (Carson et al., 2009), reflecting the widespread 
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under-reporting of medication errors that is known to occur in the clinical setting 
(Levinson, 2012; Westbrook et al., 2015).  
Opioid error types 
The most common opioid errors identified in this review related to under prescribing 
of opioids for cancer pain (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994), failure to order 
PRN analgesia for patients with regular opioid orders (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner 
et al., 1994), incorrect dosing intervals (Shaheen et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1994), 
incorrect route or formulation for pain type (Botterman & Criel, 2011; Shaheen et al., 
2010), and failure to pre-emptively prescribe for opioid side effects (Shaheen et al., 
2010; Turner et al., 1994). Opioid prescribing strategy errors are also commonly 
reported in the acute care setting (Carson et al., 2009; Denison Davies et al., 2011; 
Dy et al., 2007; Humphries et al., 1997; Jenkins, Tuffin, Choo, & Schug, 2005), 
suggesting this is a widespread problem, and not unique to palliative and cancer care 
settings. 
A notable absence in the empirical palliative and cancer care literature were reports 
of opioid administration errors in the clinical setting. A small number of case reports 
have described opioid administration errors in cancer and palliative care populations 
related to wrong route errors (Barrett & Sundaraj, 2003) and wrong dose errors 
(Blinderman, 2010; Butts & Jatoi, 2011). Given the routine use of opioids in 
palliative and cancer care settings, it is highly likely that opioid administration errors 
are prevalent in this setting, and this warrants further investigation. 
Patient impact 
The harm experienced by patients as a result of opioid errors was not specifically 
reported in any of the included studies in this review, rather patient impact was 
observed relative to pain intensity (Mayahara et al., 2014) and the immediate adverse 
effects from an opioid over dosage (Botterman & Criel, 2011; Dietz et al., 2014). 
The lack of detailed patient harm data resulting from opioid errors prevented an 
assessment of the relationship between error type and patient harm being undertaken. 
2.9.1 Implications for future research 
This review has highlighted the paucity of literature examining and reporting opioid 
error prevalence, type and patient harm in palliative and cancer care settings. As 
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identified in this review, the prevalence of opioid errors in these care settings is not 
readily identifiable, and, in the case of opioid administration errors, not reported at 
all. 
There is scope for future research in the palliative and cancer care setting which 
quantifies and identifies opioid error types, in addition to those related to deviations 
from prescribing guidelines (e.g., opioid administration errors), and identifies the 
degree of patient harm from opioid errors. A comparison of opioid error prevalence, 
patient impact and characteristics in palliative and cancer care settings, relative to 
other acute care settings will be beneficial to better understand opioid errors in the 
palliative and cancer care service delivery context. Reviews of local, state-wide and 
national data on reported opioid errors, categorised by setting, may also be indicated. 
Additionally, exploring palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of opioid error in their 
services, will provide valuable insights into the phenomena of opioid errors from the 
clinician’s perspective.  
2.9.2 Limitations 
This review excluded papers not published in English, which may contribute to the 
risk of selection bias. Data extraction was undertaken by a single reviewer to assess 
eligibility of included studies; however, multiple independent reviewers rated study 
quality (NH, JP, TS). It is possible that some studies may not have been identified 
through database searching due to the multiplicity of terms used to describe 
medication errors (Lisby et al., 2010). Drug interactions with opioids and prescribing 
errors relating to adjuvant medications recommended for use with opioids (e.g., non-
opioid analgesia, aperients, anti-emetics), were not explicitly identified as part of this 
review. The heterogeneity of the data reported in the included studies limits 
generalisability of this review in oncology and palliative care settings. 
2.10 Summary 
This systematic review examined the reported prevalence, types and impact of opioid 
medication errors in palliative and cancer care settings. Despite routine use of 
opioids for the management of cancer pain and end of life symptoms in a population 
already vulnerable to harm from medication errors, little remains known about the 
prevalence, patient impact and characteristics of opioid errors in palliative and cancer 
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care settings. There is a need to further explore opioid error types, other than those 
resulting from deviations from opioid prescribing guidelines, and the degree of 
patient harm resulting from these errors, from both patient data and the perspectives 
of palliative care clinicians, to better understand and address the patient safety issues 
in these vulnerable patient populations. 
The following chapter (Chapter 3) reports the methodology used in the mixed 
methods PERISCOPE project to better understand the prevalence and patient impact 
of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services, and identify opioid 
error contributory and mitigating factors in this specialist setting.    
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Chapter 3: Methods 
3.1 Overview 
As detailed in Chapter 2 there is a paucity of empirical literature reporting opioid 
errors in the palliative care setting (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, & Phillips, 2015). This is 
despite palliative care clinicians’ perceptions that opioid errors are common in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services, contribute to iatrogenic patient harm, and 
are a quality improvement priority (Heneka, Shaw, Azzi, & Phillips, 2018a). Reports 
of opioid error prevalence, opioid error characteristics beyond deviations from 
prescribing guidelines, and the impact of opioid errors on palliative care patients are 
notable gaps in the literature.  
Given this reality, a detailed and systematic exploration of opioid errors in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient services context was considered essential to better 
understand the scope and factors contributing to opioid errors in this specialist 
setting. This doctoral research project was designed to identify the prevalence, 
patient impact and characteristics of opioid errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, and determine how to best support safe opioid delivery practices 
in this clinical environment. 
This chapter details the methodology underpinning this mixed methods doctoral 
research project. It highlights the rationale for choosing a mixed methods design, and 
explains why neither a purely qualitative or quantitative approach would have 
adequately answered the phenomena of interest. The two conceptual frameworks 
used to guide the project are also described. An overview of the research design and 
methods of each of the five studies that comprise the PERISCOPE project are 
presented in this chapter. 
3.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this two-phase, pragmatic, explanatory sequential mixed methods 
doctoral research project were to: 
i) Describe the prevalence, patient impact and characteristics of opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services in NSW; 
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ii) Identify and understand the individual and systems factors that contribute to 
opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services; 
iii) Explore opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services; and  
iv) Integrate these data to determine how specialist palliative care inpatient 
services can best support and strengthen safe opioid delivery practices.  
3.3 Research design 
To answer the research questions, a pragmatic, explanatory sequential mixed 
methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) was selected. This doctoral project 
comprises five discrete but inter-related studies, as summarised below: 
• Study 1: A systematic review of opioid errors reported in palliative care and 
cancer services (Heneka et al., 2015) (reported in Chapter 2);  
• Study 2: A retrospective review of clinical incidents involving opioids in 
palliative care and cancer services reported at a state-wide (NSW) level 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018b) (reported in Chapter 4);  
• Study 3: A retrospective review of clinical incidents involving opioids in 
local specialist palliative care inpatient services in metropolitan NSW 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018d) (reported in Chapter 4); 
• Study 4: Multi-incident analysis of reported opioid error contributing factors 
in local specialist palliative care inpatient services in metropolitan NSW 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018c) (reported in Chapter 5); 
and  
• Study 5: Semi-structured interviews and focus groups with palliative care 
clinicians and service managers (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 
2019a) (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2019b) (reported in 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
The research was guided by a multi-incident analysis framework (Incident 
Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). The alignment of the project’s research 
questions, study stages and research methods are presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Overview of PERISCOPE project research questions, alignment with the multi-incident analysis framework and study methods 
Study Phase Multi-incident 
analysis stage                       
Research questions Method Output 
Phase 1 Stage 1:  
Prepare for analysis 
 
1. What is the prevalence, patient impact and 
characteristics of opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services? 
Study 1: Systematic review  (Heneka et 
al., 2015) 
 Stage 2:  
Understand what 
happened 
 Study 2: Retrospective review of clinical 
incidents with opioids reported by 
palliative care services through a state-
wide clinical incident monitoring system  
(Heneka et al., 
2018b) 
  
Study 3: Retrospective review of 
reported clinical incidents with opioids 
in local palliative care services  
 
Study 4: Retrospective review of 
reported opioid error contributing 
factors in local palliative care services  
 
(Heneka et al., 
2018d) 
 
 
(Heneka et al., 
2018c) 
 
Phase 2 Stage 3: 
Determine how and 
why it happened 
 
2. What are the individual and systems factors that 
contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? 
3. What are the opioid error mitigating factors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services?  
Study 5: Semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups  
 
(Heneka et al., 
2019a) 
(Heneka et al., 
2019b) 
Interpretation Stage 4: 
Recommendations  
 
4. What is required to support and strengthen safe 
opioid delivery practices in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? 
Data integration and meta-inference  
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3.3.1 Defining mixed methods research 
Mixed methods research explicitly integrates quantitative and qualitative research 
data, drawing on the inherent, yet complementary, differences and strengths of each 
method, to better understand complex research problems (Creswell, 2014; Plano 
Clark, 2017). Mixed methods research is now recognised as the third major research 
paradigm, positioned mid-way between the qualitative-quantitative research 
continuum (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). 
Mixed methods are best suited to research problems where one data source may not 
adequately answer the research question(s), where initial results require further 
explanation and/or exploration, or when a research aim is best addressed with 
multiple studies (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). Central to the premise of mixed 
methods research is that the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
provides a greater breadth and depth of understanding, than either approach alone 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). 
As a methodology, mixed methods research encompasses many diverse viewpoints, 
and is defined by a core set of characteristics that combine methods, philosophy and 
research design orientation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Greene, 2006). These 
characteristics include: i) rigorous collection and analysis of both quantitative and 
qualitative data informed by the research questions; ii) integration of quantitative and 
qualitative data by combining/merging, sequentially building, or embedding one data 
set within the other; iii) prioritising one or both forms of data in accordance with the 
emphasis of the research; iv) applying the procedures in a single study, or in multiple 
phases of a program of study; v) framing the procedures within philosophical world 
views and/or theoretical lenses; and vi) combining the procedures into specific 
research designs that guide the study conduct (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). 
As such, mixed methods research extends beyond an ad hoc combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods and/or data in a study (Andrew & Halcomb, 
2009b; Johnson et al., 2007). Rather, the mixed methods approach is informed by 
philosophical assumptions that guide the research design and methods of inquiry. 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) describe these philosophical assumptions as the 
‘worldview’ (i.e., the beliefs and assumptions about knowledge) the researcher 
brings to their inquiry. The researchers’ worldview, in turn, may inform the 
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theoretical lens (e.g., explanatory framework), which directs and shapes the direction 
of the research study, for example, guiding the development of the research questions 
and answers. The methodological approach to the study (e.g., mixed methods), and 
the methods of data collection (e.g., surveys, interviews) are then informed by the 
theoretical lens selected by the researcher (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Crotty, 
1998). Critically, the research methods in a mixed methods study should be selected 
to best, and most fully, answer the research question(s), and reflect the needs of the 
population for whom the research is conducted (Andrew & Halcomb, 2009b; 
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004)  
3.3.2 Reporting a mixed methods study 
The reporting of the PERISCOPE project is guided by the Good Reporting of A 
Mixed Methods Study (GAMMS) guidelines (O'Cathain, Murphy, & Nicholl, 2008). 
Accordingly, the following elements have been included in this thesis: i) the 
justification for using a mixed methods approach to answer the research questions; ii) 
description of the study design purpose, priority and sequence of the methods; iii) 
detailed description of each method including sampling strategies, data collection 
and analysis; iv) identifying and describing where and how data integration occurred; 
v) identifying the associated strengths and limitations of study methods; and vi) 
describing the insights gained from data integration (O'Cathain et al., 2008). 
3.3.3 Rationale for mixed methods in the PERISCOPE project  
Health services research is inherently complex as it seeks to better understand 
multifaceted and dynamic systems of care, service culture, a myriad of clinical 
processes, and individual clinician/patient behaviours and perceptions (Curry et al., 
2013; Fetters, Curry, & Creswell, 2013). Accordingly, both quantitative and 
qualitative forms of data are often required to answer research questions posited in 
the health services research context (Creswell, Klassen, Plano Clark, & Smith, 2011). 
Combining both quantitative and qualitative methods allows for deeper insight into 
complex health services research problems, and facilitates a broader understanding 
of the issues at hand (Andrew & Halcomb, 2009a; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). As 
a result, mixed methods research is rapidly growing in health science and health 
services research (Creswell, 2014; Doyle, Brady, & Byrne, 2016; NIH Office of 
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Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2018), and has gained traction as a particularly 
useful approach for palliative care research specifically (Morag et al., 2013). 
3.3.4 Contextualising the need for a mixed methods design  
The PERISCOPE project sought to explore the phenomenon of opioid errors in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient service delivery context. Medication error research 
has been undertaken for over 50 years (Flynn & Barker, 2007) with several seminal 
studies published since 1990 (Allan & Barker, 1990; Barker, Flynn, Pepper, Bates, & 
Mikeal, 2002; Leape et al., 1995; Leape et al., 1991). The goals of medication error 
research include: measuring rates of medication errors within a specific service(s); 
identifying error characteristics; identifying error causes/contributing factors; 
comparing the accuracy of medication administration rates associated with various 
drug distribution systems; and assessing the effectiveness of medication error 
detection and prevention techniques (Allan & Barker, 1990; Flynn & Barker, 2007).  
There are numerous methods used to identify medication errors including review of 
clinical incident data, retrospective patient chart review, direct observation, and 
trigger tools (Flynn & Barker, 2007; McLeod, 2015). Direct observation, although a 
validated method for detecting administration errors (Flynn, Barker, Pepper, Bates, 
& Mikeal, 2002), is costly, and was beyond the scope of practice of the doctoral 
researcher (NH), who does not have a clinical background. Trigger tools (i.e., the 
identification of specific events to trigger a detailed incident review, such as the use 
of specific antidotes) (Resar, Rozich, & Classen, 2003) were deemed inappropriate 
as, in the context of opioid errors, would be limited to errors resulting in opioid 
overdose, which were treated with an opioid reversal agent, such as naloxone.  
Thus, for the purposes of the PERISCOPE project, a combination of retrospective 
clinical incident and patient chart review was considered the most feasible approach 
given the constraints of a doctoral project and the medication errors of interest. 
Clinical incident data is routinely collected, in a standardised format, in the NSW 
public health system, and was readily accessible at a state-wide and local level. 
While access to patient charts was not possible for the state-wide data (Study 2), 
patient chart review was undertaken in the local participating services (Studies 3 and 
4). Patient chart review in the PERISCOPE project encompassed a review of opioid 
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orders, clinician progress notes, and medication administration records (Flynn & 
Barker, 2007).  
There is, however, a notable disadvantage to clinical incident review as an error 
detection method. Namely, medication errors are known to be widely under-reported 
across all healthcare settings (Flynn et al., 2002; Franklin et al., 2009; Levinson, 
2012; Westbrook et al., 2015). In a recently published Australian study, comparing 
medication errors in the acute care setting identified by audit and/or observation to 
medication errors reported in internal incident management systems, there were only 
1.2 incident reports per 1000 identified prescribing errors. Additionally, there were 
nil incident reports for over 2000 clinical administration errors identified during 
direct observation (Westbrook et al., 2015). The reasons for medication error under-
reporting are multi-factorial, and include: lack of awareness an error has occurred, 
fear of disciplinary action or other repercussions, perceived or actual lack of time it 
takes to report an error, and perceived effectiveness of error reporting (Braithwaite, 
Westbrook, Travaglia, & Hughes, 2010; Lawton & Parker, 2002)  
Hence, while clinical incident data would provide initial insights into opioid error 
characteristics and scope in the specialist palliative care inpatient setting, these data 
were unlikely to accurately reflect actual error prevalence. In order to better 
understand, and verify, clinical incident data, it was imperative that palliative care 
clinicians’ perspectives were sought to answer the PERISCOPE project research 
questions. 
3.3.5 Applying a mixed methods design 
To answer the research questions the PERISCOPE project sought both 
complementarity and completeness by combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Bryman, 2006; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). The PERISCOPE 
project sought to both quantify opioid errors in the palliative care service delivery 
context (clinical incident review) and understand why these errors are occurring 
(clinician’s perceptions, qualitative data), which could not be determined using 
quantitative or qualitative data alone (completeness) (Bryman, 2006). While each of 
the five studies in the PERISCOPE project stand alone, the overall aim of the 
PERISCOPE project is addressed through data integration and meta-inference. 
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3.3.6 Philosophical assumptions  
The PERISCOPE project was guided by an overarching pragmatist worldview. From 
a pragmatist worldview, research begins with a problem to be addressed or a 
question(s) to be answered (purpose). In turn, the research purpose must be 
connected with appropriate procedures that can adequately address the 
problem/question(s). Thus research guided by pragmatism is a process where 
purpose and procedures are actively combined and cannot be considered in the 
absence of one another (Morgan, 2014). 
Pragmatism is typically associated with mixed methods research, as this stance 
privileges the research questions and consequences of the research rather than the 
methods, and supports the use of multiple data collection methods to inform the 
problems being studied (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009). Fundamental to pragmatism is the premise that the research question(s), not a 
method or paradigm, is the impetus for selecting the research design (Muncey, 
2009).  
Pragmatism is not aligned to any single system of philosophy and reality (Creswell 
& Creswell, 2017). Instead, pragmatism prioritises ‘what works’ (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2018), allowing researchers flexibility in their choice of research methods to 
answer the research question (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). As a result, research 
guided by a pragmatic worldview abandons both the use of concepts such as ‘truth’ 
and ‘reality’, and the forced-choice dichotomy between quantitative (post-
positivism) or qualitative (constructivism) methods (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). 
Rather, pragmatism purports that knowledge is about relationships between actions 
and consequences, and can only be acquired through the combination of action and 
reflection (Biesta, 2010). Importantly, the pragmatist worldview is real-world 
practice oriented (Creswell, 2009), making it well suited to exploring phenomena 
under investigation in health services research. 
3.3.7 Theoretical lens 
The theoretical lens used in the PERISCOPE project was grounded in quality and 
safety principles for healthcare, namely, that care is consumer centred, driven by 
information, and organised for safety (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality 
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in Health Care, 2010). These principles directed and shaped the direction of the 
PERISCOPE project which sought to collect and analyse safety and quality data 
(information) to understand and minimise opioid errors (safety) and improve palliative 
patient outcomes (consumer) (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health 
Care, 2010). Informed by these quality and safety principles, two conceptual 
frameworks were employed to guide the project. Firstly, a multi-incident analysis 
framework (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012) facilitated the systematic 
exploration of opioid errors from a patient safety perspective, in congruence with the 
PERISCOPE project research questions. Secondly, the Yorkshire Contributory Factors 
Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) was applied to categorise opioid error contributory 
and mitigating factors using a standardised taxonomy, and guide data analysis and 
interpretation. Both conceptual frameworks, and their application in the PERISCOPE 
project are described in detail in Section 3.4.  
3.3.8 Explanatory sequential mixed methods design 
A two-phase, pragmatic explanatory sequential mixed methods design was 
considered the ideal methodology for the PERISCOPE project given the nature of the 
research questions. The explanatory sequential mixed methods design commenced 
with a predominantly quantitative phase (Phase 1) (QUAN + qual). Classification of 
opioid error types and contributing factors in Phase 1 necessitated some thematic 
coding of clinical incident narratives; however, quantitative data was given priority 
in this phase. Phase 1 was followed by a qualitative phase (Phase 2) (QUAL), which 
allowed for key elements of the quantitative data to be explored in more depth 
(Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the quantitative methods in Phase 1 and qualitative 
research methods in Phase 2 were given equal priority (QUANT → QUAL) in 
addressing the research problem. Figure 3.1 illustrates the study phases and points of 
data integration in the PERISCOPE project. This figure also outlines the study 
procedures (‘procedures’), and the associated data (‘product’) for each study phase 
(Figure 3.1). 
As reported earlier, the researchers were aware of the limitations of the quantitative 
clinical incident data to be collected in Phase 1 of the PERISCOPE project. Namely, 
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under-reporting of medication errors is widespread and unlikely to reflect the actual 
error prevalence or error characteristics (Westbrook et al., 2015). Despite these 
acknowledged limitations of the quantitative data, analysis of reported opioid errors 
was considered a critical first step in the PERISCOPE project. This was due to both 
the paucity of existing empirical literature (Heneka et al., 2015) and an absence of 
benchmarked opioid error data across palliative care services in NSW.  
Secondly, data analysis from Phase 1 of the PERISCOPE project was used to inform 
the question route for the subsequent qualitative study planned for Phase 2. The 
qualitative phase of the PERISCOPE project provided opportunities to explore the 
quantitative data from the perspective of palliative care clinicians, and provide 
additional insights into error reporting practices and perceived error contributory and 
mitigating factors in the participating palliative care services. Participants in Phase 2 
of the project (Study 5) were recruited from the same local palliative care services 
where quantitative data was collected in Phase 1. Given the paucity of data related to 
opioid errors in the palliative care service context, the explanatory sequential design 
lent itself to emergent approaches in the second phase, following analysis of 
quantitative data in Phase 1 (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  
3.3.9 Data integration 
Data integration is a critical component of all mixed methods research (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2018; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). The meaningful and deliberate 
integration of quantitative and qualitative data distinguishes mixed methods research 
from other research methodologies, providing insights beyond what is identified 
from the separate quantitative and qualitative results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).   
There are four key considerations for planning and implementing integrative analysis 
and interpretation in mixed methods research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018): i) the 
intent of the integration; ii) the primary data analysis procedure; iii) the 
representation of the integration results; and iv) the interpretation of the integration 
results, which are outlined below in the context of the PERISCOPE project.  
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Figure 3.1 Visual model for the mixed methods sequential explanatory design procedures in the PERISCOPE project, adapted from Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2018) and Ivankova et al. (2006)
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The intent of the integration was to connect the quantitative and qualitative phases of 
the PERISCOPE project, so that the qualitative data (Study 5) provided a strong 
explanation of the quantitative data (Studies 2, 3 and 4). The primary data analysis 
procedures unfolded over four phases. Firstly, quantitative state-wide data (Study 2) 
and local data (Study 3) were analysed to determine if local data were congruent with 
state-wide data. Secondly, all quantitative data (Studies 2, 3 and 4) were analysed to 
inform the qualitative study phase. Thirdly, the qualitative data (Study 5) were 
analysed and used to follow up on specific data identified in the quantitative phase. 
Finally, data integration of the quantitative results and qualitative findings was 
undertaken to answer the mixed methods research questions.  
The connected, sequential, integration throughout the PERISCOPE project was 
represented using joint displays (Guetterman, Fetters, & Creswell, 2015). Joint 
displays are an increasingly common way of representing the data integration 
process in mixed methods research (Bazeley, 2017; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; 
Guetterman et al., 2015).  In a joint display, quantitative and qualitative data are 
presented side-by-side, enabling researchers to visually display the process of 
drawing inferences from the integrated data (Guetterman et al., 2015; McCrudden & 
McTigue). 
 
For the PERISCOPE project, each joint display comprised five columns representing 
the research question domain, quantitative and/or qualitative data relevant to each 
domain, the degree of data convergence, and the mixed methods inference for each 
domain. An exemplar is provided in Table 3.2. The joint displays visually 
represented the connection between the quantitative and qualitative data across all 
study question domains, and the degree of data convergence in each domain, i.e. 
whether quantitative and qualitative data confirmed (‘confirm’), contradicted 
(‘contradict’) or enhanced (‘enhance’) each other (Fitzpatrick, 2016). They also 
showed how the quantitative results in the first phase of the PERISCOPE project 
were used to guide the development of the question route in the second (qualitative) 
phase of the project. Finally, the joint display tables presented the inferences 
generated through data integration to answer the research questions (Bazeley, 2017; 
Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Guetterman et al., 2015).  
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Interpretation of the integrated data was achieved through data consolidation 
(Caracelli & Greene, 1993) and meta-inference (Greene, 2007; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). Inferences generated during data integration were thematically 
coded to create a new, consolidated, qualitative data set (Caracelli & Greene, 1993). 
Through multiple, sequenced phases of iterative analysis (Bazeley, 2017), this 
process of meta-inference enabled the elicitation of new understandings and 
explanations of factors required to support safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Meta-inference enabled the 
development of a coherent conceptual framework to answer the project aim (Teddlie 
& Tashakkori, 2009) which is reported in Chapter 8.   
3.3.10 Considerations for the explanatory sequential design 
Although the explanatory sequential design is one of the most straightforward mixed 
methods designs, there are specific challenges that require consideration prior to the 
PERISCOPE project commencing: i) the two phase nature of the explanatory 
sequential design requires considerable time for implementation, and participants 
must be available over an extended time period; ii) the qualitative phase cannot be 
fully planned in advance as it is dependent on the results of the quantitative phase; 
iii) similarly, the quantitative results to follow up cannot be identified until 
quantitative data collection and analysis is complete; and iv) careful consideration 
must be given to sampling methods in the second phase in order to best 
explain/elaborate on the quantitative results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; 
Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). 
These potential challenges were addressed in the PERISCOPE project as follows: i) a 
project plan was developed factoring in the potential time span for each study and 
project phase within the constraints of the doctoral candidature; participating services 
were advised of the extended time-frame of the study and committed to participation 
in both study phases; contingencies to extend the project if required were planned; ii) 
a protocol for the qualitative study was drafted early in the PERISCOPE project and 
updated as quantitative data analysis was completed; a separate ethics application, 
and corresponding timeline for the qualitative study, was pre-planned in the project 
plan; iii) a defined timeframe for identification of quantitative data for follow up was 
planned to ensure timely completion of the qualitative study protocol; and iv) 
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purposive sampling at participating study sites was selected as the most appropriate 
sampling strategy (described in Section 3.6.3).    
 Skills of the researcher 
The skills of the researcher also need to be considered when undertaking mixed 
methods research in the context of a doctoral project, regardless of the design chosen 
(Halcomb & Andrew, 2009). The conduct of a mixed methods project requires a 
number of skills including project design, research management, and familiarity with 
both quantitative and qualitative data collection, analysis and integration from a 
mixed methods perspective (Halcomb & Andrew, 2009). Additionally, 
understanding the theories underpinning mixed methods research, and the nuances of 
mixed methods designs can prove challenging for the novice researcher (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2018; Halcomb & Andrew, 2009). 
To address these challenges, the doctoral researcher (NH) was supported to attend 
academic workshops, seminars and conferences (e.g., mixed methods research, 
quality and safety methodologies, data management, statistical analysis, qualitative 
research). An interdisciplinary supervisory team with extensive expertise in mixed 
methods research methodology, health services and palliative care research, and 
patient safety was convened to guide and support the doctoral researcher throughout 
the project (Halcomb & Andrew, 2009).  
3.3.11 Positioning of the researcher 
In all interactions with site teams, potential and/or actual study participants, the 
researcher (NH) openly presented herself as a PhD candidate, with a non-clinical 
background, who was exploring medication errors with opioids in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. This positioning was critical to establish an open 
and transparent relationship with service managers during site engagement and 
throughout the study, as the nature of data collection (both quantitative and 
qualitative) was sensitive and potentially damaging for participating services and 
individual clinicians.  
At the start of each semi-structured interview or focus group, the researcher 
introduced herself to participants, provided an overview of the project and advised 
participants of the interview/focus group purpose. Participants were reassured they 
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would not be asked to disclose any medication errors they had been involved in, that 
they did not have to answer any questions they were not comfortable with, and that 
anything that was discussed in the context of the interview/focus group would remain 
strictly confidential. For focus groups specifically, the researcher asked that all 
discussions that took place remained confidential and requested participants did not 
share anything that was discussed with anyone outside the focus group. This initial 
rapport building was critical to creating an environment where participants felt safe 
to explore opioid errors in their service without fear of consequences. The 
effectiveness of the rapport building was evident in the depth of disclosure given by 
participants. Despite not ever being directly asked to disclose their personal 
experiences with opioid errors, participants readily shared examples of opioid errors 
they had made, and how that had impacted them.  
There were no pre-existing relationships between the researcher and the study 
participants. This, and the fact the researcher was not a clinician, may have enabled 
the open disclosure of participants’ experiences with opioid errors, as they may have 
felt more secure sharing their experiences with someone removed from their service 
and discipline. While the researcher had initial concerns that a lack of clinical 
background may be a barrier to effectively conducting the semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups with clinicians, this concern was unfounded. Clinicians welcomed 
the researcher’s disclosure and suggested data collection and analysis would be less 
prone to clinical and/or confirmation biases in the absence of a clinical background. 
Summary 
Having described the rationale for the use of mixed methods and the selection of the 
explanatory sequential design in the PERISCOPE project in this section, the 
following section unpacks the conceptual frameworks used to guide the project’s 
data collection and analysis. 
3.4 Conceptual frameworks for the PERISCOPE project  
Two complementary conceptual frameworks were used to guide the PERISCOPE 
project. An over-arching multi-incident analysis framework was used to inform 
project implementation, in alignment with accepted methods for clinical incident 
review in healthcare (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). In addition to 
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the multi-incident analysis framework, the Yorkshire Contributory Factors 
Framework was selected to guide classification and data analysis of opioid error 
contributing and mitigating factors (Lawton et al., 2012). Each conceptual 
framework is described in detail below. 
3.4.1 Multi-incident analysis framework 
Increasingly, patient safety incidents are being recognised as resulting from systems 
failures rather than human error alone (Institute of Medicine, 2007; Lawton et al., 
2012; Reason, 2008). Hence, there is value in exploring common causes across 
multiple incidents of a similar nature, to identify system-level changes that are 
contributing to, or could prevent, these incident types in future (Percarpio, Watts, & 
Weeks, 2008). Multi-incident analysis is being increasingly implemented in 
healthcare to facilitate systems-level changes in patient safety (Incident Analysis 
Collaborating Parties, 2012). 
Multi-incident analysis provides a structured process for concurrent review of 
clinical incidents grouped by pre-defined theme, facilitating organisational and 
system-wide learning that cannot be readily achieved through other methods, such as 
root cause analysis (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). Multi-incident 
analysis can also reveal the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of recommended 
actions undertaken following an incident (e.g., tailored education, policy change) 
(Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012).   
The multi-incident analysis methodology is one component of the Canadian Incident 
Analysis Framework, which was developed by the Incident Analysis Collaborating 
Parties (2012) in response to the recognised limitations of root cause analysis in 
healthcare (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012; Percarpio et al., 2008). 
Root cause analysis is typically used in healthcare to determine the characteristics, 
contributing factors and causes of serious safety incidents, such as medication errors 
(Burkhardt, Lee, Talylor, Williams, & Bagian, 2007). The process of root cause 
analysis yields recommendations to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents and 
rules out non-contributory factors (Burkhardt et al., 2007; NSW Health, 2014). 
However, root cause analysis is limited to the investigation of an individual, serious 
incident that has resulted in significant patient harm or death, and does not allow for 
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the concurrent analysis of multiple similar incidents, or incidents with less serious 
patient outcomes (NSW Health, 2014; Percarpio et al., 2008).  
Multi-incident analysis has been widely used in Canada, including for patient safety 
incidents involving medications (Cheng, Yang, Chan, & Patel, 2017; Incident 
Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012; Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) 
Canada, 2008). In Australia, the multi-incident analysis methodology underpins the 
best practice guide to clinical incident management in Queensland (Queensland 
Health, 2014). 
The multi-incident analysis closely aligns with the explanatory sequential mixed 
methods design used in the PERISCOPE project. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the 
multi-incident analysis framework, like the explanatory sequential design, comprises 
distinct, and sequential, quantitative and qualitative data collection stages, which are 
ultimately integrated to generate recommended actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Alignment of the explanatory sequential mixed methods study design 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) with the multi-incident analysis framework (Incident 
Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012) in the PERISCOPE project 
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3.4.2 Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework  
As previously mentioned, in addition to the multi-incident analysis, the Yorkshire 
Contributory Factors Framework (‘framework’) (Lawton et al., 2012) was applied 
throughout the PERISCOPE project to guide classification of opioid error 
contributory and mitigating factors. The framework is depicted in Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.3 Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) 
Reproduced from: Development of an evidence-based framework of factors contributing to patient safety incidents 
in hospital settings: a systematic review, Lawton R, McEachan RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW, Giles SJ, Sirriyeh R, 
Watt IS and Wright J. 21:369-80 2012 with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. (Appendix 3) 
 
This framework was specifically developed for application in the healthcare context, 
and identifies multiple levels of contributory factors to clinical incidents in 
accordance with a systems approach to patient safety (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
2000; Lawton et al., 2012; Reason, 2000). The framework comprises 20 factor 
domains representing active failures (i.e. any failure in performance or behavior of 
the person in direct contact with the patient) (Reason, 1990), situational factors, 
(patient, individual, task or team) and latent factors (e.g., physical environment, 
training and education, policies and procedures) that influence patient safety (Lawton 
et al., 2012). Definitions of each factor domain are listed in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Definition of contributory factor domains, adapted from Lawton et al. (2012) 
Factor Definition 
Active failures Any failure in performance or behaviour of the health professional, 
including slips, lapses, mistakes and violations. 
Situational factors 
Individual factors Characteristics of the person delivering the care that may contribute in 
some way to active failures, e.g., inexperience, stress, attitudes. 
Patient factors Those features of the patients that make caring for them more difficult 
and therefore more prone to error, such as abnormal physiology, 
language difficulties, personality characteristics (e.g., aggressive 
attitude). 
Task characteristics Factors related to specific patient related tasks that may make 
individuals vulnerable to error. 
Team factors Any factor related to the working of different professionals within a 
group that they may be able to change to improve patient safety. 
Local working conditions 
Equipment and supplies Availability and functioning of equipment and supplies. 
Lines of responsibility Existence of clear lines of responsibility clarifying accountability of staff 
members and delineating the job role. 
Management of staff and 
staffing levels 
The appropriate management and allocation of staff to ensure 
adequate skill mix and staffing for the volume of work. 
Staff workload Level of activity and pressures on time during a shift. 
Supervision and leadership The availability and quality of direct and local supervision and 
leadership. 
Latent/organisational factors 
Physical environment  Features of the physical environment that help or hinder safe practice, 
such as the layout of the unit, fixtures and fittings, level of noise, 
lighting, temperature, etc. 
Policies and procedures The existence of formal and written guidance for the appropriate 
conduct of work tasks and processes. This can also include situations 
where procedures are available but contradictory, incomprehensible or 
of otherwise poor quality.  
Scheduling and bed 
management 
Adequate scheduling to manage patient throughput, minimising delays 
and excessive workload. 
Support from central 
functions 
Availability and adequacy of central services to support the functioning 
of wards/units. This might include support from information 
technology, human resources, portering services, or clinically related 
services such as radiology, pharmacy. 
Training and education Access to correct, timely and appropriate training, both specific (e.g., 
task related) and general (e.g., organisation related). 
Latent external factors 
Design of equipment and 
supplies 
The design of equipment and supplies to overcome physical and 
performance limitations. 
External policy context Nationally driven policies/directives that impact on the level and quality 
of resources available to hospitals.  
General factors 
Communication systems Effectiveness of the processes and systems in place for the exchange 
and sharing of information between staff, patients, groups, 
departments and services, including both written (e.g., documentation) 
and verbal (e.g., handover) communication systems. 
Safety culture Organisational values, beliefs and practices surrounding the 
management of safety and learning from error. 
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To better understand the nature of incidents coded as ‘active failures’ (i.e., errors 
made by the clinician), these incident types were further categorised into slips, 
lapses, mistakes, and/or violations, in accordance with accepted human error 
taxonomies (Reason, 1990), namely: 
• Slip: failure to execute an action due to misdirection of a routine behaviour 
(skill based, unintentional), e.g., drawing the wrong drug into an infusion.  
• Lapse: failure to execute an action due to a lapse in memory, resulting in the 
omission of a routine behaviour (skill based, unintentional), e.g., forgetting to 
administer a dose of regular analgesia. 
• Mistake: an error originating from an incorrect thought process or analysis 
(knowledge or rule based, unintentional), e.g., ordering morphine for a patient 
with a known allergy to morphine. 
• Violation: a deliberate deviation from rules, protocols, policies/procedures 
etc., (behavioural choice), e.g., failing to undertake a second person check 
before administering a high-risk medicine. 
Violations were considered in the context of compliance with the state medication 
handling policy (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013), which mandates general principles 
for medication charting/orders and safe medication administration, and additional 
requirements for the recording and safe delivery of scheduled/high-risk medications.  
3.5 PERISCOPE project study settings and participants 
The PERISCOPE project was undertaken in three specialist palliative care inpatient 
services in NSW, from to January 2015 to November 2017. The project’s study 
settings and participants are described below. 
3.5.1 Study settings 
The initial PERISCOPE project studies (Study 1 and Study 2) included both adult 
palliative and cancer care settings because opioids are widely used to manage cancer 
related pain (Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management Guideline Working Party, 
2014; Therapeutic Guidelines Limited, 2016). Investigating opioid errors in both 
palliative and cancer care services provided an opportunity to identify similarities 
and differences in error characteristics and patient impact between services where 
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opioid delivery to manage cancer pain is routine (Australian Adult Cancer Pain 
Management Guideline Working Party, 2014; Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2018). Paediatric services were excluded because of the unique needs of 
paediatric patients, compared to adult patient populations, and ought to be the focus 
of a separate study (O'Leary, Flynn, MacCallion, Walsh, & McQuillan, 2006) 
(Hynson & Sawyer, 2001). The local retrospective review (Study 3) and the 
qualitative study (Study 5) involved three NSW specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
All three participating specialist palliative care inpatient services (‘local services’) 
are situated in metropolitan NSW, Australia. They are all classified as Level 3 
palliative care services, that is, highly resourced services providing for patients with 
complex end of life care issues, staffed by palliative medicine and palliative nursing 
specialists (NSW Ministry of Health, 2016). Services 1 and 2 are larger 40-bed 
palliative care units, while Service 3 is a smaller 20-bed palliative care unit. 
These services were selected based upon existing professional relationships with the 
researcher and the researcher’s doctoral supervisors, which supported the 
researcher’s access. However, only two of the three specialist palliative care 
inpatient services (Service 1 and 3) were able to be involved in Study 4 
(retrospective review of reported opioid error contributing factors). Service 1 and 
Service 3 had ready access to three years of reported clinical incidents involving 
opioids, including comprehensive incident narratives on opioid error contributing 
factors. However, Service 2 was unable to contribute as their electronic medication 
management system had undergone a substantial rebuild two years earlier. This 
rebuild limited access to two years of reported opioid incidents and narrative data 
pertaining to opioid error contributing factors was not available.  
3.5.2 Study participants 
Participants for the qualitative study (Study 5) were recruited from each of the three 
participating specialist palliative care services. These participants included clinicians 
(medical, nursing, pharmacy) and service managers (service/unit managers, quality 
and safety managers) involved in any step of the opioid delivery process or with 
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oversight of the opioid delivery process. Participant recruitment is described in detail 
in Section 3.6.3. 
3.6 Data collection and analysis methods 
In accordance with the multi-incident analysis framework, there are four defined 
stages that determine data collection and analysis methods:  
• Stage 1 - Prepare for analysis;  
• Stage 2 - Understand what happened;   
• Stage 3 - Understand how and why it happened; and  
• Stage 4 - Develop recommended actions (Incident Analysis Collaborating 
Parties, 2012). 
Each of these stages, as they were applied in the PERISCOPE project and the 
corresponding studies, are summarised in Figure 3.4. A detailed description of data 
collection and analysis methods for each stage of the multi-incident analysis in the 
PERISCOPE project is provided below.
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Figure 3.4 Stages of multi-incident analysis and corresponding studies in the PERISCOPE project, adapted from Incident Analysis Collaborating 
Parties (2012)
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3.6.1 Stage 1: Prepare for analysis 
Seek expert opinions to guide data collection and provide local context 
Extensive consultation with service managers, palliative care clinicians (doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists), hospital pharmacists, and hospital quality and safety managers 
at participating services (‘site team’) was undertaken in preparation for the multi-
incident analysis, and throughout the project, to provide local context and facilitate 
data collection.  
Identify analysis theme and inclusion criteria 
In the preparation for a multi-incident analysis, the analysis theme and inclusion 
criteria for clinical incidents are determined (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 
2012). Following consultation with the site teams, the selected theme for the 
PERISCOPE project was: clinical incidents involving Schedule 8 opioids (‘opioids’). 
The analysis theme was restricted to Schedule 8 opioids (controlled drugs) ,versus 
opioids such as codeine (Schedule 4, prescription only), as Schedule 8 opioids are: i) 
the primary pharmaceutical treatment used in palliative care services to manage 
cancer and other pain, and symptoms such as coughing and dyspnoea towards the 
end of life (Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management Guideline Working Party, 
2014; Therapeutic Guidelines Limited, 2016); and ii) the most frequently implicated 
drug class causing patient harm due to medication error (Colquhoun, Koczmara, & 
Greenall, 2006; National Patient Safety Agency, 2008; Prairie Research Association, 
2014). 
Inclusion criteria for the PERISCOPE project encompassed: i) all clinical incidents 
reported via the palliative care services’ internal incident management system which 
involved opioids in adult (≥18 years) patients; and ii) occurred in the palliative care 
service during a pre-defined timeline.  
Reported opioid incidents that did not directly involve a patient, (e.g., narcotic 
discrepancies, drug storage, wastage, and/or security incidents), or opioid incidents 
that occurred in an external service but were first identified and reported by the 
palliative care service, were excluded in the PERISCOPE project. 
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Review literature for background information 
Prior to the PERISCOPE project commencing, consultation with palliative care 
clinicians suggested opioid errors were contributing to iatrogenic harm in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services, and reducing these errors was a quality 
improvement priority (Heneka et al., 2018a). As a result, a systematic literature 
review to determine the prevalence, types and patient impact of opioid errors 
reported in adult palliative and cancer care patient settings was undertaken at the 
outset of the PERISCOPE project (Heneka et al., 2015). The systematic review was 
guided by The Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
(PRISMA) Statement (Liberati et al., 2009). The detailed methodology of the review 
process is reported in Chapter 2. The systematic review was critical to highlighting 
the paucity of empirical research reporting opioid errors in the palliative care service 
delivery context. 
Develop analysis plan 
A data analysis plan was developed a priori in conjunction with a biostatistician for 
each of the PERISCOPE project quantitative studies. Qualitative data were analysed 
using thematic content analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Details of data analyses for 
each of the four studies are reported in the corresponding sections below. 
3.6.2 Stage 2: Understand what happened  
In order to understand what happened, Stage 2 of the multi-incident analysis focused 
on quantitative analysis of reported incidents involving opioids. In this stage of the 
multi-incident analysis, preliminary patterns and trends, including incident 
characteristics, reported contributing factors, and patient outcomes were identified.  
Study 2: Retrospective review of state-wide clinical incident data 
Study 2 combined a retrospective review of de-identified clinical incidents involving 
opioids, and analysis of opioid incident trends, reported to the Clinical Excellence 
Commission via the state-wide incident management system. The Clinical 
Excellence Commission has oversight over the NSW incident information 
management system and responsibility for identifying opportunities for statewide 
policies and strategies to improve health care (Clinical Excellence Commission, 
2018). Incidents are classified into one of 19 ‘Principal Incident Types’ and rated in 
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accordance with a Severity Assessment Code (SAC) risk rating (Clinical Excellence 
Commission NSW Health, 2016). 
Due to the paucity of published literature reporting medication errors with opioids in 
palliative and cancer care services, this retrospective review was designed to capture 
a snapshot of opioid incident reporting, characteristics of reported opioid incidents, 
incident contributing factors, and patient impact of opioid incidents in the NSW 
public hospital system (‘NSW Health’). Retrospective research is a widely used 
methodology in health care that utilises existing health records and/or clinical data to 
answer research questions (Vassar & Holzmann, 2013). In medication error research, 
retrospective review of incident reports is used to determine the clinical significance 
and potential causes of medication errors (Flynn & Barker, 2007).  
For this study, two custom, state-wide datasets were created in collaboration with the 
Clinical Excellence Commission. Both datasets were extracted from incidents 
notified under the principal incident type – ‘medication/IV fluid’ (Clinical 
Excellence Commission NSW Health, 2016). Data collection and analysis methods 
for each data set is detailed below. 
Dataset 1 comprised a search of reported incidents involving opioids, for calendar 
years 2011 to 2014 inclusive.  
Data collection: The trend search variables encompassed: i) service type (all 
hospital services), ii) opioid type; and iii) incident SAC. Sample size was limited by 
the Clinical Excellence Commission to four retrospective calendar years of data, 
commencing with the most recently available full data set at the time of the study 
(calendar year 2014).  
Data analysis: Data analysis was undertaken using descriptive statistics and 
percentage analysis to quantify reported incidents by variable. Pearson’s Chi-Square 
test was used to determine differences in frequency of errors by opioid type and 
service involved. Quantitative data analysis was undertaken with the IBM Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (‘SPSS’) V25 software package. 
Dataset 2 comprised 500 consecutive, retrospective incident report summaries of 
incidents involving opioids reported in palliative care and cancer services.  
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Data collection: Sample size was limited by the Clinical Excellence Commission to 
a total of 500 consecutive retrospective incident reports commencing December 31, 
2014, in accordance with the Commission’s data release policy at the time of the 
study. Variables in this data set included incident by: problem type; incident SAC; 
incident time band; patient age band; and free text entries completed by the notifier 
at the time of reporting comprising: incident description; and incident contributing 
factors. 
Data analysis: Data analysis of the incident reports was undertaken by firstly 
classifying opioid incidents by service (palliative care or cancer service) then 
problem type (Clinical Excellence Commission NSW Health, 2016), and then by 
error type (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention, 1998). Patient harm was determined by deductive thematic content 
analysis of the incident narrative (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and categorised according 
to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
index (Hartwig, Denger, & Schneider, 1991). Similarly, incident contributing factors 
were identified by deductive thematic content analysis of the incident narrative 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006) and categorised according to the Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors Framework (Figure 3.4, Table 3.2) (Lawton et al., 2012). To ensure correct 
interpretation of error contributory factors, a second clinical reviewer independently 
identified and classified error contributory factors from the incident narrative. Where 
discrepancies between the candidate and clinical reviewer were identified, a third 
clinical reviewer was consulted. Descriptive statistics and percentage analysis were 
used to quantify reported incidents. Pearson’s Chi-Square test was used to determine 
differences in error characteristics and patient impact between cancer and palliative 
care services. All quantitative data analysis was undertaken with the IBM Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (‘SPSS’) V25 software package. Qualitative data 
was managed using the NVivo software package V11.4.1.  
Data from Study 2 served as a comparison measure for data collected at the local 
level (Study 3 and Study 4).  
Study 3: Retrospective review of local clinical incident data 
Study 3 commenced with a seven-day snapshot audit to quantify the frequency of 
opioid delivery in the specialist palliative care inpatient service delivery context. 
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This was followed by a retrospective review of consecutive clinical incidents with 
opioids reported by three specialist palliative care inpatient services in metropolitan 
NSW (‘local services’). For ease of reporting, the seven-day snapshot audit is 
reported as Study 3a, and the local retrospective review as Study 3b.  
Study 3a - Snapshot audit 
Data collection - snapshot audit: A retrospective seven-day snapshot audit of all 
documented opioid orders and administrations was undertaken to quantify the 
number of opioids delivered in the three local participating specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. The medication charts of all patients admitted to the participating 
palliative care inpatient units, from February 12 to 18 (inclusive), 2015, were 
included in the snapshot audit. All regular, PRN and immediate (‘STAT’) opioid 
orders and administrations were recorded into an Excel spreadsheet (Appendix 4). 
The date and start time of each opioid order was documented and projected doses 
aligned with the patients’ length of stay/time of discharge in the audit period. Where 
a dose had been ordered but not administered, the reason for non-administration was 
noted. Any doses not administered without a documented reason were categorised as 
omitted dose errors. The sum of all opioid doses ordered and all doses administered, 
was calculated. The sum of opioid administrations by opioid was also calculated. 
Service characteristics (i.e., number of available beds, number of patients, percentage 
occupancy, and patient length of stay in the snapshot audit period) were sought from 
the Clinical Information Team at each service. 
Data analysis - snapshot audit: Descriptive statistics and percentages were used to 
quantify opioid delivery and administrations by opioid. All quantitative data analysis 
was undertaken with the SPSS V25 software package. 
Study 3b - Local retrospective review 
Data collection - local retrospective review: Custom datasets were created in 
consultation with the site teams to capture clinical incidents with opioids, extracted 
from the participating services’ internal incident management system. Data was 
extracted by the services’ Quality and Safety team and provided to the research team 
for analysis. A purpose-built data collection tool (Appendix 5) was developed and 
piloted for this project following consultation with senior palliative care clinicians, 
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hospital pharmacists, and service quality/safety managers. This data collection tool 
was designed to capture: patient demographics, problem type and opioid involved, 
incident characteristics, patient impact of the opioid incident, and action by service 
following incident. The local retrospective review period spanned March 1, 2013 to 
February 28, 2015, inclusive.  
Data analysis - local retrospective review: Incidents were firstly classified by 
problem type (Clinical Excellence Commission NSW Health, 2016) then by error 
type (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 
1998). Patient harm was determined by deductive thematic content analysis of the 
incident narrative (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and categorised according to the National 
Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention index (Hartwig 
et al., 1991). Sample size was determined by the number of opioid incidents 
identified. Descriptive statistics and percentages were used to quantify reported 
incidents. Pearson’s Chi-Square test was used to determine differences in error 
characteristics between services. All quantitative data analysis was undertaken with 
the SPSS V25 software package. Qualitative data was managed using the NVivo 
software package V11.4.1.  
Study 4: Retrospective review of reported opioid error contributing factors  
In Study 4 a retrospective review of opioid error contributing factors documented in 
clinical incident reports involving opioids was undertaken in two specialist palliative 
care inpatient services in NSW.  
Data collection: The retrospective review period for Study 4 spanned January 1, 
2013 to December 31, 2015, inclusive. Data collection was undertaken using the 
same methods as described in Study 3b above. Additionally, the incident narrative of 
reported clinical incidents involving opioids in the audit period was recorded to 
identify documented opioid error contributing factors.  
Data analysis: Incident classification and assessment of patient harm following an 
error was undertaken using the same data analysis methods as in Study 3b above. 
Differences in patient demographics between the two local specialist palliative care 
inpatient services were analysed using Chi-square tests, test of normality and 
homogeneity of variance, and univariate one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) by 
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General Linear Model. Descriptive statistics and percentage analysis were used to 
identify incident characteristics. Pearsons’ Chi Square and Correlation were applied 
to determine relationships between patient and opioid error characteristics. Deductive 
thematic content analysis of the incident narrative, (Braun & Clarke, 2006) in 
alignment with the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Figure 3.4, Table 
3.2) (Lawton et al., 2012), was undertaken to classify and quantify opioid error 
contributing factors. Verbatim quotes from the incident narrative were reported to 
support contributory factor classifications. Quantitative data analysis was undertaken 
with the IBM SPSS Statistics V25 software package. Qualitative data was managed 
using the NVivo software package V11.4.1.  
3.6.3 Stage 3: Determine how and why it happened 
Stage 3 is the qualitative portion of the multi-incident analysis. The focus in this 
stage is to explore palliative care clinicians’ and service managers’ perceptions of 
opioid error prevalence, contributing and mitigating factors, to better understand how 
and why opioid errors are occurring in specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
Study 5: Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
Study 5 was informed by the results of Study 2, 3 and 4 in accordance with an 
explanatory sequential mixed methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  
Data collection - sampling: Purposive sampling was used to identify eligible 
participants at each service. This sampling technique is widely used in qualitative 
research to identify participants with in-depth knowledge and/or experience with the 
phenomenon of interest (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Patton, 2015). The 
purposive sampling strategy was selected for the PERISCOPE project based on the 
sampling strategy guidelines developed by Curtis and colleagues (2000), as 
described below.  
The sampling strategy stemmed logically from the multi-incident analysis and 
Yorkshire Contributory Factors conceptual frameworks, and the project’s research 
questions. Palliative care clinicians and service managers involved in opioid delivery 
or oversight were well positioned to provide insights into opioid error reporting 
practices, characteristics, contributory and/or mitigating factors in the PERISCOPE 
project. A critical stage in the multi-incident analysis (conceptual framework) is the 
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qualitative exploration of opioid errors to understand how and why errors occurred 
(Stage 3) (Curtis et al., 2000).  
Participants in the PERISCOPE project were able to generate a comprehensive 
dataset on opioid errors in the palliative care context as they represented three 
clinical disciplines, across multiple levels of management, with a wide range of years 
of experience in palliative care. These participants were specifically recruited for the 
PERISCOPE project, to provide sufficient data to answer the research questions and 
confirm or refute the quantitative data results. Throughout the semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups, the researcher (NH) fed-back their interpretation of the 
data and asked study participants to assess whether these interpretations were 
accurate. Hence, the PERISCOPE project participants enabled the drawing of clear 
inferences and credible explanations from the data (Curtis et al., 2000).  
The sampling strategy was ethical in that all participants provided informed consent 
prior to attending a semi-structured interviews or focus group (refer Section 3.6.3); 
and the sampling plan was feasible, as purposive sampling was congruent with the 
abilities of the researcher, who had prior qualitative interviewing experience (Curtis 
et al., 2000). 
Data collection: A combination of focus groups and semi-structured interviews were 
used in the PERISCOPE project to explore and better understand the quantitative 
data from Stage 2 of the multi-incident analysis. Data were collected between March 
and November 2017. 
Rationale for focus groups and semi-structured interviews 
Both focus groups and semi-structured interviews are commonly used data collection 
methods in qualitative and mixed methods research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) (Kitzinger, 2005). In the PERISCOPE project, both 
methods were used in order to maximise the number of participants in Phase 2 of the 
project. The researchers were highly cognisant of palliative care clinicians’ busy 
schedules. Hence, giving clinicians the option of attending either a pre-scheduled 
focus group or having them nominate a preferred time for a semi-structured 
interview, was considered the best approach to accommodating clinicians’ schedules. 
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Focus groups are a planned series of discussions designed to explore participants’ 
thoughts or feelings about an issue, based on their personal experience (Kitzinger, 
1994; Krueger, 2014). They are typically composed of five to eight participants with 
common characteristics, based on the purpose of the study. In the PERISCOPE 
project, we sought perceptions and experiences of opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services from the perspective of clinicians and service 
managers who were involved in opioid delivery or oversight. These characteristics 
formed the basis for recruitment (Krueger, 2014). 
Focus groups are an ideal way of collecting qualitative data of interest to the 
researcher in a timely manner and assist with identifying a range of opinions across 
multiple groups. In the PERISCOPE project, focus group questions were pre-
determined and open-ended, starting with more general questions at the beginning of 
the group and becoming more focussed as the group progressed. The researcher 
moderated the focus group, acting as listener, observer, and ultimately data analyst. 
The purpose of a focus groups was not to reach consensus, rather, the moderator 
focussed on understanding the opinions, perceptions and thought processes of 
participants as the opioid errors in the specialist palliative care inpatient setting were 
discussed (Krueger, 2014). 
However, as focus groups are often difficult for busy clinician to participate in, 
interested clinicians in the PERISCOPE project were also provided with the option to 
participate in a semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interviews provided an 
opportunity to explore the phenomenon of opioid errors from the perspective of the  
different disciplines that are involved in key stages of opioid delivery (nursing, 
medical, pharmacy) in more depth than afforded in a focus group. Open-ended 
questions were developed in a manner that allowed question prompts to be 
introduced (Table 3.4) to encourage participants to reflect more deeply on different 
question elements (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).  
Throughout both the focus groups and semi-structured interviews the researcher 
(NH) sought to further explore the results of the preceding quantitative studies 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). To assist the 
researcher to better understand the results from the retrospective reviews, a  
summary of the retrospective review data for each local service (Study 3) was 
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provided to participants, once their perceptions of opioid error prevalence, patient 
impact and characteristics had been explored (Appendix 6). Participants were asked 
to comment on the results, giving the researcher an opportunity to explore the 
congruences and differences between the quantitative and qualitative data in the 
PERISCOPE project.  
Recruitment 
Eligible clinicians received an email invitation to attend a focus group or semi-
structured interview from the unit/service manager. Included in the email invitation 
was a participant information and consent form (Appendix 7), which clearly 
described what taking part in the study would involve. Participants could attend 
either an onsite focus group or semi-structured interview, or a semi-structured 
telephone interview. The focus group schedule at each participating service was 
arranged with the unit managers. Interested clinicians contacted the researcher (NH) 
directly if they: had any questions prior to consenting to the study, wished to attend a 
scheduled focus group, or wanted to arrange a time for an interview. Written 
informed consent was obtained from eligible participants prior to the focus groups or 
interviews.  
A question route, informed by the literature (Heneka et al., 2015) and piloted with 
palliative care service managers and medication safety experts, guided the focus 
groups and semi-structured interviews (Table 3.3). 
All focus groups and semi-structured interviews were conducted by a researcher 
(NH) with qualitative interviewing expertise and were audio recorded and 
professionally transcribed by an external transcription service. A dedicated scribe 
(PB) took detailed focus group field notes. Immediately following each focus group, 
the researcher and scribe individually reflected on the focus group content, then 
compared and discussed their reflections, noting any differences in the field note 
observations. The researcher (NH) summarised the key points and insights and noted 
any questions or concepts for follow-up after each focus group and semi-structured   
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Table 3.3 Question route for semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
Semi-structured interviews only 
• Just so I understand how it works in this unit, I am wondering if you could walk me 
through a typical opioid order (doctor); administration (nurse); dispensing 
(pharmacist) scenario?  
• Is there anywhere in this (opioid delivery) process where you think the risk of making 
error is high? 
Semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
1. Opioid error prevalence, characteristics and patient harm 
• What do you define as an opioid error? 
• How often do you think opioid errors occur in this unit? 
• What are the main types of opioid errors that occur in this unit?  
• Do you think all opioid errors that occur are reported?  
- Question prompts: Why or why not? What would/wouldn’t you report? 
• Can you tell me how you think opioid errors impact on: 
- patients?  
- other members of the team?   
A summary of the retrospective review data for each local service (Study 3) was shown to 
participants at this point in the question route, and participants were asked: 
• Do you have any comments about the results of this review? 
- Question prompts: Is there anything in the review you find surprising/not 
surprising? 
2. Opioid error risk and contributing factors 
• Is there anywhere in the opioid delivery process, from the time the patient is first 
admitted to the unit, until the opioid has been administered to the patient, where the 
risk of opioid error is greater?                                                                                                                   
• Are there any factors that you think contribute to opioid errors in this unit?       
- Question prompts: Are there any systems factors that contribute to opioid 
errors in this unit? 
• Is there anything you think could be done in this service to better support safe opioid 
delivery in this unit? 
3. Opioid error mitigating factors 
• What are the strategies (current and/or previous) used in this unit to prevent/reduce 
opioid errors? 
• Is there anything else you think helps support safe opioid delivery in this unit? 
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interview. The qualitative data collection continued until no new insights were 
generated.  
Data analysis: All transcriptions were read in conjunction with the original audio 
recording (NH) to check for accuracy. Data familiarisation was achieved through 
multiple readings of the transcripts and field notes (NH). Confirmation of 
contributory and descriptive themes was reached through collaborative analysis (NH 
and JP). A combination of inductive and deductive thematic data analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) was used in Study 5.  
Inductive thematic analysis: Initial data coding was guided by the focus group/semi-
structured interview questions, with codes and collated data examined for potential 
themes. To ensure rigour, the preliminary themes were identified independently (NH 
and JP) and refined through collaborative analysis until the final themes and sub-
themes were confirmed.  
Deductive thematic analysis: opioid error contributing factors were categorised using 
the domains of the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) 
as initial coding categories.  
Trustworthiness of the data and findings: Development and reporting of this study 
was guided by the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research 
(COREQ) checklist (Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007). The procedures used to 
generate the findings were guided by the four general types of trustworthiness in 
qualitative research, namely: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability (Lincoln, Guba, & Guba, 1985).  
Credibility was achieved by using purposive sampling targeting palliative care 
clinicians. Participants were assured that their identities would be protected on all 
transcripts, reports and publications that resulted from the interviews. Open-ended 
questions, probes and prompts were utilised throughout the interview process to 
encourage participants to share their experiences. A combination of semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups and field notes were used to enhance the reliability, validity, 
and veracity of qualitative data collection (Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2015). 
Member checking was undertaken within and across semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups to check interpretation of the data, and data collection was undertaken 
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until data saturation was reached. Validation and discussions among co-researchers 
was used to enhance the trustworthiness of the data analysis (Lincoln et al., 1985).  
To enhance the transferability of the PERISCOPE project findings, the participants, 
study settings, impetus for the study, and specific contexts of the study were 
described in detail, allowing other researchers to determine the potential for applying 
the project’s findings to other contexts and/or participants (Braun & Clarke, 2013; 
Lincoln et al., 1985). Data analysis was congruent with the accepted standards of the 
mixed methods explanatory sequential design, the conceptual frameworks used to 
guide the PERISCOPE project, and qualitative research reporting criteria (Tong et 
al., 2007) ensuring dependability of the project findings (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). 
Finally, each of the research steps taken, from study conception to development and 
reporting of the findings, were transparently described to lend confirmability to the 
findings. The voices of the participants were widely represented in the quotes 
provided to support the themes and show transparency in the confirmability of the 
data interpretation.  
3.6.4 Stage 4: Develop recommended actions 
Data integration and meta-inference is undertaken in this stage in order to generate 
recommendations to support safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. Details of data integration methods for the PERISCOPE project have been 
described in Section 3.3.9. All inferences drawn from the integrated PERISCOPE 
project data were entered into a matrix and thematically analysed to arrive at a new, 
consolidated, qualitative data set (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Caracelli & Greene, 1993). 
A conceptual framework based on the primary themes generated during analysis was 
created to identify relationships within and between themes and subthemes, and to 
answer the project aim. Chapter 8 reports the inferences reached at each stage of data 
integration in the PERISCOPE project, as well as the meta-inferences drawn from 
the project as a whole. Recommended actions generated from the meta-inference are 
also reported in Chapter 8.  
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3.7 Ethical considerations in the PERISCOPE project  
3.7.1 Values 
The PERISCOPE project was undertaken in accordance with the National Statement 
on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (‘National Statement’) (The National Health 
and Medical Research Council, 2007) and the Australian Code for Responsible 
Conduct of Research (National Health and Medical Research Council, 2018). 
Accordingly, the PERISCOPE project addresses and reflects each of the following 
values. 
Research merit 
The PERISCOPE project sought to make a substantial contribution to the body of 
knowledge pertaining to medication safety with opioids in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. Prior to submission for ethical review the project underwent peer 
review at the: Improving Palliative Care through Clinical Trials (ImPaCCT) Concept 
Development Workshop (August 11, 2014); and the Sacred Heart Health Services, St 
Vincent’s Hospital, New Studies Meeting (November 11, 2014), to ensure the 
research merit of the project, and the appropriateness of the research design. 
Collectively, the project research team (NH, JP, TS, DR, SL) had appropriate 
qualifications and extensive experience in palliative care services research, 
medication safety research, and mixed methods research methodology.  
Research integrity 
The PERISCOPE project was undertaken following the principles of research 
integrity, namely: seeking new knowledge and understanding; following recognised 
principles of research conduct, and local codes of conduct as participating services; 
and, conducting the research with honesty and transparency (National Health and 
Medical Research Council, Australian Research Council, & Universities Australia, 
2007). Study results/findings were shared with participating services for feedback 
prior to submission for publication. Study results were communicated through 
written reports (Appendix 8 ) and presentations at participating services, as well as 
through peer reviewed oral and poster presentations and invited presentations (refer 
Research Outputs Associated with Thesis in front matter). 
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Justice 
The participant inclusion criteria for the PERISCOPE project was broad, 
encompassing all palliative care clinicians and personnel who were involved with, or 
had oversight of, the opioid delivery process. Participation was voluntary and 
participants were made aware of the time burden and what the research activities 
would entail, prior to consenting to the study. The conduct of the study was the same 
at all sites, ensuring there was no unfair burden of participation in particular groups. 
Research outcomes were made accessible to participants through written reports and 
presentations at all participating services in a timely manner, following completion 
of each study (Appendix 8). 
Beneficence 
The likely benefit of the project extended to: i) participants, who had an opportunity 
to reflect on their clinical practice in relation to opioid delivery, risk factors for 
opioid error, and exploration of safety culture in the service; ii) specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, who were provided with analyses of opioid errors both within 
their unit and benchmarked against local and state-wide data; as well as analysis of 
systems factors contributing to or mitigating opioid errors; and iii) palliative 
inpatients, who may benefit from a reduction in opioid errors and resultant patient 
harm.   
Respect 
Throughout the PERISCOPE project, there was a high level of engagement with 
participating services, including clinicians, service managers and support staff (e.g., 
clinical information teams, quality and safety personnel) to ensure the research was 
conducted in a respectful manner, with due regard for the welfare of participants. All 
research activities were negotiated with senior management at participating sites and 
conducted in a way to minimise disruption of unit workflow. Semi-structured 
interviews and focus group times were negotiated with Nurse Unit Managers and 
Clinical Nurse Educators, and scheduled at the site at a time that suited the workflow 
of the unit. The dates, venues and times for the focus groups and interviews were 
negotiated to minimise inconvenience for the participants. Participants were also 
assured they did not need to answer any questions they were not comfortable with 
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and were made aware of support options if the semi-structured interviews/focus 
groups raised any issues for them. 
Risk and benefit 
All studies in the PERISCOPE project were assessed as low/negligible risk by the 
relevant Hunan Research Ethics Committees. The only foreseeable risk for 
participants was one of discomfort and/or inconvenience related to participation in 
the focus groups and/or semi-structured interviews. Participants were asked about 
their perceptions of opioid errors within the service. Whilst they were not 
specifically asked to disclose any personal involvement in regard to opioid errors that 
they may have been directly or indirectly involved in, raising the possibilities of 
errors may cause participants to reflect on their practice or to recall an error that 
could cause them discomfort and/or distress especially if there was an adverse 
outcome. As such, being asked to reflect on opioid errors, and their impact on 
patients and staff, may raise feelings of discomfort related to participants’ 
professional practice. To minimise these potential study procedure risks, the 
researchers outlined support services that were available to participants and are free 
of charge, offered by participating sites, as well as other relevant local/national 
support services. This information was included in the participant information sheet 
and given to participants again at the conclusion of the interview/focus group. 
Additionally, participants were advised that they were not obliged to answer 
interview or focus group questions and could end the interview or focus group at any 
time without giving a reason, and with no consequence to their current employment. 
Participants were also given the option of attending a one-on-one interview 
following the focus group if they wished to further discuss opioid errors, but were 
not comfortable sharing this in the context of a focus group.  
3.7.2 Consent 
Eligible participants were provided with a study information form (Appendix 7), 
which provided detailed information about study procedures and participant 
involvement. Participants were advised that taking part in the study was voluntary, 
and that they were free to decline participation without any consequences. Written 
informed consent was collected from all participants prior to study enrolment, and 
any study activities being undertaken.  
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3.7.3 Ethical and site specific approval 
Ethical approval, ratification and cross-institutional recognition 
Ethical approval was sought from three Human Research Ethics Committees 
(HREC) for the PERISCOPE project: i) NSW Population and Health Services 
Research Ethics Approval, ii) St Vincent’s Hospital HREC, and iii) University of 
Notre Dame Australia HREC.  
Study 2 required access to a data collection owned by NSW Health, via the Clinical 
Excellence Commission. As such, ethical approval for this study was sought from the 
NSW Population and Health Services Research Ethics Committee, which is jointly 
convened by the NSW Ministry of Health and the Cancer Institute NSW. Prior to 
submitting Study 2 for ethical approval to the NSW Population and Health Services 
Research Ethics Committee, a study protocol review was requested from the Cancer 
Institute NSW, who confirmed the study would be of benefit to the NSW Health 
system. Subsequent in-principle support of the data request was then offered by the 
Clinical Excellence Commission, subject to ethics approval. Low and negligible risk 
ethical approval was also sought, and granted, by the University of Notre Dame 
Australia HREC. 
Ethical approval for Studies 3, 4 and 5 was obtained from St Vincent’s Hospital 
HREC [EC00140]. Cross-institutional recognition of ethics approval was then 
obtained from the University of Notre Dame Australia HREC (Appendix 9). 
Site specific/governance approval 
Site specific assessment (SSA) authorisation was obtained from the relevant 
Research Governance Office at participating sites (Appendix 9). As Study 3 and 
Study 4 required access to hospital incident reports and patient medical records by 
the researcher, who was external to participating services, an Honorary Research 
Appointment was sought where required. 
3.7.4 Data storage and security 
All data arising from the PERISCOPE project were stored on a secured, password 
protected research drive, or in a locked filing cabinet in a secure office, at the Centre 
for Improving Palliative, Aged and Chronic Care through Clinical Research and 
 89 
Translation (IMPACCT), University of Technology Sydney, where the candidate’s 
primary supervisor is based. A copy of the de-identified project data is also stored on 
a secured, password protected research drive at the University of Notre Dame School 
of Nursing per University requirements. De-identified data were also stored on an  
encrypted repository on the researcher’s password-protected computer while the 
study was in progress.  
Participant confidentiality, privacy and anonymity were ensured through the 
allocation of site codes and de-identified participant codes that were used throughout 
data analysis. Signed consent forms were securely stored separately from other study 
data. Participant names were removed from all data transcripts and digital files were 
saved using participants codes only. The electronic list of study codes with 
participant details was stored in the secure, password protected IMPACCT research 
drive, with an additional level of password protection. Only the researcher (NH) and 
primary supervisor (JP) have access to study data (electronic and/or hard copy). All 
publications associated with the project reported global, de-identified data only.  
All study data will be stored for a period of five years from the date of any associated 
publications in accordance with national requirements (National Health and Medical 
Research Council, 2018; National Health and Medical Research Council et al., 
2007).  At the completion of the study, all data collection forms and study materials 
(both hard copy and electronic) will be prepared for collation and archiving 
consistent with the jurisdictional regulations regarding the retention and disposal of 
research data, as advised by the National Statement (National Health and Medical 
Research Council et al., 2007).   
 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the rationale for a mixed methods design, conceptual 
frameworks, data collection and analysis methods, and ethical considerations of the 
PERISCOPE project. The following chapters report, in detail, the individual studies 
that comprise PERISCOPE project, the project conclusions and recommendations.  
The following chapter reports the results of the retrospective review of reported 
clinical incidents with opioids undertaken in palliative care services across NSW 
(Study 2), and in three local specialist palliative care inpatient services (Study 3).  
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Chapter 4: Identifying opioid error prevalence, 
patient impact and characteristics 
in NSW and local palliative care 
services   
4.1 Chapter preface 
Despite the frequency in which opioids are used in palliative care services, the 
systematic review reported in Chapter 2 identified a dearth of empirical studies 
reporting opioid error prevalence, patient impact and characteristics in this setting 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, & Phillips, 2015). Given these gaps in the literature, the 
second and third studies in the PERISCOPE project sought to undertake a 
retrospective review of opioid errors reported by palliative care services across the 
NSW public health system (Study 2) and in three local specialist palliative care 
inpatient services (Study 3). This chapter reports the individual results of Studies 2 
and 3. 
4.2 Context for Study 2 
In Australia, opioids currently account for three of the top five medications involved 
in reported clinical incidents (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2019) and are widely 
used to manage cancer related pain. While a cohort of NSW palliative and cancer 
care clinicians had identified opioid errors as a patient safety priority (Heneka, Shaw, 
Azzi, & Phillips, 2018), little could be gleaned from the existing literature about the 
characteristics, contributory factors and patient impact of opioid errors in these care 
settings. In order to better understand opioid errors in palliative and cancer care 
services, it was decided to analyse clinical incidents involving opioids in palliative 
care and cancer services, reported through the NSW state-wide incident management 
system.  
An unpublished report of study results from Study 2 was completed for the Clinical 
Excellence Commission (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018). 
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4.3 Objectives - Study 2 
The objectives of Study 2 were to identify:  
i) the number of clinical incidents involving opioids reported in NSW via the 
incident management system [January 1, 2011 – December 31, 2014]; and  
ii) characteristics of opioid errors reported in NSW palliative and cancer care 
services, related to incident type, opioid involved and patient outcome. 
4.4 Methods - Study 2   
Study methods have been described in Chapter 3. 
4.5 Results - Study 2   
4.5.1 Dataset 1  
Over four years, NSW public health services (N=220) reported 13,555 incidents 
involving opioids (Table 4.1). The majority (71%, n=9066) of opioid incidents were 
categorised as SAC 4 (Table 4.1). Palliative care services had the 7th highest opioid 
incident reporting rate by service type (3.4%, n=467), while cancer services reported 
a much smaller proportion of opioid incidents (1.9%, n=258) (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.1 Reported opioid incidents by service and SAC [Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 31, 2014] 
 Palliative Care Cancer Care All other 
services 
combined 
Total 
2011-2014 N=467 (%) N=258 (%) N=12830 (%) N=13555 (%) 
Opioid incidents   
by year 
        
2011 104 (22.2) 55 (21.3) 2874 (22.4) 3033 (22.4) 
2012 132 (28.3) 65 (25.2) 3104 (24.2) 3301 (24.3) 
2013 109 (23.3) 71 (27.5) 3298 (25.7) 3478 (25.7) 
2014 122 (26.1) 67 (26.0) 3554 (27.7) 3743 (27.6) 
Opioid incidents   
by SAC 
        
SAC 1 0 (0) 2 (0.8) 5 (0.1) 7 (0.05) 
SAC 2 4 (0.9) 1 (0.4) 48 (0.4) 53 (0.4) 
SAC 3 133 (28.5) 68 (26.4) 3553 (27.7) 3754 (27.7) 
SAC 4 314 (67.2) 185 (71.7) 9066 (70.7) 9565 (70.6) 
SAC not allocated 16 (3.4) 2 (0.8) 158 (1.2) 176 (1.3) 
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Table 4.2 Percentage of reported opioid incidents in the NSW public health service by 
service type [January 1, 2011 – December 31, 2014] 
Service type                                            Reported   
opioid errors 
Service type                                            Reported   
opioid errors 
 n %  n % 
Drug - Alcohol Services 2014 14.9% Adolescent Health 29 0.2% 
Pharmacy 1283 9.5% Surgical - Gynaecology 29 0.2% 
Medicine - General 1133 8.4% Women's Health - General 29 0.2% 
Aged Care - Geriatrics 788 5.8% Paediatric Surgery 28 0.2% 
Ambulatory Care 620 4.6% Burns - Severe 22 0.2% 
Surgical - General 477 3.5% Outpatient Services 21 0.2% 
Palliative Care 467 3.4% Clinical Pharmacology/Toxicology 
18 0.1% 
Emergency Medicine 445 3.3% Spinal Services 18 0.1% 
Intensive Care 437 3.2% Transplant Services 15 0.1% 
Ambulance Emergency 436 3.2% Rheumatology 13 0.1% 
Surgical - Orthopaedics 400 3.0% Surgical - Cardiothoracic 13 0.1% 
Rehabilitation 341 2.5% Trauma Services 13 0.1% 
Pain Management 296 2.2% Aged Care - Community 12 0.1% 
Medical/Radiation Oncology 258 1.9% Imaging 12 0.1% 
Other 202 1.5% Stroke 12 0.1% 
Obstetrics - Maternity 175 1.3% Endocrinology 10 0.1% 
Mental Health - Inpatient 172 1.3% Surgical - Neurosurgery 9 0.1% 
Anaesthetics 166 1.2% Mental Health - Community 8 0.1% 
Recovery 130 1.0% Surgical - Ophthalmology 8 0.1% 
Cardiology 125 0.9% Forensic Inpatient Services 7 0.1% 
Respiratory Medicine 124 0.9% Surgical - Hand 7 0.1% 
Operating Theatre 119 0.9% Ambulance Aeromedical 6 0.0% 
Paediatrics 117 0.9% Immunology & Allergy 6 0.0% 
Haematology 113 0.8% Ambulance Patient Transport 5 0.0% 
Renal Medicine 105 0.8% Infection Control 5 0.0% 
Surgical - Colorectal 86 0.6% Surgical - Oral Maxillo-Facial 5 0.0% 
Gastroenterology 84 0.6% HMO/VMO 4 0.0% 
Surgical - Vascular 78 0.6% AIDS - Infectious Diseases 3 0.0% 
Neurology 74 0.5% Mental Health - Rehabilitation 3 0.0% 
Neurosurgery 64 0.5% Public Health 3 0.0% 
Mental Health - Forensic 
Inpatient 
61 0.5% Aboriginal Health Services 2 0.0% 
Neonatology 61 0.5% Dental - Oral Health 2 0.0% 
Cardiothoracic 57 0.4% NETS 2 0.0% 
Surgical - Urology 57 0.4% Ambulance Administrative 
Services 
1 0.0% 
Aged Care - Psychogeriatrics 53 0.4% Ambulance 
Education/Training 
1 0.0% 
Paediatric Oncology 52 0.4% Ambulance Rapid Response 1 0.0% 
Community Nursing 42 0.3% Ambulance SCAT 1 0.0% 
Surgical - Plastic & 
Reconstructive 
37 0.3% Ambulatory Care - Paediatric 1 0.0% 
General Practice 36 0.3% Child Protection 1 0.0% 
Ambulance Equipment 34 0.3% Occupational Therapy 1 0.0% 
Surgical - ENT - 
Otolaryngology 
31 0.2% Patient Transport 1 0.0% 
   Service Not Specified 1318 9.7% 
   Total 13555 100% 
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Seven SAC 1 notifications involving hydromorphone (n=3), morphine (n=3) and 
fentanyl (n=1) were reported. In this trend search, two SAC 1 notifications involving 
hydromorphone (n=1) and fentanyl (n=1) occurred in cancer services. All SAC 2 
notifications in cancer and palliative care services involved hydromorphone; 
whereas, oxycodone (n=15), morphine (n=12) and fentanyl (n=11) resulted in the 
majority of SAC 2 notifications in all other services combined. Cancer and palliative 
care services were significantly more likely to report errors with hydromorphone 
(𝒳𝒳12=787, p<.001) and morphine (𝒳𝒳12=17, p<.001), compared to all other services 
combined (Figure 4.1).      
Figure 4.1 Incident reports by service type and opioid involved (2011-2014) (N=13555)  
4.5.2 Dataset 2  
Of the 500 extracted records, 379 incident reports from palliative care and cancer 
services met the inclusion criteria for data analysis (‘opioid incidents’) (Figure 4.2). 
Two-thirds (64%, n=241) of opioid Incidents were reported in palliative care 
services.  
Error SAC ratings were similar for both service types with two-thirds of incidents 
rated SAC 4 (cancer services: 69%, n=95; versus palliative care: 66%, n=159), and 
one-third rated SAC 3 (cancer services: 30%, n=42 versus palliative care: 30%, 
n=73). Two SAC 2 errors were reported in palliative care, both involving 
hydromorphone. The majority of opioid incidents across both service types involved 
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hydromorphone (35%, n=131), morphine (23%, n=88) or oxycodone (20%, n=74) 
(Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.2 Overview of incident reports included for analysis (N=379) 
 
 
Consecutive opioid incident 
reports extracted for review 
(n=500) 
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Figure 4.3 Opioid errors by service type and opioid involved (N=379) 
 
Opioid incidents by problem type 
In both palliative and cancer care services, opioid administration errors comprised 
approximately three-quarters (74%, n=282) of reported errors (Table 4.3). 
Prescribing errors accounted for one-fifth (20%, n=75) of errors with much smaller 
numbers of dispensing (3%, n=10), near miss (2%, n=6) and drug supply issues (2%, 
n=6) reported.  
Administration errors 
Omitted dose (29%, n=81), wrong dose (15%, n=42) and wrong route (14%, n=38) 
errors were the leading reported administration error types overall (Table 4.3). 
Palliative care services reported significantly more omitted dose errors (𝒳𝒳12=15, 
p<.001) compared to cancer services, whereas cancer services reported significantly 
more wrong route errors (𝒳𝒳12=15, p=.001). All omitted doses, bar one, were non-
therapeutic omissions, not doses withheld based on clinical judgement. Three-
quarters (74%, n=28) of wrong route errors occurred when opioids were 
administered subcutaneously instead of orally, almost half of which (47%, n=13) 
occurred with hydromorphone.   
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Table 4.3 Reported opioid incidents by service and problem type (N=379) 
Problem type Incident type Palliative Care Cancer Care Total p-value*  
N=241 (%) N=138  (%) N=379 (%)  
Administration  Total 181 (75.1) 101 (73.2) 282 (74.4) 0.55 
Omitted dose 66 (36.5) 16 (15.8) 82 (29.1) <.001 
Wrong dose 22 (12.2) 20 (19.8) 42 (14.9) 0.12 
Device – wrong rate 20 (11.0) 5 (5.0) 25 (8.8) 0.07 
Transdermal patch 
error  
14 (7.7) 11 (10.9) 25 (8.8) 0.43 
Device – other error 14 (7.7) 4 (4.0) 18 (6.4) 0.41 
Wrong route 13 (7.1) 25 (24.8) 38 (13.5) 0.001 
Wrong drug 13 (7.1) 12 (11.9) 25 (8.8) 0.22 
Wrong patient 6 (3.3) 2 (2.0) 8 (2.8) ** 
Incomplete 
administration 
5 (2.8) 2 (2.0) 7 (2.5) ** 
Wrong technique 4 (2.2) 2 (2.0) 6 (2.1) ** 
Wrong time 4 (2.2) 2 (2.0) 6 (2.1) ** 
Prescribing  Total 45 (18.7) 30 (21.7) 75 (19.8) 0.35 
Medication charting 20 (44.4) 18 (60.0) 38 (50.1) 0.15 
Wrong dose 10 (22.2) 4 (13.3) 14 (18.7) ** 
Wrong drug 8 (17.8) 3 (10.0) 11 (14.7) ** 
Wrong dosage form 2 (4.4) 2 (5.0) 4 (5.3) ** 
Opioid conversion 
error 
2 (4.4) 0 0 2 (2.7) ** 
Wrong route 1 (2.2) 1 (2.5) 2 (2.7) ** 
Wrong patient 1 (2.2) 1 (2.5) 2 (2.7) ** 
Device – wrong rate 1 (2.2) 0 0 1 (1.3) ** 
Delayed order 0 0 1 (3.2) 1 (1.3) ** 
Dispensing Total 7 (2.9) 3 (2.2) 10 (2.6) ** 
Labelling error 2 (28.6) 1 (33.3) 3 (30.0) ** 
Wrong device  2 (28.6) 0 0 2 (20.0) ** 
Wrong amount  1 (14.3) 1 (33.3) 2 (20.0) ** 
Wrong patient 1 (14.3) 0 0 1 (10.0) ** 
Unauthorised 
dispensing 
1 (14.3) 0 0 1 (10.0) ** 
Communication error 0 0 1 (33.3) 1 (10.0) ** 
Near miss  Total 4 (1.7) 2 (1.4) 6 (1.6) ** 
Wrong drug 2 (50.0) 0 0 2 (33.3) ** 
Wrong dose 1 (25.0) 0 0 1 (16.7) ** 
Wrong route 1 (25.0) 0 0 1 (16.7) ** 
Wrong patient 0 0 1 (50.0) 1 (16.7) ** 
Drug preparation  0 0 1 (50.0) 1 (16.7) ** 
Supply/ 
ordering 
problem 
Total 4 (1.7) 2 (1.4) 6 (1.6) ** 
Nil stock  4 (100) 2 (100) 6 (100) ** 
*df=1; **Count not strong enough to provide statistical evidence  
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Prescribing errors 
Prescribing errors accounted for 20% (n=75) of reported incidents. Medication 
charting errors comprised half (50%, n=38) of all reported prescribing errors, over 
one third (39%, n=15) of which were due to ambiguous written opioid orders. One-
quarter (23%%, n=9) of charting errors occurred when re-charting opioid orders, 
including discharge medications. Wrong dose (20%, n=15) and dosage form 
(immediate versus extended release) errors (5%, n=4) collectively accounted for one 
quarter of prescribing errors, almost half of which (47%, n=9) involved 
hydromorphone.  
Other errors 
Dispensing (3%, n=10) and opioid supply/ordering (2%, n=6) problems were less 
frequently reported; however, almost half (44%, n=7) of these incidents directly 
resulted in patient harm due to clinically significant opioid underdose.   
Patient impact 
Of the 379 errors reported, 93% (n=353) reached the patient (Table 4.4). Almost half 
(49%, n=184) of opioid errors that reached the patient required clinical intervention 
to preclude or manage harm. Patient impact/outcome was not recorded in the 
incident report in 43% (n=161) of incidents, limiting data analysis. In this data set, 
palliative care services recognised and notified significantly more incidents 
involving opioid underdosing (𝒳𝒳12=11, p=.001), whereas opioid overdose was 
significantly more recognised and notified in cancer services (𝒳𝒳12=13, p<.001). 
There were no significant differences in patient harm reported (p=.684), or reported 
need for clinical intervention (p=.434) following an opioid error for patients aged 65 
years or over (57%, n=202) in either service type. Almost half of all omitted doses 
(48%, n=39) resulted in patients requiring additional monitoring and/or PRN opioids 
to manage increased pain. The majority (79%, n=30) of wrong route errors resulted 
in opioid overdose, and over half (55%, n=23) of wrong dose errors resulted in 
opioid overdose ranging from 1.5 to 10-fold higher doses being administered than 
ordered.  
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Table 4.4 Impact of reported opioid errors on patient outcomes by service type 
 Palliative Care  Cancer Care       Total p-value* 
 N=241 (%) N=138 (%) N=379 (%)  
Error reached patient        
Yes 223 (92.5) 130 (94.2) 353 (93.1) 0.15 
No 16 (6.6) 4 (2.9) 20 (5.3)  
Could not determine 2 (0.8) 4 (2.9) 6 (1.6)  
Patient outcome (NCC MERP error category (Hartwig, Denger, & Schneider, 
1991) 
N=241 (%) N=138 (%) N=379 (%)  
Category B - error occurred, did not reach patient 15 (6.2) 3 (2.2) 18 (4.7) 0.19 
Category C - error reached patient, no patient harma 11 (4.6) 5 (3.6) 16 (4.2) 0.65 
Category D - error reached patient, required monitoringb and/or interventionc to 
preclude harma 
72 (29.9) 53 (38.4) 125 (33.0) 0.11 
Category E - error resulting in temporary patient harma which required interventionc 37 (15.4) 20 (14.5) 57 (15.0) 0.87 
Category F - error resulting in temporary patient harma which required initial or 
prolonged hospitalisation  
2 (0.8) 0 0 2 (0.5) ** 
Error reached patient - patient impact/outcome not documented  104 (43.2) 57 (41.3) 161 (42.5)  
Incident dose outcome (patient reached) N=223 (%) N=130 (%) N=353 (%)  
Opioid underdose 134 (60.1) 53 (40.8) 187 (53.0) 0.001 
Opioid overdose 66 (29.6) 64 (49.2) 130 (36.8) <.001 
Could not determine 23 (10.3) 13 (10.0) 36 (10.2)  
        
a Harm: Impairment of physical, emotional, or psychological function or structure of the body and/or pain resulting from error (Hartwig et al., 1991) 
b Monitoring: observation or recording of relevant physiological or psychological signs (Hartwig et al., 1991) 
c Intervention: change in therapy or active medical treatment (Hartwig et al., 1991) 
*df=1; **Count not strong enough to provide statistical evidence
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Error contributory factors 
Active failures, described as errors made by the clinician, were identified as 
contributing to opioid errors in over half (59%, n=222) of incident reports, primarily 
due to non-compliance with medication handling policy (36%, n=80) (Table 4.5). 
Notably, one-third (30%, n=111) of incident reports did not have a contributory 
factor documented, limiting accurate analysis. Poor clinical communication 
contributed to 17% of opioid errors, due to ambiguous or illegible opioid orders 
(n=41), and deficits in clinical hand-over (n=23). Additionally, staff workload and/or 
sub-optimal skill mix was noted to have contributed to 9% of opioid errors (n=34), 
while clinician inexperience contributed to 8% (n=31). At an organisational level, 
drug supply issues (n=6), absence of medical personnel (n=3), and issues with 
medication chart access (n=2) contributed to 3% of errors. 
Table 4.5 Opioid error contributory factors identified in incident reports per the 
Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) 
 Palliative Care Cancer Care Total 
Factor N=241 (100%) N=138 (100%) N=379 (100%) 
Active failures 143 (59.3) 82 (59.4) 222 (59.4) 
- violation (non-compliance with 
medication handling policy) 
52 (36.4) 28 (34.1) 80 (36.0) 
- slip, lapse or mistake 28 (19.6) 6 (7.3) 34 (15.3) 
- unable to determine 63 (44.1) 48 (58.5) 111 (50.0) 
Situational factors 25 (10.4) 9 (6.5) 34 (9.0) 
Individual factors - inexperience 23 (92.0) 8 (88.9) 31 (91.2) 
Patient factors 2 (8.0) 1 (11.1) 3 (9.8) 
Task characteristics Nil identified 
Team factors Nil identified 
Local working conditions 26 (10.8) 13 (9.4) 39 (10.3) 
Staff workload 17 (65.4) 11 (84.6) 28 (71.8) 
Management of staff and staffing 
levels (skill mix) 
5 (19.2) 1 (7.7) 6 (15.4) 
Equipment and supplies – device 
malfunction (syringe driver) 
4 (15.4) 1 (7.7) 5 (12.8) 
Lines of responsibility Nil identified 
Supervision and leadership Nil identified 
Latent/organisational factors 5 (2.1) 6 (4.3) 11 (2.9) 
Support from central functions  5 (100) 6 (100) 11 (100) 
Physical environment  Nil identified 
Policies and procedures Nil identified 
Scheduling and bed management Nil identified 
Training and education Nil identified 
Latent external factors 6 (2.5) 0 0 6 (1.6) 
Design of equipment and supplies 
- transdermal patch adhesion 
6 (100) 0 0 6 (100) 
External policy context Nil identified 
General factors       
Communication systems 36 (14.9) 28 (20.3) 64 (16.9) 
- Written communication 25 (69.4) 16 (57.1) 41 (64.1) 
- Clinical handover 11 (30.6) 12 (42.9) 23 (35.9) 
Safety culture Nil identified 
 107 
4.6 Discussion – Study 2  
This retrospective review study has provided insights into the characteristics of 
reported medication errors with opioids in palliative and cancer care services at a 
state-wide level. As acknowledged previously, when analysing clinical incident 
notifications multiple sources of data/information are required to understand the 
context. Given the wide variation between services and facilities in NSW Health, 
accurate comparisons cannot be made based on incident notification numbers alone 
as many variables can influence incident reporting.  
During the four year reporting period, palliative and cancer care services in NSW 
reported significantly more incidents with hydromorphone and morphine compared 
to all other services combined. These data may reflect that the patient population in 
palliative and cancer care services are more likely to be using opioids (in particular 
hydromorphone and morphine) for pain than other services. This also highlights the 
risk of patient harm in an already vulnerable patient population (Myers & Lynn, 
2001). In contrast, incidents with oxycodone and morphine are the most frequently 
reported in other services in the NSW public health system (Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2019).  
Opioid administration and prescribing errors were the most frequently reported 
problem type, consistent with opioid error reporting trends in other health care 
settings (Carson, Jacob, & McQuillan, 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Dy, Shore, Hicks, & 
Morlock, 2007). However, opioid prescribing error reporting was slightly lower in 
palliative and cancer services than identified in other acute care units (15% vs. 21%) 
(Dy et al., 2007). The complexity of patients, interpretation of error, differing drug 
utilisation between settings, and variability in staff reporting, are other factors that 
may contribute to this finding. 
There were notable differences in reported administration error types and subsequent 
dose errors between services. Of note, and somewhat unexpectedly, palliative care 
services reported significantly more omitted dose errors than cancer services, with a 
correspondingly significant rate of opioid under dose directly due to error. This is in 
contrast to opioid dose outcomes in another study where over half (53%) of all 
reported opioid errors in acute care settings resulted in opioid overdose (Dy et al., 
2007).  
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Conversely, in this study, the reporting of opioid overdose due to error in cancer 
services was significantly greater than reported in palliative care services, likely 
attributable to the significantly higher number of wrong route errors, most of which 
involved hydromorphone given subcutaneously instead of orally. While wrong route 
errors, both with opioids (Dy et al., 2007) and other drugs (Barker, Flynn, Pepper, 
Bates, & Mikeal, 2002), are relatively infrequent in other adult healthcare settings, 
hydromorphone is over three-times more potent when delivered subcutaneously 
compared to orally (eviQ Cancer Treatments Online, 2018), considerably adding to 
the risk of patient harm from opioid overdose. 
Patients over 65 are more likely to be exposed to, and experience harm from, 
medication errors (Myers & Lynn, 2001). Over half of patients who experienced an 
opioid error in this study were aged 65 years over; however, there were no 
significant differences in the degree of patient harm following an error for these 
patients, compared to those aged under 65 years. These findings warrant further 
investigation, as almost half the incident reports did not document patient outcome 
following the error, limiting data analysis. 
Initial analysis of factors contributing to opioid errors suggest active failures 
underpinned errors in almost half of all incident reports. Importantly, contributory 
factors are identified by the clinician completing the incident report and have not 
been validated. Error contributory factors skewed towards human error in this study, 
which may be due to the notifiers’ limited understanding of latent causes of error and 
the tendency to report the error or individual factor itself as the cause (Lawton et al., 
2012; Mahajan, 2010). All reported error contributory factors were adequately 
represented by the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) 
in this study. A comprehensive analysis of opioid error contributory factors, 
combining data from incident reports and clinicians’ perceptions, is warranted to 
identify individual, organisational and/or latent factors that may be contributing to 
opioid errors in cancer and palliative care services. 
Based on the results of this retrospective review of opioid error data across NSW, 
further exploration of opioid error prevalence, error contributory factors, and patient 
impact at a local level, and in the context of specialist palliative care inpatient service 
delivery, are essential next steps to better understand these results.  
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4.6.1 Limitations 
NSW Health clinicians and managers maintain a culture of reporting clinical 
incidents to ensure action is taken to improve the safety and quality of care provided 
to patients. However, comprehensive and timely reporting is reliant on the clinician 
notifying, leading to potential for variation in reporting patterns. Though counts or 
rates have been used in this study it is acknowledged that when analysing clinical 
incident notifications multiple sources of data/information is required  to understand 
the context, the safety and quality issues, and opportunities for improvement. Given 
the wide variation between services and facilities in NSW Health, accurate 
comparisons cannot be made based on incident notification numbers alone. Many 
variables can influence incident reporting. Lower rates of reporting are not a reliable 
indicator of safer care. Further qualitative, rather than quantitative, interpretation of 
the data is also required (Clinical Excellence Commission, 2018).  
The incident analysis is based only on information contained in the 'incident 
description' ‘contributing factors’ and 'review of incident' section in the Incident 
Information Management System (IIMS) notifications. If the information was not 
documented in these sections, or the selected search terms were not used or were 
spelt differently, the incidents will not have been captured during this review. It 
should be noted that all reviews of incident data are retrospective and can reflect both 
hindsight and outcome bias. 
Data from this study relied solely on opioid errors reported via clinical incident 
management systems, which identify significantly fewer medication errors than 
measurement by audit and/or observation, suggesting opioid errors are likely to occur 
more frequently than is currently being reported (Australian Commission on Safety 
and Quality in Health Care and NSW Therapeutic Advisory Group Inc., 2013; 
Levinson, 2012; Munzner, Welch, & Richardson, 2012; Westbrook et al., 2015). 
Medication errors are known to be widely under-reported, with great variations in 
reporting practices across services (Institute of Medicine, 2007). Additionally, data 
analysis was predicated on the incident narrative as reported by the incident notifier, 
which may not capture all relevant information pertaining to the incident (Vincent, 
2007). Incident notifications are the notifier’s perception and not necessarily a true 
interpretation of facts or reality and as the incident narrative is completed 
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retrospectively it may reflect both hindsight and outcome bias. The incident narrative 
also does not contain any context (e.g. complexity of patients or services, drug 
utilisation by patient group or setting) and the variation in reporting patterns (as 
timely reporting is reliant on the notifier) limits the ability to use this data to make 
any accurate comparisons between services and settings.  Finally, contributing 
factors are identified by the clinician completing the incident report making reporting 
subject to interpretation and bias. 
The de-identified nature of the datasets precluded calculation of opioid error 
prevalence and limited in-depth statistical analysis, as service and patient 
characteristics were not available. Despite these limitations, this study has provided 
valuable insights into reported opioid error characteristics and patient impact of 
opioid error in cancer and palliative care services, which, to our knowledge, has not 
been previously reported.    
It should be noted that at the time of this study the majority of NSW health services 
were using hand written medication charts. Since the study electronic medication 
management systems that are improving the reliability of medication management 
have been implemented and significant investment has been made by NSW Health 
and the Clinical Excellence Commission to address errors and to improve systems in 
relation to medication management. 
4.7 Summary – Study 2 
Identifying the prevalence, characteristics and patient impact of reported opioid 
errors is a crucial first step in better understanding and addressing opioid errors 
clinically, and establishing a baseline of opioid error data against which local opioid 
incident data can be compared. Results from this study will be used to inform 
retrospective reviews of reported opioid errors in local palliative care services. 
4.8 Context for Study 3 
Study 2 identified the characteristics and patient impact of opioid errors reported in 
palliative and cancer care services in NSW over approximately three years. The 
study indicated that in palliative care services: i) errors with hydromorphone and 
morphine were the most frequently reported, ii) opioid administration errors were the 
leading problem type reported, iii) omitted dose errors accounted for the majority of 
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reported administration errors, and iv) patients were more likely to experience an 
opioid under dose, than overdose, as a direct result of an opioid error, adversely 
impacting pain management. Study 3 sought to further explore the scope of opioid 
errors in local specialist palliative care inpatient services and compare the findings to 
those reported in NSW palliative care services in Study 2.  
Study 3 was a retrospective review of reported opioid errors in three specialist 
palliative care inpatient services in metropolitan NSW. In addition to identifying 
opioid error characteristics and patient impact at a local level, Study 3 sought to 
establish the volume of opioid use and opioid error incidence within the participating 
services, as this could not be identified from the data sets in Study 2. Study 3 
continues to scope the extent and patient impact of opioid errors, specifically in local 
specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
4.9 Publication reference - Study 3 
The results of Study 3 were published as a short report in BMJ Supportive and 
Palliative Care, a peer reviewed scholarly journal targeting clinicians and healthcare 
workers undertaking clinical work in palliative medicine, specialist or generalist 
palliative care, supportive care, psychosocial-oncology and end-of-life care. This 
chapter contains an edited version of the published short report (Appendix 1) and 
additional data from a 7-day snapshot audit, undertaken to quantify the frequency of 
opioid delivery in inpatient palliative care services. 
Heneka, N., Shaw, T., Rowett, D., Lapkin, S. & Phillips, J. (2018). 
Opioid errors in inpatient palliative care services: a retrospective 
review. BMJ Supportive and Palliative Care, 8(2), 175-179.  
BMJ Supportive and Palliative Care: Impact factor: 2.385; ISI JCR Ranking 2017: 
35/94 (Health Care Sciences & Services). 
The published short report was picked up by the Australian Science Media Centre 
and included on the Scimex (Scientific Media Exchange) website, an online news 
portal aimed at helping journalists cover science and research (Appendix 1). As a 
result, Fairfax Media featured an article on the short report, in both print and online 
news nationally (Appendix 1), and ABC News Breakfast, a national radio broadcast, 
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interviewed the PhD Candidate (NH) on January 8, 2018. The short report was also 
promoted by BMJ Supportive and Palliative Care, as the ‘best article to read this 
month’ (Appendix 1).                   
4.10 Objectives – Study 3  
The objectives of Study 3 were to:  
i) quantify the number of opioids ordered and administered in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services; 
ii) identify the number of opioid errors reported by specialist palliative care 
inpatient services; 
iii) determine the impact of opioid errors on palliative patient outcomes; and 
iv) identify reported opioid error characteristics. 
4.11 Methods – Study 3  
Study methods have been described in Chapter 3. As outlined in Chapter 3, this study 
includes two parts: i) a retrospective seven-day snapshot audit of opioid orders and 
administrations (Study 3a), and ii) a retrospective audit of reported opioid errors 
from three specialist palliative care inpatient services in NSW over 24 months (Study 
3b).  
4.12 Results - Study 3a (snapshot audit)  
The seven-day snapshot audit captured opioid orders and administrations for 120 
palliative inpatients in three specialist palliative care inpatient services (Table 4.6). 
Patients spent an average of 5.4 days (±2.4) in the palliative care unit in the audit 
period. Almost all (98%) palliative inpatients had at least one opioid order (regular, 
PRN or STAT). One-third of patients (29%) had two or more regular opioid orders, 
and almost half (44%) had two or more PRN orders. Hydromorphone accounted for 
almost half (48%) of all opioid administrations (Figure 4.4).
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Table 4.6 Overview of service characteristics and opioid orders per patient in seven-day snapshot audit of three specialist palliative care inpatient 
services 
 Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 Total 
Service characteristics      
Number of available beds in audit period (n) 39 38 20 97 
Number of patients in audit period (n) 48 45 27 120 
Percentage occupancy in audit period (%) 83.9% 98.1% 87.9% 92.0% 
Mean number of days patient on ward in audit period (±SD) 5.0 (±3.4) 6.0 (±2.1) 5.0 (±2.7) 5.4 (±2.4) 
Opioid orders per patient in snapshot audit period     
Total number of patients with an opioid order (regular, PRN 
and/or STAT) n (%) 48 (100%) 44 (97.8%) 25 (92.6%) 117 (97.5%) 
Regular opioid orders in audit period n (%)     
Number of patients with nil regular opioid order  12 (25.0%) 6 (13.6%) 11 (44.0%) 29 (24.8%) 
Patients with one regular opioid order only 23 (47.9%) 21 (47.7%) 11 (44.0%) 55 (47.0%) 
Patients with two regular opioid orders  8 (16.7%) 10 (22.7%) 3 (17.9%) 21 (17.9%) 
Patients with three regular opioid orders 2 (4.2%) 5 (11.4%) 0 (6.0%) 7 (6.0%) 
Patients with four regular opioid orders 1 (2.1%) 1 (2.3%) 0 (1.7%) 2 (1.7%) 
Patients with five regular opioid orders 2 (4.2%) 1 (2.3%) 0 (2.6%) 3 (2.6%) 
PRN and stat opioid orders in audit period n (%)     
Patients with nil PRN order  1 (2.1%) 0  0  1 (0.9%) 
Patients with one PRN order  20 (41.7%) 29 (65.9%) 16 (64.0%) 65 (55.6%) 
Patients with two PRN orders 16 (33.3%) 8 (18.2%) 8 (32.0%) 32 (27.4%) 
Patients with three PRN orders 7 (14.6%) 5 (11.4%) 1 (4.0%) 13 (11.1%) 
Patients with four PRN orders 4 (8.3%) 2 (4.5%) 0 6 (5.1%) 
Patients with STAT opioid order  3 (6.3%) 0 4 (16.0%) 7 (6.0%) 
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Figure 4.4 Percentage of opioid administrations in seven-day snapshot audit, provided 
to 120 inpatients in the participating specialist palliative care inpatient services (n=3)  
 
In total, there were 10,031 opioid doses ordered (regular, PRN and/or STAT) and 
1,732 opioid doses administered across the three specialist palliative care inpatient 
services in seven days (Table 4.7). This equates to 86 opioid orders per patient over 
seven days, or 12 opioid orders per patient, per day. Opioids were administered 247 
time per day, equating to one opioid administration approximately every six minutes 
in the specialist palliative care inpatient service. 
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Table 4.7 Overview of opioid orders and administrations in seven-day snapshot audit for three specialist palliative care inpatient services 
 Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 Total 
Opioid orders and administrations in snapshot audit period      
Regular opioids     
Total regular opioid doses ordered in audit period (n)  444 698 100 1242 
Total regular opioid doses administered in audit period n (%)a  377 (84.9%) 690 (98.9%) 83 (83.0%) 1150 (92.6%) 
PRN opioids     
Total PRN opioid doses ordered in audit period  2928 1783 4070 8781 
Total PRN opioid doses administered in audit period n (%)  141 (4.8%) 225 (12.6%) 208 (5.1%) 574 (6.5%) 
STAT opioids     
Total STAT opioid doses ordered in audit period (n) 4 0 4 8 
Total STAT opioid doses administered in audit period n (%)  4 (100%) 0 4 (100%) 8 
Total opioid doses ordered in audit period 3376 2481 4174 10,031 
Total opioid doses administered 522 915 295 1732 
                 a All omitted doses were therapeutic omissions or dose omissions due to the patient being off the ward (e.g., for investigation/treatment).
 116 
4.13 Results – Study 3b (local retrospective review) 
Study 3b was a retrospective review of consecutive clinical incidents with opioids 
reported by three NSW specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
4.13.1 Opioid error prevalence 
Opioid errors accounted for 32% (n=55) of all reported medication errors (N=174), 
equating to 0.9 (±1.5) opioid errors per 1000 occupied bed days (Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5 Comparison of reported opioid errors and all reported medication errors 
per 1000 occupied bed days in specialist palliative care inpatient services (n=3)  
 
4.13.2 Patient impact  
Eighty four percent (n=46) of reported opioid errors reached the patient. The mean 
age of the affected patients was 71.3 years (± 10.7). Most patients (84%, n=46) had 
cancer and almost two-thirds (62%, n=54) of patients died during this admission. The 
mean length of stay for these patients was 27.2 days (± 20.0) (Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8 Patient demographics – patients involved in reported opioid errors (N=55) 
Demographics  Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 Total 
  N=22 (100%) N=14 (100%) N=19 (100%) N=55 (100%) 
Gender Male 14 (63.6) 5 (36.0) 9 (47.4) 28 (50.9) 
Female 8 (36.4) 9 (64.0) 10 (52.6) 27 (49.1) 
Age (years) Mean (SD)  76.3 (±9.2) 67.3 (±9.9) 68.0 (±10.5) 71.3 (±10.7) 
Median (IQR) 77.5 (15) 68.5 (18) 65.0 (18) 72.0 (18) 
Cancer diagnosis Yes 16 (72.7) 12 (85.7) 18 (94.7) 46 (83.6) 
No 6 (27.3) 2 (14.3) 1 (5.3) 9a (16.4) 
Primary reason for 
admission 
Symptom management 11 (50.0) 5 (35.7) 15 (78.9) 31 (56.4) 
End of life care 4 (18.2) 3 (21.4) 1 (5.3) 8 (14.5) 
Pain control 3 (13.6) 4 (28.6) 1 (5.3) 8 (14.5) 
Respite 2 (9.1) 1 (7.1) 2 (10.5) 5 (9.1) 
Palliative rehab 2 (9.1) 0 0 0 0 2 (3.6) 
Supportive care 0 0 1 (7.1) 0 0 1 (1.8) 
Length of stay (days) Mean (SD) 19.9 (±13.5) 30.9 (±24.6) 32.8 (±20.3) 27.2 (±20.0) 
Median (IQR) 15.5  (14) 25.0 (32) 30.0 (22) 22.0 (24) 
Died during admission Yes 12 (54.5) 8 (57.1) 14 (73.7) 34 (61.8) 
No 10 (45.5) 6 (42.9) 5 (26.3) 21 (38.2) 
aOther than cancer diagnosis: COPD (n=2- 1), heart failure (n=1), cardiac amyloidosis (n=1), end stage liver failure (n=1), end stage renal disease (n=1), lung function failure (n=1), motor neuron 
disease (n=1), sepsis (n=1). 
 118 
One-third (33%, n=18) of opioid errors resulted in patient harm (Table 4.9), 
requiring clinical intervention as a direct consequence of the error. An additional 
one-fifth (20%, n=11) of patients required monitoring and/or a clinical intervention 
to preclude harm following an opioid error.  
Table 4.9 Impact of reported opioid errors on patient outcomes 
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and 
Prevention error category (Hartwig et al., 1991) N=55 (100%) 
Category B - error occurred, did not reach patient 9 (16.4) 
Category C - error reached patient, no patient harma 11 (20.0) 
Category D - error reached patient, required monitoringb and/or interventionc 
to preclude harma 11 (20.0) 
Category E - error resulting in temporary patient harma which required 
interventionc 18 (32.7) 
Error reached patient - patient impact/outcome not documented  6 (10.9) 
a Harm: Impairment of physical, emotional, or psychological function or structure of the body and/or pain 
resulting from error; b Monitoring: observation or recording (Hartwig et al., 1991) of relevant physiological 
or psychological signs; c Intervention: change in therapy or active medical treatment. 
 
Over half of patients (57%, n=26), received an opioid underdose as a direct 
consequence of an opioid administration error (Table 4.10). Almost half of these 
patients (42%, n=11) subsequently required PRN opioids to manage their increased 
pain (n=9) or shortness of breath (n=2). 
Table 4.10  Reported opioid error underdose characteristics 
Administration 
error type 
Opioid  
ordered 
Opioid  
administered 
Under-dosage            
(% of ordered 
dose)a 
Wrong dose Morphine s/c 40 mg regular Morphine s/c 4 mg  10% 
Hydromorphone PO 80 mg 
regular 
Hydromorphone PO 8 mg  10% 
Morphine PO 120 mg regular Morphine PO 60 mg  50% 
Oxycodone/Naloxone 10/5 
regular 
Oxycodone/Naloxone 5/2.5  50% 
Wrong drug Hydromorphone s/c 5 mg 
regular 
Morphine s/c 5 mg  12% 
OxyContin PO 10 mg regular MS Contin PO 5 mg 33% 
Hydromorphone s/c 1.5 mg      
PRN 
Fentanyl s/c 60 mcg 50% 
Omitted dose 
Number of doses omitted Frequency   
1 9 0% 
2 3 
3 2 
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Thirty nine percent (n=18) of patients experienced an opioid overdose due to the 
opioid error, ranging from 1.5 to 11-fold higher doses of the intended opioid order 
being administered (Table 4.11). Opioid toxicity was documented in 39% (n=7) of 
these patients; however, administration of an opioid reversal agent was not required 
for any of these patients. 
Table 4.11 Reported opioid error over dose characteristics  
Opioid over-dose characteristics 
Problem type Error type Opioid ordered Opioid administered 
Over-
dosagea 
Prescribing Charting – 
duplicated dose 
Morphine s/c      
20 mg PRN 
Additional morphine s/c 
20 mg PRN 2-fold 
Charting 
Hydromorphon
e PO 0.5 mg 
regular 
Hydromorphone PO 2 
mg  
4-fold 
Conversion error 
Morphine PO Hydromorphone s/c 1.5-fold 
Fentanyl 
transdermal  Hydromorphone s/c 2-fold 
Administration 
Wrong dose 
Oxycodone PO    
20 mg PRN 
Additional oxycodone 
PO 20 mg  
2-fold 
Morphine PO      
20 mg regular Morphine PO 40 mg  
2-fold 
Oxycodone PO    
10 mg PRN Oxycodone PO 20 mg
b 2-fold 
Hydromorphon
e PO 5 mg 
regular 
Hydromorphone PO 10 
mg  
2-fold 
Morphine s/c       
60 mg via 
syringe driver 
Morphine s/c  60 mg via 
two syringe drivers 
2-fold 
Wrong drug 
 
Morphine s/c         
5 mg regular 
Hydromorphone s/c 5 
mg 
6-fold 
Morphine s/c       
10 mg regular  
Hydromorphone s/c 10 
mg 
6-fold 
Fentanyl s/c     
350 mcg (via 
syringe driver) 
Morphine s/c 400 mg 
(via syringe driver) 
11-fold 
Transdermal 
patch –  
not removed 
 
Fentanyl 12 
mcg 
Fentanyl 12 mcg patch 
insitu 7 days 
Unable to 
determine 
Fentanyl 25 
mcg 
Buprenorphine 5 mg 
patch insitu 6 days 
Unable to 
determine 
Fentanyl 25 
mcg 
Buprenorphine 25 mg 
patch insitu 3 days 
Unable to 
determine 
Fentanyl 37 
mcg 
Patch insitu 3 days 
following order to 
remove 
Unable to 
determine 
Wrong patient Endone PO           5 mg regular 
Oxynorm PO  
10 mg 
Two-fold 
s/c – subcutaneous; PO – per oral;  
a dose calculations using EviQ opioid conversion calculator (eviQ Cancer Treatments Online, 2018) 
b two instances of same wrong dose error in different patients 
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4.13.3 Opioid error characteristics 
Two thirds of reported opioid errors involved morphine (35%, n=19) or 
hydromorphone (29%, n=16). Opioid errors were more likely to occur with regular 
(78%, n=43) PRN orders (27%, n=10), and occurred more frequently with oral (49%, 
n=27) than subcutaneous (36%, n=20) or transdermal opioid administration (15%, 
n=8). The peak time for opioid errors was between 08:00 and 08:59 hours (20%, 
n=10), reflecting main medication delivery times in all participating services.  
Administration errors 
Opioid administration errors accounted for three-quarters (76%, n=42) of reported 
opioid errors, and were the most frequently reported opioid error type at each service 
(Table 4.12). Omitted opioid doses (33%, n=14) were the leading administration 
error reported. All omitted doses were non-therapeutic omissions, rather than doses 
withheld based on clinical judgement. Wrong dose errors (24%, n=10) occurred 
primarily with oral opioids (82%, n=9). One-fifth (19%, n=8) of administration 
errors occurred due to missing transdermal patch errors (n=4) or non-removal of 
original transdermal patch (n=4) (Table 4.12).  
Prescribing and other errors 
Opioid prescribing errors comprised 15% (n=8) of reported opioid errors and were 
most frequently reported with regular hydromorphone (63%, n=5). Prescribing errors 
were primarily due to medication charting errors (50%, n=4), opioid conversion 
(25%, n=2), or wrong drug errors (25%, n=2). A very small number of ‘near miss’ 
(wrong patient) (5%, n=3) and dispensing errors (4%, n=2) were reported (Table 
4.12).  
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Table 4.12 Overview of reported opioid incidents by problem type 
Problem type Incident type 
Service 1 
 
Service 2 
 
Service 3 
 
Total 
N=22  (100%) N=14  (100%) N=19 (100%) N=55 (100%) 
Administration  Total 13 (59.1) 12 (86.7) 17 (89.5) 42 (76.4) 
Omitted dose 9 (69.2) 0 0 5 (29.4) 14 (33.3) 
Wrong dose 3 (23.1) 4 (33.3) 3 (17.6) 10 (23.8) 
Transdermal patch 
error – missing or 
not removed 
0 0 3 (25.0) 5 (29.4) 8 (19.1) 
Wrong drug 1 (7.7) 3 (25.0) 2 (11.8) 6 (14.3) 
Wrong patient 0 0 1 (8.3) 2 (11.8) 3 (7.1) 
 Device – wrong rate 0 0 1 (8.3) 0 0 1 (2.4) 
Prescribing  Total 7 (31.8) 1 (7.1) 0 0 8 (14.5) 
Medication charting 3 (42.9) 1 (100) 0 0 4 (50.0) 
Opioid conversion 
error 
2 (28.6) 0 0 0 0 2 (25.0) 
Wrong drug 2 (28.6) 0 0 0 0 2 (25.0) 
Near miss  Total 2 (9.1) 0 0 1 (5.3) 3 (5.4) 
Wrong patient 2 (100) 0 0 1 (100) 3 (100) 
Dispensing Total 0 0 1 (7.1) 1 (5.3) 2 (3.6) 
Drug preparation 
error 
0 0 0 0 1 (100) 1 (100) 
 Expired medicine 
dispensed 
0 0 1 (100) 0 0 1 (100) 
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4.14 Discussion - Study 3 
This local retrospective review has identified the percentage of reported opioid errors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient services was almost three-times higher than 
reported in other inpatient settings (Carson et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Mc 
Donnell, 2011), and double that reported by hospitals, individual practitioners, and 
community pharmacies collectively (Prairie Research Association, 2014). These 
differences are visually represented in Figure 4.6. Comparatively, opioid errors made 
up: 9% (n=507) of medication related safety reports in a Canadian paediatric hospital 
over four years (Mc Donnell, 2011); 10% (n=3105) of medication errors reported in 
396 USA nursing homes over 12 months (Desai et al., 2013); 12% (n=54) of 
medication errors reported over five years in a 620 bed acute general hospital in 
Ireland (Carson et al., 2009); and 16% (n=6076) of all medication incidents based on 
national incident data (inpatient, outpatient, community) reported over six years in 
Canada (Prairie Research Association, 2014).  
  
Figure 4.6 Comparison of rate of reported opioid errors as percentage of all reported 
medication errors types  
 
The higher percentage of opioid error reporting may be due to the frequency of 
opioid delivery, and the volume of opioid orders, in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. As identified in the seven-day snapshot audit, an opioid is 
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delivered approximately every six minutes in this specialist setting . However, it may 
also reflect differences in error reporting culture in the specialist palliative care 
inpatient services compared to other healthcare settings. While this could not be 
ascertained from the incident reports in this study, further exploration from the 
perspective of palliative care clinicians may provide further insights into the 
prevalence of reported opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services.   
Patient impact 
Over half of palliative inpatients in this review required clinical intervention and/or 
monitoring to preclude or manage iatrogenic harm(s) as a direct consequence of an 
opioid error. The majority of opioid errors in this review resulted in opioid 
underdosing, which is over double the rate reported in other hospital settings (57% vs 
23%), where opioid overdose is a more likely error outcome (Dy et al., 2007). 
Although wrong drug and wrong dose administration errors caused opioid 
underdosing in this review, omitted opioid doses were the primary contributor to 
opioid underdosing and subsequent adverse impact on patients’ previously well 
managed pain. 
Unrelieved pain is a major issue in specialist palliative care (Pidgeon et al., 2016) 
and it appears opioid errors, particularly omitted dose errors, may be contributing to 
the burden of palliative patients’ pain. Better understanding of the factors that 
contribute to or mitigate opioid errors, including systems factors and the impact of 
error reporting culture, and developing strategies to prevent iatrogenic pain occurring 
as a result of opioid errors, is a priority for this clinical setting and population.  
Opioid error characteristics – administration errors 
Opioid administration errors accounted for the majority (76%) of all reported opioid 
errors in this study, reflecting trends in opioid error prevalence reported in other 
health care settings (Carson et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Dy et al., 2007; Mc 
Donnell, 2011). However, administration error types in this study differed from other 
healthcare settings (Figure 4.7). 
Wrong dose (13%-49%) and wrong drug (27%-35%) errors are the most commonly 
reported opioid administration errors in healthcare settings internationally (Desai et 
al., 2013; Dy et al., 2007; Mc Donnell, 2011; Prairie Research Association, 2014) as 
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illustrated in Figure 4.7. Whereas, these administration error types were reported far 
less frequently in the specialist palliative care inpatient services in this study. Further  
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of opioid administration error types as percentage of all 
reported opioid administration errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services in 
the PERISCOPE project and other healthcare settings 
 
exploration of these differences in error types is warranted in the specialist palliative 
care inpatient context. 
In contrast, the specialist palliative care inpatient services in this study reported 2.5 
times more omitted dose errors, compared to other healthcare settings (Prairie 
Research Association, 2014), with omitted dose accounting for one-third of reported 
opioid administration errors. All reported omitted dose errors in this study were non-
therapeutic omissions (i.e., a reason for dose omission was not documented) 
(Latimer, Chaboyer, & Hall, 2011), not doses withheld based on clinical judgement, 
patient refusal, or drug unavailability (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality 
in Health Care, 2016). Comparatively omitted dose errors (all drug types) have been 
shown to account for up to 25% of all reported medication errors internationally 
(National Patient Safety Agency, 2010) and up to 11% in Australian studies (Latimer 
et al., 2011; Lawler, Welch, & Brien, 2004; O'shea, Spalding, & Carter, 2009). 
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Given the relationship between the high rate of omitted dose errors and the degree of 
iatrogenic patient harm in specialist palliative care inpatient services identified in this 
study, it is critical to better understand the underlying factors contributing to omitted 
dose errors in this care setting.  
One factor may be related to the use of electronic versus paper medication 
management systems in specialist palliative care inpatient services. In this study, the 
lowest overall prevalence of both reported opioid errors and omitted dose errors 
came from the service utilising the electronic medication management system. In 
contrast, omitted doses comprised up to two-thirds of reported adminstration errors 
in the two services using paper medication charts. Electronic medication 
management systems have been shown to reduce medication errors in other clinical 
settings (Ammenwerth, Schnell-Inderst, Machan, & Siebert, 2008), which may 
account for the differences observed in this review; however, further investigation is 
warranted to confirm this observation.  
Another difference between the services was the proportionally greater number of 
prescribing errors reported by the service without an onsite clinical pharmacist. The 
presence of an onsite pharmacist may help identify and avert opioid prescribing 
errors before they are administered (Herndon et al., 2016), and this factor warrants 
further exploration in the palliative care service context. While the percentage of 
reported opioid prescribing errors in this study is similar to that reported in inpatient 
acute care (Carson et al., 2009; Dy, 2016) and nursing homes (Desai et al., 2013), the 
small number of prescribing errors reported in this study limits meaningful 
comparisons with other healthcare services. Further investigation from the 
perspective of palliative care clinicians is required to better understand these results. 
Frequency of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services  
The seven-day snapshot audit identified a high volume of opioid orders per palliative 
inpatient and a high frequency of opioid administrations in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. To our knowledge, this is the first report to quantify opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services. Hence, as comparable data 
could not be identified in the literature, these results will be explored in more depth 
with palliative care clinicians in a future study.  
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4.14.1 Strengths and limitations 
A major strength of this review is that it examined reported opioid errors across three 
similar specialist palliative care inpatient services, identified opioid error prevalence, 
quantified opioid delivery, and characterised reported opioid errors in accordance 
with accepted taxonomies (Hartwig et al., 1991; National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 1998). A limitation of this review is that 
as medication errors are consistently under-reported it is conceivable that the actual 
number of medication errors patients experienced during their admission may have 
been higher than those reported (Westbrook et al., 2015). The variations in opioid 
error reporting practices noted between services may reflect differences in service 
systems and/or error reporting cultures across services; however, this could not be 
confirmed by this review alone.   
The seven-day snapshot audit does not account for different bed-occupancy rates, 
variations in patient opioid needs and opioid delivery practices. Therefore, the seven-
day snapshot audit data needs to be interpreted with some caution. Without a larger 
scale assessment of opioid errors as a proportion of opioid involved, further 
conclusions cannot be drawn. However, this seven-day snapshot audit does provide 
some insights into the volume and frequency of opioid delivery across specialist 
palliative care inpatient services.  
The impact of broader systems factors that may be contributing to opioid errors, 
irrespective of the opioid involved, warrants further consideration.      
4.15 Summary 
Establishing a baseline profile of opioid error characteristics and prevalence in 
palliative care inpatient services is an important first step to quantifying the burden 
of this problem. Like most errors, opioid errors in this specialist setting occur as a 
result of a complex interplay of systems, health professional and patient factors. 
Better understanding these factors and their role in opioid errors is required. Given 
the variations in reporting practices between services in this review, further 
exploration of service characteristics and error reporting culture is also warranted.   
The following chapter reports the final retrospective review (Study 4) undertaken in 
the PERISCOPE project, which sought to explicitly explore opioid error contributory 
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factors documented in clinical incident reports in two specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. 
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Chapter 5: Exploring reported opioid error 
contributory factors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services   
5.1 Chapter preface 
Chapter 4 reported the results of two retrospective reviews of clinical incidents with 
opioids reported in NSW and local palliative care services. These reviews identified 
that opioid administration errors account for three-quarters of reported opioid errors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient services, and that omitted dose errors are the 
most frequently reported error type in this setting. Half of palliative inpatients who 
experience an opioid error will require a clinical intervention to manage or preclude 
harm. 
Having determined opioid errors prevalence, patient impact and characteristics, it 
was essential to next identify opioid error contributory factors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services. As mentioned previously, only two specialist palliative care 
inpatient services participated in this final retrospective review as reported opioid 
error contributory factors were not accessible from the remaining palliative care 
services in the PERISCOPE project. This chapter reports the results of a 
retrospective review of reported opioid error contributory factors (Study 4) 
undertaken in two specialist palliative care inpatient services in NSW. 
5.2 Publication reference 
This study was published in 2018 in the Journal of Palliative Medicine, a peer 
reviewed journal which covers medical, psychosocial, policy, and legal issues in end 
of life care. This chapter contains an edited version of the published study. 
Heneka, N., Shaw, T., Rowett, D., Lapkin, S., & Phillips, J. L. 
(2018). Exploring factors contributing to medication errors with 
opioids in Australian specialist palliative care inpatient services: a 
multi-incident analysis. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 21(6), 825-
835.  
Journal of Palliative Medicine: Impact factor: 2.49 
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5.3 Overview 
Medication safety with opioids is increasingly being recognised as a palliative care 
patient safety priority (Dietz et al., 2013; Dy, 2016; Heneka, Shaw, Azzi, & Phillips, 
2018). Opioid errors account for one-third of all reported medication errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient services (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & 
Phillips, 2018b). Yet, little is known about the factors contributing to opioid errors in 
this specialist setting. Understanding the factors contributing to opioid errors is an 
essential first step in reducing error occurrence and resultant patient harm (Lawton et 
al., 2012).  
System versus individual clinician factors 
Factors contributing to medication errors can be broadly categorised into two groups: 
errors caused by systems factors, and errors due to individual clinician factors 
(McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006). Few medication errors have a single cause, with 
most errors occurring as a result of differing combinations of individual, team, 
environmental and/or organisational factors (Institute of Medicine, 2007; Lawton et 
al., 2012; Reason, 2008). Adopting a systems approach to medication errors 
recognises that the health care settings in which clinicians work are, themselves, 
subject to latent failures, which manifest as error promoting conditions in the 
workplace (Lawton et al., 2012). Hence, focussing solely on the actions of the 
clinician (active failures) when errors occur will not prevent error recurrence, if, in 
fact, failings within the system itself are the issue (Lawton et al., 2012; McBride-
Henry & Foureur, 2006).   
Integral to a systems approach to patient safety is the use of incident reporting 
systems. These systems are widely used in healthcare to identify, investigate and 
respond to medication errors (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care, 2017; Institute of Medicine, 2007; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; 
Smetzer & Cohen, 2007). While preliminary analysis of opioid error contributory 
factors in palliative care services across NSW has been undertaken(Heneka, Shaw, 
Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018a), in almost half of incident reports (44%, n=63) an 
error contributory factor was not documented, limiting data analysis. This study 
sought to explore opioid error contributory factors reported over three years in 
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specialist palliative care inpatient services to better understand the individual and 
systems factors that may be contributing to opioid errors in this specialist setting. 
5.4 Objective 
The objective of this study was to identify opioid error contributory factors 
documented in clincal incident reports, in specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
5.5 Methods 
Study methods have been described in Chapter 3. 
As previously mentioned, only two of the specialist palliative care inpatient services 
in the PERISCOPE project participated in this study (Service 1 and Service 3). 
Service 2 could not be included in this study as a rebuild of the services’ incident 
management system prevented extraction of documented error contributory factors 
for the retrospective review period.   
5.6 Results  
5.6.1 Incident characteristics  
A total of 78 opioid incidents met the inclusion criteria, with an equal number of 
incidents identified in each service (n=39), representing 1.7 reported opioid incidents 
per 1000 occupied bed days. The majority of incidents involved palliative care 
inpatients with cancer (86%, n=63), who had been admitted for symptom 
management (59%, n=43) and died during their admission (70%, n=51). The mean 
length of stay was 23.3 (± 20.0) days (Table 5.1).  
Three quarters of incidents were due to administration errors (76%, n=59), with a 
smaller number of prescribing errors (19%, n=15) and near miss incidents (5%, n=4) 
reported (Table 5.2). The most common administration errors were omitted opioid 
doses (34%, n=20), accounting for a third of all administration errors, followed by 
wrong dose errors (17%, n=10). Prescribing errors were predominately related to 
medication charting errors (33%, n=5). Almost half of all errors occurred at times, 
which coincide with peak medication administration and/or change of shift, namely 
between: 08:00 to 08:59 (13%, n=10); 20:00 to 20:59 (13%, n=10); 14:00 to 14:59 
(10%, n=8); or 22:00 to 22:59 (10%, n=8). 
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Table 5.1 Patient demographics: reported clinical incidents with opioids 
Demographics  Service 1 Service 3 Total p-value 
 N=37 (100%) N=36 (100%) N=73 (100%)  
Gender Male 20 (54.1) 18 (50.0) 38 (52.1) 0.816 
Female 17 (45.9) 18 (50.0) 35 (46.7)  
Age 
(years) 
Mean (SD)  75.2 (±10.9) 69.1 (±10.6) 72.2 (±11.1) 0.018 
Median (IQR) 76.0 (13) 71.0 (18) 74.0 (18)  
Cancer 
diagnosis 
Yes 29 (78.4) 34 (94.4) 63 (86.3) 0.085 
No 8 (21.6) 2 (5.6) 10b (13.7)  
Primary 
reason for 
admission 
Symptom 
management 20 (54.1) 23 (63.9) 43 (58.9) 
0.329 
End-of-life care 8 (21.6) 4 (11.1) 12 (16.4)  
Pain control 5 (13.5) 6 (16.7) 11 (15.1)  
Respite 2 (5.4) 3 (8.3) 5 (6.8)  
Palliative rehab 2 (5.4) 0 0 2 (2.7)  
Length of 
stay 
(days) 
Mean (SD) 18.9 (±14.1) 27.9 (±24.0) 23.3 (±20.0) 0.206* 
Median (IQR) 14.0 (21) 20.5 (26) 17.0 (23)  
Died 
during 
admission 
Yes 22 (59.5) 29 (80.6) 51 (69.9) 0.074 
No 15 (40.5) 7 (19.4) 22 (30.1)  
a Three patients experienced more than one incident during admission; two near miss incident were not linked to a 
specific patient in the incident report. b Other than cancer diagnosis: heart disease/failure (n=3), COPD (n=2), end 
stage renal disease (n=1), ischemia (n=1), motor neuron disease (n=1), pulmonary fibrosis (n=1), sepsis (n=1). 
*Adjusted with age as covariate. 
 
Collectively, two-thirds of reported incidents involved hydromorphone (37%, n=29) 
or morphine (28%, n=22). The remaining errors involved fentanyl (15%, n=12), 
oxycodone (9%, n=7), methadone (6%, n=5), and oxycodone/naloxone (4%, n=3). 
Administration errors occurred most frequently with hydromorphone (34%, n=20), 
morphine (25%, n=15), and fentanyl (20%, n=12), whereas the majority of 
prescribing errors (n=9, 60%) involved hydromorphone.   
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Table 5.2 Opioid incidents by problem type (N=78) 
Problem type Incident type Service 1 Service 3 Total 
N=39 (100%) N=39  (100%) N=78 (100%) 
Administration  Total 26 (66.7) 33 (84.6) 59 (75.6) 
Omitted dose 10 (38.5) 10 (30.3) 20 (33.9) 
Wrong dose 4 (15.4) 6 (18.2) 10 (16.9) 
Transdermal patch – 
missing or not removed 
- - 7 (21.2) 7 (11.9) 
Wrong patient 3 (11.5) 2 (6.1) 5 (8.5) 
Wrong drug 4 (15.4) - - 4 (6.8) 
Wrong route 1 (3.8) 3  (9.1) 4 (6.8) 
Syringe driver error 1 (3.8) 2 (6.1) 3 (5.1) 
Incomplete 
administration 
2 (7.7) 1 (3.0) 3 (5.1) 
Challenge – non-
compliance with policy 
- - 2 (6.1) 2 (3.4) 
 Clinical management 1 (3.8) - - 1 (1.7) 
Prescribing  Total 11 (28.2) 4 (10.3) 15 (19.2) 
Medication charting 4 (36.4) 1 (25.0) 5 (33.3) 
Opioid conversion error 3 (27.3) - - 3 (20.0) 
Wrong dose 2 (18.2) 1 (25.0) 3 (20.0) 
Wrong drug 2 (18.2) - - 2 (13.3) 
Illegible order - - 1 (25.0) 1 (6.7) 
Delayed order 1 (14.3) 1 (25.0) 1 (6.7) 
Near miss – 
arrested or 
interrupted 
sequence  
Total 2 (5.1) 2 (5.1) 4 (5.2) 
Wrong patient 2 (100) 1 (50.0) 3 (75.0) 
Wrong dose - - 1 (50.0) 1 (25.0) 
 Total 39 (100) 39 (100) 78 (100) 
 
5.6.2 Error contributory factors 
Analysis of the 78 incident case report summaries identified four primary factor 
domains per the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012):   
i) active failures, ii) individual factors, iii) communication systems, and iv) staff 
workload (Table 5.3). For a number of incidents (n=8), multiple contributory factor 
domains applied. 
Active failures 
Active failures were identified in two-thirds (n=53) of reported opioid incidents, of 
which 42% (n=22) were violations, specifically, non-compliance with medication 
management policies. 
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Active failures - violations 
Non-compliance was identified in three policy areas: safe medication administration, 
second person checks prior to administration, and medication charting. Violations of 
safe medication administration policy (n=14) included: failure to correctly document 
opioid administrations, either in the patient’s medication chart or the Schedule 8 drug 
register (n=5); and failure to check medication charts between and during shifts 
(n=4). Failure to fully implement a second person check prior to opioid 
administration was noted in four incidents, and led to wrong dose or wrong route 
errors, all of which resulted in opioid overdose. Non-compliance with medication 
ordering/prescribing policies was relatively infrequent (n=2), comprising medication 
charting errors only (Table 5.3). Two incidents reported challenges to practices when 
non-compliance with medication administration policy was identified. In both cases 
the nurse being challenged proceeded with the incorrect administration procedure 
and the challenging nurse reported the violation.  
Active failures – slips, lapses and mistakes 
Slips, lapses and mistakes collectively comprised half (51%, n=27) of active failures. 
Slips (n=11) and lapses (n=5) occurred more frequently during opioid administration 
processes (n=15, 94%); whereas, mistakes (n=11) were predominantly identified in 
the prescribing process (n=8, 73%). Slips resulted primarily in wrong dose (n=3) and 
wrong drug (n=2) errors. All lapses resulted in omitted doses, mainly during night 
shift (n=3). In all cases the incident report noted nursing staff could not recall why 
the dose had been omitted, they had simply forgotten to do so. Mistakes during 
prescribing comprised opioid conversion errors (n=3), wrong dose (n=3) and wrong 
drug (n=2) errors (Table 5.2).  
Individual factors 
Individual factors were identified as contributing factors by the notifier in 12% (n=9) 
of incidents. In one third of individual factors (n=3), staff workload also underpinned 
the incident. Inattention and/or distraction were the primary individual factors 
identified (n=4) followed by inexperience (n=3) and fatigue (n=2). All incidents 
linked with individual factors occurred during the opioid administration process. 
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Communication systems 
Communication related factors were evident in 17% (n=13) of incidents, all of which 
resulted in opioid errors that reached the patient. Deficiencies were primarily 
identified in communication during clinical handover (n=8) and in written 
communication (n=5). Poor clinical handover caused dose omissions for multiple 
patients, which adversely impacted patients’ previously well-managed pain. Failure 
of medical staff to document and/or handover changes to route of opioid 
administration also contributed to omitted doses. The interpretation of written opioid 
orders was affected by ambiguous written orders (n=3), e.g., ‘chart with morphine 
order altered from 3mg to 4mg, (clinician) signature could be mistaken as 8 mg’, and 
poorly handwritten orders (n=2), which resulted in dose misinterpretation by the 
administering nurses.  
Staff workload 
Factors related to the work environment at the time of the incident, such as increased 
workload due to staffing levels and/or high unit workload, were explicitly identified 
in 10% (n=8) of incidents, predominantly resulting in omitted doses. Multiple 
incident reports cited the ‘…busy nature of the ward’ as a contributing factor to 
opioid incidents, at times underpinning non-compliance with policy, such as failing 
to implement a two-person medication check. Increased workload contributed to 
opioid errors regardless of staff experience (Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3 Opioid incident contributing factors categorised by Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework domains (Lawton et al., 2012) 
Contributory factor and 
domain (proximal to latent) 
(Lawton et al., 2012)  
N =78 (100%) Key subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
Active failures (proximal) 53 (67.9)   
Violation 22 (41.5) Non-compliance with 
medication management 
policy 
Administration error – missing transdermal patch: ‘Patient fentanyl 50mcg patch 
was due for change/administration. Nursing staff were unable to locate previous patch 
on patient for removal. The palliative care plan was signed to say that the patch was 
sighted on the morning shift on [date] but not the (previous) afternoon or night shift. 
Care plan states that fentanyl patches should be sighted on all shifts, had this occurred 
on the afternoon and night shifts the patch may have been identified as loose or 
missing sooner.’ Site Incident ID_18 
Prescribing error – order not ceased resulting in wrong dose: ‘Whilst checking 
patient’s syringe driver it was discovered that the contents of the syringe differed from 
the order given. There were two medication orders for a syringe driver, one had not 
been cancelled from the previous day when the next one was written. Order for [date] 
was hydromorphone 5mg, new order was hydromorphone 6mg. The correct medication 
was reloaded on [date]. Contents of incorrect syringe driver discarded. The Medical 
Officer has been advised to be sure to cancel orders when another is written.’ Site 
Incident ID_49 
Slip 11 (20.8)  Administration error - wrong drug: ‘Hydromorphone 2 mg subcutaneous given at 
regular drug round instead of morphine 2 mg subcutaneous. I discussed this error with 
the two nurses involved. Both are experienced in palliative care nursing and both 
understand the difference in strength between the two drugs. Neither could offer an 
explanation for the error.’ Site Incident ID_42 
Prescribing error – wrong dose: ‘Rechart of medications done, oxycodone 40mg bd 
re-charted (unintentionally) as oxycodone 40mg d, with 0800 the only time entered. No 
oxycodone given at 2000 on [date].’ Site Incident ID_21 
Mistake 11 (20.8)  Prescribing error – wrong dose: ‘Patient had been taking 4/24 9mg oral morphine, 
yesterday this was changed to bd 60mg MS Contin. Medical staff had made an error in 
calculating dosage when changing MS Contin, however, as the dosage was within the 
normal range of MS Contin given frequently in the unit this was not picked up, and the 
higher dose was given on two occasions.’ Site Incident ID_41 
Lapse 5 (9.4)  Administration error – omitted dose: ‘During regular drug round, noted three doses 
of regular 4/24 10 mg oral morphine had not been given overnight. Nurses on shift 
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Contributory factor and 
domain (proximal to latent) 
(Lawton et al., 2012)  
N =78 (100%) Key subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
unable to explain or recall why dose omitted, other than agreeing that morphine not 
given.’ Site Incident ID_56 
Could not be determined 4 (7.5)   
Situational factors 9   (11.5)   
Individual factors 9 (100) Inattention/distraction 
Inexperience 
Fatigue  
Administration error – wrong drug: ‘Regular subcutaneous morphine 10 mg due, 
subcutaneous hydromorphone 10 mg given instead. The incident was discussed with 
the nurses concerned who are both experienced palliative care nurses. They stated 
they had given several subcutaneous hydromorphone injections prior to this patient 
and did not pay sufficient attention to this (patient’s medication order).’ Site Incident 
ID_43 
Local working conditions 8 (10.3)   
Staff workload 8 (100) Staffing levels at time of 
incident 
High unit workload 
Administration error – omitted dose: ‘Patient stated this morning that nocte 
Oxycontin 70 mg had not been administered. Oxycontin PM dose not signed for in 
medication chart. Patient requiring 1 x breakthrough subsequent AM. Reviewed roster - 
3 x staff had taken sick leave, with 1 x hospice casual and 1 x permanent RN on the 
PM shift (sick leave replaced with 1 x agency RN & 1x agency EEN).’ Site Incident 
ID_31 
Administration error – wrong drug: ‘Suspected wrong drug used in subcutaneous 
infusion pump – morphine instead of fentanyl. Two regular staff involved in incident, 
neither staff member had a history of medication errors. Ward extremely busy at time 
of incident with more than normal requirements of breakthrough analgesia required for 
multiple patients.’ Site Incident ID_19 
Applies across all factor 
types (proximal to latent) 
13 (16.6)   
Communication systems 13 (100) Poor clinical handover 
Written communication 
Administration error – omitted dose: ‘Patient seen by Medical team at 1600 [date]. 
Subcutaneous infusion pump (SCIP) ordered and team handed instruction over to 
afternoon shift nursing staff. Team noted in progress notes that patient was a high falls 
risk and should be transferred to different bed. Nursing staff failed to hand over 
instructions regarding SCIP order to Pt's accepting nursing staff and as a result the 
SCIP was not commenced. At 0200, night staff found the SCIP order and commenced 
same.’ Site Incident ID_34 
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Contributory factor and 
domain (proximal to latent) 
(Lawton et al., 2012)  
N =78 (100%) Key subthemes Incident example (from incident narrative) 
Administration error – transdermal patch not removed: ‘Patient presented to unit 
with fentanyl patches insitu. Medical review indicated that the patient was becoming 
intolerant to fentanyl and was rotated to another oral opioid, however nil documentation 
in progress notes of request to remove fentanyl patch noted. Found to still have 
patches on body when there was a verbal order to remove. On review of medication 
chart, order to remove patch was written over initial order, the modified request is 
unclear.’ Site Incident ID_20 
Administration error – wrong dose due to poorly written order: ‘(Nurse A) and I 
gave patient subcutaneous hydromorphone at 1000. When I went to give another dose 
later, Nurse B checking it with me said that the order was 5 mgs to 6 mgs. Nurse A and 
I had given 3mgs for the dose before instead of 5 mgs as we read the order as 3 mg. It 
was a new (as-required/PRN) re-chart and Nurse B knew it was 5 mg from the 
previous order, and the patient was generally having a 6 mg dose.’ Site Incident ID_39 
Multiple 8 (10.2)   
• Active failure: violation 
• Situational factors: 
individual factors 
• Local working conditions:  
staff workload 
8 (100) Non-compliance with 
medication 
management policy 
Fatigue 
High unit workload 
Administration error – wrong dose: ‘At 2300 patient was given 20mg breakthrough of 
oxycodone instead of 10mg. The wrong strength of medication was taken out of the 
cupboard and used. The shift was busy and the medication was not checked correctly 
against the order as outlined in the policy. Was also night shift and staff were fatigued.’ 
Site Incident ID_30 
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5.6.3 Error mitigating factors 
A number of incidents (n=8) highlighted the nurses’ role in preventing opioid errors. 
In one example, nurses intercepted a potential 10-fold overdose of hydromorphone 
before it was administered (Table 5.4). Nurses also instigated additional checks of 
opioid orders that were considered ‘unusual’ (for example, very high doses or doses 
that were not routinely ordered) by cross-referencing with what had been recorded as 
dispensed and administered in the drug register previously, before administering the 
opioid. Adherence to medication management policy, such as second person checks 
prior to administration, was noted in a small number of incident narratives (n=4) to 
have prevented errors from reaching the patient, or mitigated patient impact 
following an error (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Examples of error mitigating factors identified in incident narrative 
Nurses’ role in preventing opioid error: 
‘Patient was admitted to ward from [external service], according to the medical 
discharge summary and medication chart from [external service], patient was on 
regular hydromorphone 0.75 mg per oral q4h, however, regular hydromorphone 7.5 
mg per oral q4h was ordered by doctor. Nurse A and I double checked the dose given 
at [external service] and advised doctor who corrected the order on the medication 
chart.’ (Site Incident ID_54)  
Adherence to medication management policy: 
‘When checking patient to locate the fentanyl patch on the afternoon shift, patch was 
found to be missing. Medication chart indicated that patch had been applied to Right 
side of patient’s chest. On the morning shift (of the same day), per the patient’s care 
plan, fentanyl patch had been checked and recorded to say it was insitu. Nurses 
contacted the morning shift who confirmed patch was insitu on patients right chest 
when showered that morning. Medical staff notified and a stat order given to replace 
fentanyl patch. Fentanyl patches are sighted and recorded on the patients care plan 
each shift this is an example of how well this process works, the patient didn’t suffer 
unnecessary pain as the missing patch was identified quickly.’ (Site Incident ID_04) 
 
5.7 Discussion 
This retrospective review has provided valuable insights into the characteristics of, 
and factors contributing to, reported opioid errors in specialist palliative care 
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inpatient services. Opioid errors were primarily reported during the administration 
process, versus the prescribing process, consistent with findings from other health 
care services (Carson, Jacob, & McQuillan, 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Dy, Shore, 
Hicks, & Morlock, 2007). While none of the errors resulted in serious adverse events 
or death, opioid errors impacted adversely on patients’ symptom management, with 
almost half of the patients affected requiring clinical intervention as a direct 
consequence of an opioid error, largely due to omitted dose errors. 
Local working conditions and clinical communication failures appear to play a role 
in facilitating opioid errors; however, the focus on contributing factors in this multi-
incident analysis tended towards active failures (Figure 5.1). Active failures were 
most often due to violations, primarily during the administration process. Unlike 
slips and lapses, which are unintentional, violations are an intentional, behavioural 
choice (Reason, 1990). Given the number of opioid errors due to violations of 
medication management policy, understanding the factors that prompt non-
compliance with policy, and strengthening adherence to these policies, is essential to 
reducing opioid errors and patient symptom burden in specialist palliative care 
services. Factors contributing to non-compliance with medication management 
policy are comprehensively explored in Chapters 6 and 8. 
Slips and lapses (skill-based errors) were readily identified during the administration 
process; however, in-depth analysis was restricted, as information provided in the 
incident summary was often limited. Errors in prescribing were more likely to be 
knowledge-based (mistakes), than a result of a slip or lapse. However, whether the 
errors were due to rule-based, knowledge-based, or other mistakes (Reason, 1990), it 
could not be determined from the incident summary, as this information was not 
documented by the incident notifier. These deficiencies in the analysis highlight the 
need to further explore the systems factors and/or conditions that prompt slips, lapses 
and mistakes throughout the opioid delivery process. Given both services utilised 
paper-based medication charts, the implementation of digital health solutions, such 
as electronic medication management systems and clinical decision support tools, 
which have been shown to reduce these error types (Ammenwerth, Schnell-Inderst, 
Machan, & Siebert, 2008), warrants consideration. 
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Figure 5.1 Opioid error contributory factor categories (Lawton et al., 2012; Reason, 1990) 
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Despite the predominance of active failures, several latent or ‘systems’ factors 
contributed to opioid errors in this analysis. Similar to factors contributing to 
medication errors in other hospital settings (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Parry, 
Barriball, & While, 2015; Santell, Hicks, McMeekin, & Cousins, 2003; Tully et al., 
2009), a combination of sub-optimal communication systems and local working 
conditions, directly contributed to, and/or facilitated opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care services. Poor clinical communication has been associated with 
increased administration errors of all drug types (Parry et al., 2015), as has the 
quality of written prescriptions (Brady et al., 2009). Identifying opportunities to 
improve clinical handover, particularly when changes to opioid orders are made, and 
encouraging nurses to question and report ambiguous written opioid orders, are key 
considerations to address the clinical communication gaps identified in this study. 
The relationship between clinical staff workload and rates of opioid error in 
specialist palliative care services warrants further investigation. Increased workload 
has been linked with higher rates of medication administration and prescribing errors 
in acute care settings (Dean, Schachter, Vincent, & Barber, 2002; Parry et al., 2015; 
Tully et al., 2009). In this analysis, high unit workload at the time of the incident was 
identified as an error contributing factor, reflecting the complexity of patient care 
and corresponding medication regimens in palliative care service provision 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014). However, it could not be 
conclusively determined if additional latent factors, such as management of staffing 
levels or patient scheduling, contributed to increased workload.  
Latent organisational and/or external factors, such as physical environment, 
scheduling and bed management, and/or external policy context, did not appear to 
contribute to error producing conditions in this analysis. However, further 
investigation is required to confirm or refute this finding. 
Beyond error contributing factors, the role of palliative care nurses in identifying and 
intercepting opioid errors was evident in the incidents reported. An important next 
step in addressing opioid errors in specialist palliative care services, is to better 
understand the factors that empower, or disempower, nurses to challenge opioid 
orders and practices they perceive to be incorrect. Also critical is an understanding of 
service safety culture, which cannot be ascertained from incident reports alone, 
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rather, requires input from clinicians and other stakeholders involved in patient 
and/or medication safety within specialist palliative care services.  
5.7.1 Limitations 
This analysis reports opioid errors from two specialist palliative care inpatient 
services in one Australian state and may not be generalisable. Medication incidents 
are consistently under-reported (Westbrook et al., 2015) and dependent on clinicians’ 
recognition that an incident has occurred, and their willingness to report the incident 
(Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care and NSW Therapeutic 
Advisory Group Inc., 2013). Data analysis in this study was predicated on the 
incident narrative as reported by the incident notifier, which may not capture all 
relevant information pertaining to the incident (Vincent, 2007). 
While this study has provided initial insights into factors contributing to opioid errors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient services, further research is necessary to confirm 
or refute the study findings.  
5.8 Summary 
In order to support safe opioid medication processes in specialist inpatient palliative 
care services, it is essential to better understand the factors and conditions that may 
give rise to error, beyond the errors made by clinicians at the front line of medication 
delivery. This study has provided a starting point from which further exploration of 
the conditions that may underpin active failures, and the latent factors impacting safe 
opioid delivery processes can be undertaken. An essential next step is identifying and 
understanding palliative care clinicians’ and service managers’ perceptions of factors 
contributing to opioid errors in their service, and the impact of service safety culture 
on opioid incident reporting.  
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Chapter 6: Palliative care clinicians’ 
perceptions of opioid error 
contributory factors in inpatient 
palliative care services   
6.1 Chapter preamble 
Chapter 5 explored reported opioid error contributory factors from clinical incident 
reports in two specialist palliative care inpatient services. This chapter reports the 
findings of a qualitative study undertaken with palliative care clinicians in the three 
NSW palliative care services that participated in Phase 1 of the PERISCOPE project. 
6.2 Publication reference  
This chapter was published in 2019 in Palliative Medicine, a peer reviewed scholarly 
journal targeting palliative care clinical practice, and contains an edited version of 
the published study exploring opioid error contributory factors from the perspective 
of palliative care clinicians (Appendix 1). 
Heneka, N., Shaw, T., Rowett, D., Lapkin, S., & Phillips, J. L. (2018). 
Clinicians’ perceptions of opioid error contributing factors in inpatient 
palliative care services: A qualitative study. Journal of Palliative 
Medicine, 33(4) 430-444.  
Palliative Medicine: Impact factor: 3.78; ISI JCR Ranking 2017: 15/94 (Health Care 
Sciences & Services), 24/154 (Medicine, General & Internal), 28/180 (Public, 
Environmental & Occupational Health). 
6.3 Overview 
Analysis of reported opioid errors in inpatient palliative care services suggests active 
failures are the major contributory factor to opioid errors in this service type 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018a; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, 
& Phillips, 2018b). To fully understand the factors contributing to opioid errors in 
inpatient palliative care services and confirm or refute the findings from analysis of 
incident reports alone, it is essential to explore error contributory factors from the 
perspective of palliative care clinicians.  
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6.4 Objective 
To explore palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of the factors contributing to opioid 
errors in Australian specialist inpatient palliative care services. 
6.5 Methods 
Study methods have been described in Chapter 3. 
Participants are reported using the following key (Study ID_Clinician 
Type_Classification_Age_Gender [M: Male; F: Female]), for example, 
ID01_Nurse_RN_35_F.  
Clinician Classification key: CNC: Clinical Nurse Consultant; CNE: Clinical nurse 
educator; CNS: Clinical nurse specialist; CON: Consultant; EEN: Endorsed enrolled 
nurse; GM: Governance manager; INT: Intern; NUM: Nurse unit manager; REG: 
Registrar; RMO: Resident medical officer; RN: Registered nurse. 
6.6 Findings 
Qualitative data was collected from 58 clinicians who participated in one of eight 
focus groups, or a semi-structured interview (n=20), conducted between March 1 and 
November 30, 2017. The mean length of the focus groups was 41 (± 8) minutes and 
34 (± 11) minutes for the semi-structured interviews. Participants comprised nurses 
(n=44), doctors (n=12), and pharmacists (n=2) (Table 6.1). The majority of 
participants were female (82%) and the mean age 42.3 (± 11.8) years. Almost two-
thirds of participants (62%, n=36) had worked in the services’ palliative care unit for 
three or more years, while half (50%, n=28) had worked in the palliative care 
specialty for six or more years. Six participants (medical n=2, nursing n=3, and 
pharmacy n=1) were unit medication safety working group members.  
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Table 6.1 Participant demographics (N=58) 
Characteristic N=58 (100%) 
Gender Female 50 (86.2) 
Male 8 (14.8) 
Age (years) Mean (SD)  42.3 (±11.8) 
Median (IQR) 41.0 (17) 
Discipline Nursing 44 (75.8) 
Medical 12 (20.8) 
Pharmacy 2 (3.4) 
Classification Endorsed enrolled nurse 3 (5.2) 
Registered nurse 29 (50.0) 
Clinical nurse educator 2 (3.4) 
Clinical nurse specialist 5 (8.6) 
Nurse unit manager 4 (6.9) 
Intern 1 (1.7) 
Senior resident medical officer 1 (1.7) 
Registrar – basic trainee 1 (1.7) 
Registrar – advanced trainee 1 (1.7) 
Consultant 8 (13.8) 
Pharmacist 2 (3.4) 
Governance manager 1 (1.7) 
Years in 
discipline*  
< 1 year 2 (3.4) 
1-2 years 6 (10.3) 
3-5 years 7 (12.1) 
6-10 years 9 (15.5) 
11-15 years 6 (10.3) 
16-20 years 10 (17.2) 
21 years or more 17 (29.3) 
Years in 
palliative care* 
< 1 year 10 (17.2) 
1-2 years 6 (10.3) 
3-5 years 12 (20.7) 
6-10 years 16 (27.6) 
11-15 years 6 (10.3) 
16-20 years 4 (6.9) 
21 years or more 3 (5.2) 
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Table 6.1 Participant demographics (N=58) (cont.) 
Characteristic  N=58 (100%) 
Years in unit* < 1 year 13 (22.4) 
1-2 years 9 (15.5) 
3-5 years 12 (20.7) 
6-10 years 14 (24.1) 
11-15 years 6 (10.3) 
16-20 years 2 (3.4) 
21 years or more 1 (1.7) 
Highest 
qualification 
attained (n=47) 
(excludes 
medical) 
Certificate in nursing 1 (2.1) 
Certificate IV 1 (2.1) 
Diploma 2 (4.2) 
Advanced diploma 2 (4.2 
Bachelor degree 18 (37.5) 
Graduate certificate 11 (22.9) 
Master’s degree 7 (14.6) 
PhD 1 (2.1) 
Role in opioid 
delivery process 
Administration 39 (67.2) 
Prescribing 11 (19.0) 
Quality and safety 3 (5.2) 
Dispensing 1 (1.7) 
Prescribing, quality and safety 1 (1.7) 
Dispensing, quality and safety, 
surveillance 
1 (1.7) 
Administration, quality and 
safety 
1 (1.7) 
Resident medical officer 
supervision 
1 (1.7) 
Frequency of 
opioid delivery 
(prescribing/ 
dispensing/ 
administration)* 
Frequently (daily) 47 (81.0) 
Occasionally (several times per 
week) 
4 (6.9) 
Rarely (several times per month) 5 (8.6) 
Never**  1 (1.7) 
Employment 
status* 
Full-time 35 (60.3) 
Part-time 21 (36.2) 
Causal 1 (1.7) 
Primary shifts 
worked* 
Day 25 (43.1) 
Afternoon 3 (5.2) 
Night 2 (3.4) 
Combination  27 (46.6) 
                         * Missing data (n=1) 
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Six primary contributory factor domains aligning with the Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012), and 13 descriptive sub-themes, were 
identified during thematic content analysis:  
1. Active failures 
• Human error is inevitable 
• Active failures and opioid underdosing 
2. Situational factors  
• Task characteristics - opioid preparation and delivery 
• Individual factors - clinician inexperience 
• Patient factors - palliative patient complexity  
3. Local working conditions   
• Skill mix 
• Staff workload 
• Palliative care workforce 
4. Latent organisational factors – Physical environment  
• Physical environment - drug preparation areas 
5. Latent organisational factors – Support from central functions  
• Support from central functions - care transitions 
• Support from central functions - absence of pharmacy input 
• Support from central functions - paper-based medication charts 
6. Communication systems 
• Clinical communication: written and verbal   
Error contributory factors were identified by participants in every phase of opioid 
delivery. These contributory factors were perceived to create error producing 
conditions from the time of patient admission to the palliative care service (Figure 
6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Perceived risk areas for opioid errors across the opioid delivery process in specialist palliative care inpatient services (adapted from Leape 
et al (1995), and corresponding contributory factor domain(s) (Lawton et al., 2012) 
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6.6.1 Active failures 
Human error is inevitable 
All participants had an in-depth awareness of the dangers associated with opioids, 
the potential for errors and harms, and a practical understanding of opioid 
management policies and practices:  
Whenever I've tried to write up a protocol or a process 
about managing opioids…you recognise how many 
complex steps actually are involved…and decision making 
process, and…when you're doing it all the time, you just 
forget that actual high level of complexity (and) high risk 
clinical activity (ID22_Physician_CON_58_F). 
However, participants readily acknowledged that active failures, such as slips, lapses 
and mistakes, were inevitable during opioid delivery: 
We are aware that human error plays a part in medication 
administration, I don't think there's any way around that, 
completely; we can be as diligent as you want, but at times 
(errors will still happen) (ID47_Nurse_RN_22_F). 
While serious opioid errors were perceived to be infrequent events, other opioid 
errors were perceived to occur more frequently: 
I think serious opioid errors are uncommon. Minor issues of 
all descriptions are relatively common, and I think that that 
is partially related to the volume of opioid use here in the 
specialist inpatient unit (ID09_Physician_CON_56_F). 
Considering the volume of opioid administrations in inpatient palliative care 
services; however, participants perceived that the incidence of opioid errors was 
comparatively low: 
We roughly calculated an average of over 3000 opioid 
administrations in one month (in the unit), and there was one 
error… I'm not minimising the seriousness of a drug error, 
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any error is dangerous, and needs to be treated extremely 
seriously, but given the volume of (opioid) administrations in 
this unit (this is actually low) (ID23_Nurse_CNE_50_F).  
Participants reflected on opioid error types they had observed in the palliative care 
unit, acknowledging that errors occurred across the medication delivery process:  
The largest proportion probably come down to either a 
prescriber error at the time or an administration error 
(ID32_Physician_CON_48_M).  
Participants suggested omitted opioid doses were potentially the most commonly 
occurring error:  
…the missed dose is quite frequent...there is no doubt 
there's an element of human error that we haven't been able 
to eliminate entirely (ID32_Physician_CON_48_M). 
Mistakes with opioid conversions, were also perceived to be common:  
…opioid conversions are the huge danger area…and that 
happens many times when you're trying to stabilise pain, 
we're changing routes and we're changing drugs 
(ID22_Physician_CON_58_F). 
Active failures and opioid underdosing 
Participants acknowledged that arriving at the correct opioid dose was challenging, 
particularly with opioid conversions. While there was a perception that overdosing 
due to conversion error is problematic:  
…you hear about the very dramatic (errors), I 
automatically think of hydromorphone/morphine and 
patients being overdosed (ID17_Nurse_RN_63_F);  
Underdosing due to error was equally concerning: 
They don't always choose too large (a dose), sometimes I 
think the dose is dangerously small…we had one case 
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recently where sub-cut morphine was changed to sub-cut 
hydromorphone, but in my estimation they gave about a 1/3 
of the dose needed (ID55_Physician_REG_34_F).  
It was suggested that under prescribing was not limited to mistakes with opioid 
conversions, but rather opioid underdosing due to error was perceived to be more 
widespread: 
So we worry about the overdose, obviously, because that's a 
life threatening problem, but, patients underdosed is also a 
major problem (ID22_Physician_CON_58_F). 
Despite the acknowledged frequency of active failures, participants involved in 
quality and safety oversight were highly cognisant of the differences between active 
failures and systems factors that contributed to opioid errors. It was evident all 
services actively sought to identify and address these systems factors: 
I really do believe in improving systems rather than looking 
so much at people, because if systems are improved then 
people also improve automatically; so having very good 
governance systems, policies and procedures, leadership 
that provides that clinical supervision at the point of care, 
reporting errors as they happen and learning from those 
errors after a thorough investigation, without blaming 
people…that's the only way really that we can improve 
patient safety, and reduce the number of opioid errors 
(ID31_Nurse_GM_38_M). 
6.6.2 Situational factors  
Task characteristics – opioid preparation and delivery 
Participants described a number of notable differences in opioid delivery in palliative 
care, compared to other care settings. They acknowledged the volume of opioid 
administrations is significantly higher in palliative care, compared to other inpatient 
settings, primarily due to the needs of the inpatient population:  
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I’ve probably given 15-20 (opioid administrations) today, 
that’s one shift, one ward, no PRN, you can have shifts 
where you’ve given 30 (opioid administrations), you have 
one unstable patient who you’ve given six (opioid 
administrations) and you feel like you’re constantly in front 
of the drug cupboard (ID49_Nurse_RN_30_F).  
Participants also perceived the amount of time spent preparing and administering 
opioids each shift, compared to other units, was much greater. Preparing opioids for 
administration was seen to be time consuming, due to mandated double checking and 
documentation requirements. Additionally, the sheer volume of opioid administration 
in palliative care impacted on the time available to perform other duties: 
We just said to each other the other day, ‘How's your day?’, 
she said, ‘I didn't get out of the (drug) cupboard the whole 
shift’ and I said, my shift was the same. And you'd hear it 
all the time ... because…you can literally be standing in that 
(drug) room and not leave. Yesterday, we did five (infusion 
pumps) in a row…and then the time doing the drug check, 
and all the breakthroughs…it’s hours, hours, hours 
(ID38_Nurse_RN_41_F). 
In addition to the time spent delivering opioids, participants also felt that 
substantially higher opioid doses are used in palliative care, compared to 
other care settings:  
It’s different, totally different, in another hospital you wouldn’t 
use this dosage (of opioids) (ID01_Nurse_NUM_48_F).  
For participants new to palliative care, a combination of the high frequency 
of opioid use and the high doses administered was a marked difference to 
their previous experience: 
I've only been nursing for three months, and over in the 
medical ward they're really reluctant to give some opioids, 
and here, because it's a lot to do with pain management, I 
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don't think the nurses are as hesitant; the biggest thing I've 
noticed, was ... not just the frequency, but how much more 
(opioids) we use here, they're big, scary drugs, and here it's 
just like, ‘no, give it’ (ID44_Nurse_RN_25_F). 
Similarly, for doctors, opioid prescribing in palliative care was perceived to differ 
from other specialties:  
…previously I didn't really put people on morphine so much 
because there was no real indication to do so, and if people 
were already on morphine…they were generally under a pain 
team so I just let them manage the medication, and here, 
there's just a lot of experience (prescribing opioids) with 
most people on opioids (ID54_Physician_REG_27_F). 
Hence, the time burden of opioid delivery methods and the complexity of specific 
routine tasks, such as opioid conversion, were perceived to directly contribute to 
opioid errors: 
…when they're doing complicated dose conversions, not 
only are they converting from one variety of opioid to 
another, but they're converting the route or the formulation, 
so oral to subcutaneous, or long-acting to fourth hourly, or 
subcut morphine to hydromorphone, methadone rotations; 
the more the complexity of the dosing, the more chance 
there is for error, if there's multiple steps, is my experience 
(ID09_Physician_CON_56_F). 
Compounding the risk of error during opioid preparation were frequent interruptions:  
I think a point that’s critical is when you’re there at the 
drug cupboard and you’re drawing something up and 
people are talking to you and everything is busy…you know 
you’re trying to do your drug calculations, draw up the 
right dose, and it can be a really busy hub in that drug 
room…it’s not even your nurses interrupting, it’s the 
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doctors saying, I’m sorry, I can see you’re doing your drugs 
but…but…or there’s a patient being taken for a scan and 
the wardsman needs something…and it only takes that 
really quick thing for you to pick the wrong thing, for 
something to happen (ID02_Nurse_RN_35_F). 
However, participants were generally pragmatic about interruptions and 
acknowledged that was part of the nature of the palliative care unit:  
Things happen and they can’t just wait half an hour for us 
to finish the drug round, we get interrupted all the time and 
we just have to deal with it, that’s what I think anyway, the 
reality of it (ID17_Nurse_RN_63_F). 
Individual factors – clinician inexperience  
Clinician inexperience was perceived to be a key contributing factor to opioid errors. 
During opioid selection and prescribing there was a perception that opioid errors 
occur edmore frequently when junior doctors were responsible for prescribing, 
especially if more experienced clinicians are not available to guide them:  
When we have to make after hours calls…(the doctors) 
often they're going by what we (nurses) see…if it's a more 
junior doctor, or a doctor from (another service), there 
could be so much room for an error there 
(ID20_Nurse_RN_28_F). 
The risk of a wrong dose error was thought to be compounded when prescribers are: 
‘unfamiliar with opioid dosing and with opioid conversions between types of opioids’ 
(ID32_Physician), as many non-palliative care doctors or junior doctors are: 
I think we've got to realise that we have a lot of new and 
young registrars that haven't seen, you know, someone on 
fentanyl and hydromorphone and methadone, and then 
being converted to a syringe driver… 
(ID11_Nurse_RN_62_F).  
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During opioid administration, participants reflected that working with less 
experienced palliative care nurses, particularly casual or agency staff, was perceived 
to amplify the error risk: 
I think…when we have casual (staff)...or people who aren't 
familiar (with opioids)…there just seem to be a number of 
errors if we use inexperienced staff 
(ID48_Nurse_RN_44_F).   
Nurses new to the specialty noted the considerable learning curve with opioids in the 
palliative care context, particularly with dosage forms: ‘when I just started, I didn’t 
know the long acting and the short acting thing’ (ID7_Nurse), and similar sounding 
drug names:  
The OxyNorm's, the oxycodone's, the Endone's…and MS 
Contin's…and they're all similar dosages, and I try to be 
very, very careful and triple check, quadruple check exactly 
what we're giving (ID12_Nurse_RN_62_M). 
Less experienced nurses also reflected that they were not yet confident identifying 
prescribing errors and were concerned this could result in errors that reached the 
patient: 
But for someone like me (new graduate), that's scary, 
because I have seen it getting picked up, and for someone 
that's less experienced, I find that very scary that, that 
there's a potential for an error there through my lack of 
knowledge (ID20_Nurse_RN_28_F). 
Patient factors 
Increasingly, palliative patients were presenting with complex conditions and 
medication regimens, and, when this was coupled with inexperienced clinicians, 
opioid errors were perceived to be more likely to occur: 
…the patient that is being looked after in palliative care, is 
very complex with a lot of co-morbidities…and 
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polypharmacy…it leaves the more junior staff in a very 
difficult situation because they have to provide care, and 
when they do that, often times this is where errors tend to 
happen (ID42_Nurse_RN_55_F).   
The fluctuating needs of palliative patients were also noted to add to error risk 
because of the resultant increased workload: 
I think sometimes when the ward is very busy, so you've got 
17 to 20 patients, and there's a lot of unstable patients, or 
deteriorating patients that need a lot of breakthroughs, the 
doctors are changing orders frequently, you have anxious 
families, that all adds up…and you could really do with 
extra staff numbers then (ID11_Nurse_RN_62_F). 
6.6.3 Local working conditions 
Skill mix 
Clinician skill mix, (i.e., the balance in staffing levels based on qualifications, levels 
of competence, abilities, knowledge and experience (Cahill, 1995)), was one of the 
most frequently reported factors perceived to contribute to opioid errors:  
If an inexperienced doctor charts a wrong dose, an 
inexperienced nurse is far less likely to pick that up, and 
sometimes the safeguard is having experienced nurses, so if 
there's a combination of inexperienced junior doctors and 
inexperienced nursing staff, I think that is where the 
potential for error is high (ID53R_Physician_RMO_27). 
Poor nursing skill mix was perceived to increase the number of patients and volume 
of opioid administrations that senior nurses had to manage. This in turn was thought 
to increase the risk of error, primarily because of the extra time pressure and 
workload put on senior nurses:  
For me, when you have a good skill mix, nothing is going to 
go wrong, even though it's chaotic, even though it's really 
busy, you've got the good staff on, you can handle it. If you 
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are the only senior (nurse), you have to make the decisions. 
You have to help the new staff, the new grad, you have to 
guide them, help them to even (administer). You have to 
check not only twice, you have to check five times to make 
sure they’re all on the right track. That is time consuming, 
and takes away your energy as well, that's how errors can 
come easily (ID60_Nurse_RN_60_F). 
Staff workload  
During the admissions process, clinician workload was raised as a risk factor for 
prescribing error, due to the impact of understaffing on the time required to 
undertake a comprehensive patient assessment: 
I think most of the prescribing errors happen at admission - 
they're (palliative care medical team) understaffed for 
admissions and the complexity of our patients has 
increased, the constant turnover means complex patients 
are being admitted daily and their (clinicians) proportional 
workload to manage those admissions I think is too high 
(ID21_Physician_CON_41_F). 
Unit workload generally was identified as a major factor contributing to error:  
…of course, it's workload that could be contributing to 
errors, time is a big contribution to errors 
(ID61_Nurse_RN_35_F).  
In addition to the amount of time spent preparing and administering opioids and 
attending to patient care, participants noted the non-clinical tasks that comprised 
their workload each shift, and the impact that had on error risk: 
What's expected of our nurses on a day to day basis, in 
addition to what they're doing for the patients, (is) they 
really do have to have that shifting focus and then complete 
concentration on a regular level, I think we need to help 
them more to be able to do that work safely, I think they're 
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inundated now with paperwork and tasks that sometimes 
takes the focus off the care of the patient, and the 
concentration required with some of the medications 
(opioids) (ID41_Pharmacist_42_F). 
Management of staff and staffing levels 
A lack of permanent fulltime palliative care nursing workforce was a perceived error 
risk, with service managers highlighting the challenge of training and maintaining an 
adequately specialised and experienced palliative care workforce:  
It's hard to keep a (palliative care) workforce that is very 
agile, that is very specialised; so you might find there are 
two nurses who are specialised per shift and the workloads 
are such that those two nurses are caring a lot in terms of 
supporting the junior staff as well as supporting the 
patients… often times this is where errors tend to 
happen…it's probably really around skilling (in) this space; 
it's hard with the changing population and with the 
(palliative) patient that is very, very complex…the doctors, 
they come, they make errors, and then you see how they 
develop, after two, three months they are so good you don't 
hear (about) any errors and then they go, and then it starts 
again, it's sort of like a rollercoaster 
(ID31_Nurse_GM_38_M). 
6.6.4 Latent organisational factors 
Physical environment 
The risk of error during opioid preparation was perceived to be compounded by 
environmental aspects of the drug room, such as the size of the drug room, which 
participants reported added to interruptions and/or distraction: 
In our treatment room it gets super busy and super noisy, so 
when you're trying to draw up a complicated (subcutaneous 
infusion pump), or even you're just trying to move because 
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someone's got to get into the cupboard, you can (make an 
error) (ID45_Nurse_RN_29_F). 
Support from central functions – care transitions 
Multiple factors were perceived to increase the risk of opioid error when a patient 
was first admitted to the inpatient palliative care service, particularly when 
transitioning from the community into the inpatient setting: 
I think (there’s a risk) in the transition from community to 
inpatient, because there may be more than one prescriber of 
the opioid and what the actual patient has been taking may be 
different from what's being prescribed…and that there's not a 
uniform medication list between GP, the community team, and 
the inpatient team necessarily (ID48_Nurse_RN_44_F).  
As ready access to information on patients’ previous and current opioid intake was 
not always available, participants reflected on how these missing details adversely 
impacted on the team admission assessment of the patient:  
There's an area of restraint of not being able to necessarily 
have all of the information that you need to make that 
assessment (ID32_Physician_CON_48_M). 
Similarly, information for patients being admitted from another health service may 
be missing or incorrect:  
There might be a transcription error on documents the 
patient brings with them or the patient might not know the 
dose that they've been on…I think errors can happen that 
way as well (ID56_Physician_INT_28_M).  
In addition, participants observed opioid doses for patients coming from other, non-
palliative care services were often incorrect:  
It's quite often that somebody gets admitted and the (opioid) 
dose that they're on is definitely not the correct dose 
(ID58_Nurse_CNS_29_F). 
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Support from central functions – absence of pharmacy input 
Pharmacist participants acknowledged that palliative patients were increasingly 
presenting with less common opioid combinations, which made error identification 
challenging, even for experienced clinicians:  
I think we're seeing more people with unusual combinations 
(of opioids on admission)…we're seeing people who might 
have MS Contin or Dilaudid…it's quite common now for 
people to be on a fentanyl patch and Dilaudid and that's a real 
error prone combination I think because, depending on 
experience, some nurses will recognise whether a 
breakthrough is in the right ball park for the medication, but 
there's very few that would recognise whether the fentanyl and 
the Dilaudid strength are right… (ID41_Pharmacist_42_F).  
Participants in services without access to a dedicated palliative care pharmacist 
perceived that the lack of routine pharmacist review, especially at admission, 
contributed to error:  
They used to have a process whereby all admissions 
(orders) were checked and that is now an ad hoc 
process…so that, I think, is a big safety gap 
(ID21_Physician_CON_41_F). 
Also, a lack of routine pharmacy review of orders on the ward prior to dispensing 
was perceived to contribute to error: 
We don’t have enough clinical pharmacists on the ward so 
they don’t come to review the charts frequently, that is a 
concern…I would like to see them review charts at least 
twice a week, they can review the charting, route, the 
generic name…you know if the medication route is wrong 
but no-one checks, or the doctor charted for bd but only put 
down one time in the chart (ID01_Nurse_NUM_48_F). 
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Support from central functions – paper-based medication charts 
Participants who had worked with both paper-based medication charts and electronic 
medication management systems, perceived paper-based charts directly contributed 
to omitted dose errors: 
I worked in (other palliative care service) and the main 
issue there was we missed lots of drug. And that was 
because of the paper chart. Since I came here (electronic 
medication chart), I can't think of going back to a paper 
chart…because it (the electronic chart) alerts us all the 
time. We can't miss it. (ID60_Nurse_RN_60_F) 
6.6.5 General factors: Communication systems, and safety culture 
Effective clinical communication was considered an essential foundation of patient 
safety:  
Communication between doctors and nurses, and the way 
that happens, is incredibly important, to set up the 
relationship that's going to be safe for the patients, it's 
critical (ID22_Physician_CON_58_F).  
However, poor inter-professional communication, especially when patients’ opioid 
orders were changed, contributed to delayed or omitted opioid doses:    
So if anything for a patient changes, as a nurse, our job is 
to then let the doctor know that this has just changed, the 
patient's in more pain, or whatever. It'd be really nice if 
that was reciprocated, in terms of, they've charted a new 
drug for a patient, especially an opioid, can you let us know 
that that has been charted? Just a quick tap on the shoulder 
and say "Hey, we've just charted this" 
(ID13_Nurse_RN_45_F). 
Poor written communication, particularly doctors’ opioid orders, was another factor 
perceived to contribute to error. While ‘prescribing in illegible writing’ 
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(ID41_Nurse) was relatively commonly identified, nurses reported they were 
confident asking for clarification before administering the opioid:  
We’re generally pretty good in going and saying: ‘Can you 
rewrite this again? We can't read it!’ 
(ID44_Nurse_RN_29_F).  
More problematic were orders that had not been correctly re-charted or clearly 
ceased:  
 (Right now) there's one (chart)...that has everything on that 
page ceased, and not a nice, neat, it's, you know, scribble-
scribble-scribble…at first glance at that chart, you go, 
‘that's all ceased’…and right in the middle of it, there's an 
oxycontin. That doesn't give us much of a chance, does it? 
(ID45_Nurse_RN_29_F). 
Of note, safety culture was not identified as an error contributory factor, with 
participants overwhelmingly reporting the existence of a strong, non-punitive opioid 
safety culture:  
I think it's supportive, which is really good, because you can 
get quite anxious when you've (made an error) and you feel 
terrible. I think all the nurses support each other and 
certainly management supports us as all, obviously. Things 
have to be reported, that's just the way it's got to be. There 
has to be some accountability and some monitoring, 
officially. That's how it is (ID43_Nurse_RN_48_F). 
6.7 Discussion 
This study has identified a range of systems factors that contribute to opioid errors 
from the perspective of palliative care clinicians across multiple disciplines, which 
have not been previously reported. While factors contributing to medication errors in 
acute care are well understood (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Lawton et al., 
2012; McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006), error contributory factors in the specialist 
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palliative care inpatient services are an emerging area of research (Heneka et al., 
2018b).  
6.7.1 Active failures 
Active failures were acknowledged as contributing to opioid errors in inpatient 
palliative care, due predominantly to lapses resulting in omitted dose errors, and 
mistakes in opioid conversion and selection. Interestingly, participants reported that 
active failures were more likely to result in opioid underdose than overdose. The 
concept of opioid underdosing, as a result of omitted dose errors, and other opioid 
error types, has been recently highlighted as a potential area of concern in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services (Heneka et al., 2018a; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, 
Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018c). While it is estimated over half (52%) of patients in acute 
care will experience an opioid overdose as a result of opioid error (Dy, Shore, Hicks, 
& Morlock, 2007), a recent retrospective review study found that 57% of palliative 
inpatients received an opioid underdose as a direct result of opioid error (Heneka et 
al., 2018c), confirming the perceptions of clinicians in this study. 
6.7.2 Situational factors 
Most palliative care inpatients have at least one, if not multiple, opioid orders, 
including regular and PRN opioid orders (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2018). The opioid delivery process is complex and time consuming, with mandated 
double checking and strict documentation requirements for each opioid 
administration (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013, 2015). There are multiple 
opportunities for errors at each step of the process; hence, it is unsurprising that the 
process of opioid delivery itself was identified as a major error contributory factor.  
Opioid delivery in the inpatient palliative care setting differs from other health care 
settings in that large volumes of opioids are administered each day, often at 
considerably higher doses, and, increasingly, in combination with other opioids 
rarely seen in other settings. The high volume of opioid use may explain why opioid 
errors in palliative care  services are reported at almost triple the rate of opioid errors 
in other health care settings (Carson, Jacob, & McQuillan, 2009; Desai et al., 2013; 
Heneka et al., 2018c).  
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Opioid delivery also routinely requires clinicians to undertake complex calculations 
when converting between opioids, including between long and short acting 
formulations and routes of administration, all of which are prone to error (Webster & 
Fine, 2012). Hence, clinician inexperience was identified as an error contributory 
factor in this study. In the acute care setting, factors such as workload, skill 
mix/supervision and clinician knowledge have been identified as critical factors 
contributing to prescribing errors by junior doctors (Coombes, Stowasser, Coombes, 
& Mitchell, 2008). Similarly, in this study the risk of opioid prescribing errors by 
junior doctors was considered heightened if more experienced clinicians were not 
available to review the opioid order.  
Irrespective of care setting or drug type, medication administration places complex, 
and often competing, demands on the administering nurse (Jennings, Sandelowski, & 
Mark, 2011; Pirinen et al., 2015). Nurses are required to: adhere to multiple 
medication administration policies (Baker, 1997; Jennings et al., 2011), effectively 
manage the administration process and the medications themselves (Jennings et al., 
2011; Pirinen et al., 2015), attend to patient care responsibilities (Barker, Flynn, 
Pepper, Bates, & Mikeal, 2002; Huynh et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2011), navigate 
drug delivery devices, and the physical environment of the unit (e.g., size and 
location of the drug room) (Jennings et al., 2011). As such, medication 
administration is not a discreet process with a defined start and end point, rather, is 
inseparable from other tasks undertaken in the multifaceted nursing role (Jennings et 
al., 2011).  
Clinicians in this study, especially nurses, confirmed this finding, acknowledging 
that the bulk of their shift is spent attending primarily to opioid administration. For 
palliative care nurses, managing interruptions and competing demands was seen as 
an inevitable but routine part of opioid preparation, determined by: the fluctuating 
needs of the patient population; the additional time burden of opioid preparation 
compared to other, less high-risk medicines; and increased workload due to issues 
with nursing staffing and/or skill mix ratios. Quantifying the time burden of opioid 
delivery in the palliative care inpatient context may help inform management of 
staffing levels, as time spent on medication administration is frequently 
underestimated (Jennings, Sandelowski, & Mark). 
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The phenomena of ‘interruptions’ during medication administration are thought to be 
inevitable, precisely because medication administration does not have a clearly 
delineated start and end-point (Jennings et al., 2011). As interruptions increase the 
risk of medication error (Westbrook, Woods, Rob, Dunsmuir, & Day, 2010), 
reducing them is a patient safety priority. However, as noted by the clinicians in this 
study, the feasibility of reducing interruptions in a palliative care unit is challenging, 
given the nature of the workflow, and will most likely require a strategy that 
considers the multiple systems factors at play, such as: the physical environment of 
the drug preparation area, workload, patient acuity, and skill mix (Jennings et al., 
2011).   
6.7.3 Local working conditions 
The challenge of training and maintaining a specialist palliative care workforce was 
noted to affect both staff management and workload. Sub-optimal skill mix was 
perceived to directly increase workload, particularly for more experienced clinicians, 
and increase the risk of error. This was most evident for experienced palliative care 
nurses who, in addition to managing their own patient load, were often also ensuring 
new graduates, agency, or casual staff adhered to the mandated opioid checking 
processes. Multiple studies report associations between increased medication 
administration errors and: poor skill mix (McGillis Hall, Doran, & Pink, 2004), 
higher patient to nurse ratios (Aiken et al., 2011; Valentin et al., 2009), clinician 
workload (McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006; Parry, Barriball, & While, 2015), and 
perceived adequacy of staffing (McKeon Christine, Fogarty Gerard, & Hegney 
Desley, 2008). Given these findings, clinician rostering should ensure that there is an 
optimal balance of experienced team members rostered on each shift to support and 
mentor less experienced palliative care clinicians (Flynn & McKeown, 2009). 
The few studies that have explored the relationship between skill mix/workload and 
medication errors in the palliative care setting are limited to exploration of staff 
stressors and wellbeing (Ablett & Jones, 2007; Peters et al., 2012). These studies 
confirm that high workloads are commonplace in palliative care service delivery, and 
are a major contributor to clinician stress (Ablett & Jones, 2007; Peters et al., 2012). 
Better understanding of the impact of repetitive, high-risk opioid delivery and 
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resultant workload on palliative care clinicians’ stress levels is important, 
particularly in terms of building a sustainable palliative care workforce. 
6.7.4 Latent organisational factors 
The absence of a standardised medication management system, between the inpatient 
and community service, and the patient’s general practitioner and/or specialist(s), 
was seen as a barrier to undertaking an accurate medication history on admission, 
which increased the risk of prescribing error. Incomplete medication histories on 
admission account for up to two-thirds (67%) of prescribing errors in acute care 
(Tam et al., 2005); however, data in the palliative care service context could not be 
identified. 
The absence of an on-site pharmacist was also perceived to increase the risk of 
prescribing errors, as, although nurses routinely check opioid orders for errors prior 
to administration, review by the on-site pharmacist was seen as an additional, high-
risk medicine safety check. A review of clinical incident reports identified palliative 
care services without on-site clinical pharmacist reported a proportionally greater 
number of prescribing errors, compared to those with on-site pharmacy support 
(Heneka et al., 2018c). The palliative care pharmacist’s role in reducing opioid errors 
includes anticipating patients’ opioid needs during transitions of care, opioid order 
review and reconciliation, safe use of opioids in the management of pain, and 
clinician education (Herndon et al., 2016; Kuruvilla, Weeks, Eastman, & George, 
2018). Clinical pharmacy support in palliative care has been shown to contribute 
favourably to patient outcomes (Lee & McPherson, 2006) and palliative care service 
delivery (Atayee, Best, & Daniels, 2008; Austwick, Brown, Goodyear, & Brooks, 
2002). As such, consideration of a dedicated pharmacist role in specialist palliative 
care services is warranted to reduce opioid prescribing errors and support safe opioid 
delivery.     
In the earlier study of opioid error characteristics in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services it was suggested the use of paper-based medication charts, versus electronic 
medication management systems, may be contributing to the substantial burden of  
omitted dose errors reported in this setting (Heneka et al., 2018c). Clinicians in this 
study confirmed this finding, highlighting the electronic medication management 
system alerts them to outstanding doses and prompts opioid administration. Indeed, 
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in the single specialist palliative care inpatient services using an electronic 
medication management system in the aforementioned study, there were nil reported 
omitted dose errors in a two year review period (Heneka et al., 2018c). 
6.7.5 Communication systems  
Communication system factors contributing to opioid error in this study were 
predominantly identified by nurses and related to clinical communication shortfalls 
on the part of the ordering physician. While poor written communication was 
generally promptly rectified, failure to hand over changes to patients’ opioid orders 
in a timely manner was reported to directly lead to error. Written and oral clinical 
communication deficits have been well documented as factors contributing to 
medication errors in acute and aged care settings (Parry et al., 2015). A progressive 
shift to electronic medication management systems will go some way to alleviating 
written communication errors, as errors due to illegible or ambiguous orders are 
effectively eliminated compared to handwritten orders (Ammenwerth, Schnell-
Inderst, Machan, & Siebert, 2008). Again, there is scant research on the relationship 
between clinical communication and medication errors in the palliative care context;  
however, palliative care clinicians have identified poor interdisciplinary 
communication and unclear medication documentation as relatively common causes 
of error in palliative care services (Dietz et al., 2013; Dietz, Plog, Jox, & Schulz, 
2014). 
6.7.6 Error protective factors 
The presence of a strong, non-punitive service safety culture was evident in this 
study, and appears to be a protective, rather than error contributory factor in the 
participating specialist palliative care inpatient settings. Gaining a deeper 
understanding of the elements that contribute to the creation of a strong 
opioid/medication safety culture in palliative care warrants further exploration.  
6.8 Strengths and limitations 
A key strength of this study was the number of participants from multiple disciplines 
who were actively involved in opioid delivery and/or medication safety oversight, 
allowing data saturation to be reached. A limitation of this study is that the analysis 
was confined to the perceptions of factors contributing to opioid errors in specialist 
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inpatient palliative care services, and, as such, may not be generalisable to other 
palliative care settings, or other services routinely using opioids. 
6.9 Summary 
There are multiple systems factors, beyond active failures, that contribute to opioid 
errors in specialist inpatient palliative care services, which must be considered in any 
quality and safety initiatives targeting safe opioid delivery in this service type. 
Adequate staffing and skill mix are critical to ensure clinicians can manage high 
workloads and safely navigate opioid delivery. Acknowledging that palliative care 
nurses spend a substantial amount of time engaged in opioid preparation, and are 
simultaneously managing multiple competing demands when handling high-risk 
opioids, is an essential medication safety consideration and a workforce issue. 
Further exploration of opioid safety culture is also warranted to better understand the 
cultural factors supporting and promoting safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative 
care services.  
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Chapter 7: Palliative care clinicians’ 
perceptions of opioid error 
mitigating factors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services  
7.1 Chapter preamble 
Chapter 6 reported the findings of a qualitative study which explored palliative care 
clinicians’ perceptions of factors contributing to opioid errors. This chapter reports  
the second half of the data and examines clinicians’ perceptions of opioid error 
mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
This chapter has been accepted by Collegian: The Australian Journal of Nursing 
Practice, Scholarship and Research, for the 2019 special palliative care issue: 
Heneka, N., Shaw, T., Rowett, D., Lapkin, S., & Phillips, J. L. (2019). Mitigating 
opioid errors in inpatient palliative care: A qualitative study. Collegian (In press) 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.colegn.2019.09.005  
7.2 Overview 
Patient safety underpins high quality care across all healthcare settings (Kohn, 
Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). In the palliative care context, patient’s fragility, 
comorbidities, significant symptom burden, and the need for input from multiple 
healthcare providers, places them at greater risk of exposure to and harm from 
medical error (Dy, 2016; Myers & Lynn, 2001). The consequences of medical error 
can impede end-of-life goals and provision of comfort measures, considerably 
adding to the distress and suffering of patients and their caregivers (Casarett, Spence, 
Clark, Shield, & Teno, 2012; Dy, 2016). As a result the importance of, and focus on, 
patient safety in palliative care has increased (Casarett et al., 2012; Dietz, Borasio, 
Schneider, & Jox, 2010). 
The timely and effective treatment of pain is a palliative patient safety priority (Dy, 
2016; Shekelle et al., 2013). Opioids are routinely used in palliative care services for 
the management of pain and other symptoms (Australian Adult Cancer Pain 
Management Guideline Working Party, 2014; Therapeutic Guidelines Limited, 
2016). Increasingly, opioid safety in the palliative care inpatient setting is being 
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identified as a patient safety priority (Dietz et al., 2010; Dy, 2016; Heneka, Shaw, 
Azzi, & Phillips, 2018a). Compared to other healthcare settings, opioid delivery for 
the vast majority of palliative care patients includes: multiple opioid orders and 
formulations, including regular and PRN orders, often administered via different 
routes (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2019). There is a higher 
frequency of opioid delivery in inpatient palliative care services than in the acute 
care setting, with considerably higher opioid doses also used compared to all other 
healthcare settings (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018; Heneka et al., 
2019).  
Despite the high frequency and high doses of opioids used in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, serious patient harm is exceedingly rare (Heneka, Shaw, 
Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018b; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 
2018d). Additionally, palliative care clinicians perceive the prevalence of opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services is low, given the high frequency 
of opioid delivery in this setting. While factors contributing to opioid errors in 
inpatient palliative care services are becoming better understood  (Heneka et al., 
2018b; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018c; Heneka et al., 2019), little 
is known about the factors that mitigate opioid errors in these services. Identifying 
opioid error mitigating factors is essential to better understand how to best support 
safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
7.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this study were to explore palliative care clinicians’ perceptions of 
factors that mitigate opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services . 
7.4  Methods 
Study methods have been described in Chapter 3. 
As in Chapter 6, participants are reported using the following key (Study 
ID_Clinician Type_Classification_Age_Gender [M: Male; F: Female]), for example, 
ID01_Nurse_RN_35_F.  
Clinician Classification key: CNC: Clinical Nurse Consultant; CNE: Clinical nurse 
educator; CNS: Clinical nurse specialist; CON: Consultant; EEN: Endorsed enrolled 
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nurse; GM: Governance manager; INT: Intern; NUM: Nurse unit manager; REG: 
Registrar; RMO: Resident medical officer; RN: Registered nurse. 
7.5 Findings 
The participant demographics are reported in Chapter 6. Three primary themes and 
four subthemes related to opioid error mitigating factors were identified in this study:   
1. A positive safety culture underpins safe opioid delivery  
• Clear expectations regarding safe opioid delivery  
• Empowering clinicians to practise safely 
• Working as a team 
• Promoting a non-punitive approach to error 
2. Opioid error reporting is encouraged and expected  
• Rectify or report? 
• Reflecting and learning from error 
3. Education is empowering  
4. Sustaining an opioid safety culture requires ongoing targeted attention 
7.5.1 A positive safety culture underpins safe opioid delivery  
Participants overwhelmingly described the existence of a positive opioid safety 
culture in their services, which they perceived to be fundamental to preventing 
opioid errors and supporting safe opioid delivery. Opioid safety culture was linked to 
four central factors: i) clearly communicated and consistent expectations from 
management regarding safe opioid delivery; ii) a culture of empowering clinicians to 
practice safely; iii) interdisciplinary teamwork; and, iv) establishing and promoting a 
non-punitive error reporting culture. 
Clear expectations regarding safe opioid delivery 
For unit managers, acknowledging the high volume use of high-risk opioids, and 
privileging the importance of consistent, safe, opioid delivery, underpinned the 
services’ approach to opioid safety: 
We've said that because we do so many (opioids) instead of 
expecting that we would, as a result of that, have a high 
rate (of errors), we've said…we should be experts at it and 
 181 
we should be the best at it. Which is another change in 
cultural focus. I think we've continued to raise the profile in 
suggesting that it's (opioid delivery) a really pivotal part of 
what we do. I think it's that culture of, ‘this is important’ 
(ID33_Nurse_NUM_39_F).  
Participants reflected on the importance of ‘a top down approach’, with management 
taking a lead role to promote awareness of opioid delivery policies, and consistently 
communicating and enforcing their expectations regarding safe opioid delivery. 
Participants also noted that the consistent messages from management regarding how 
opioid delivery policy was implemented, was vital to upholding safe opioid practices 
within the unit: 
For me [the safety culture] is from the top down, definitely 
management has a huge influence on the culture…everyone 
is aware of what is going on and wants to be sure that the 
right thing is being done…(it’s) all consistent, that's what 
I've noticed, everybody does it the same; it's not just one 
person that does it this way, everyone is doing it the same, 
that's what I think is great (ID47_Nurse_RN_26_F). 
The ever-present risk and potential consequences of an error during opioid 
preparation was readily identified by participants. Participants stressed that, 
fundamental to safe opioid delivery, was the importance of respecting both the 
opioids, and the opioid delivery process itself:  
We missed a drug when we were making up (an infusion 
pump), and there was a thousand things that happened that 
day, but it just made me realise that…when we do these 
breakthroughs, and we're dealing with the (opioids) that 
this is really important - actually, we're not going to talk 
right now because I'm doing a pump; and sometimes I 
think…that we deal with such huge doses that sometimes 
you get a bit blasé with the doses that you're dealing with, 
and it was a really good reminder for me…make sure you're 
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focused on only giving the drugs…give these drugs the 
respect they deserve (ID37_Nurse_RN_44_F). 
It was acknowledged that a positive safety culture required a multi-faceted approach 
encompassing situational awareness, vigilance and a non-punitive, organisation wide 
commitment to upholding safety culture:  
It's that combination of alertness, awareness, everyone being aware 
of inexperience, and an open, blame-free culture 
(ID09_Physician_CON_56_F). 
Empowering clinicians to practise safely 
Participants reflected on the positive impact of a culture that empowered and 
reinforced the need to practise safely in accordance with each clinicians professional 
responsibilities, especially when dealing with opioids. These participants recognised 
that opioid errors harmed the patient and the clinician:  
Preventing the errors is a safeguard for us as well as the 
patient…it's a safeguard for our professional registrations 
as well; if you're a registered nurse, it's just part of your 
professional responsibility to make sure that you maintain 
your standards (ID43_Nurse_RN_48_F). 
Mandated policies for opioid handling/management were seen as very effective in 
reducing opioid errors when policies were strictly adhered to: 
We're very strict…and again, it's just policy. We've had a 
lot of new staff start over the last year or two, and I think 
because they've come into that culture as existing, with all 
the strictness around doing things the right way (following 
policy)...that's the funny thing, we're just doing it the right 
way, it's not like we're re-inventing the wheel 
(ID35_Nurse_NUM_47_F).   
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Adherence to opioid delivery policies was perceived to be strengthened by a service 
culture that supported clinicians to challenge each other if policy non-compliance 
was identified:  
I think we've empowered our staff to feel comfortable in 
doing things the right way, and challenging people if they 
don't want to do it the right way…at the end of the day, 
you're responsible for your registration…if something goes 
wrong and you're in a court of law, nobody's actually going 
to back you when (you didn’t follow) policy 
(ID34_Nurse_CNE_50_F). 
Participants consistently acknowledged the power of a positive service culture that 
created an expectation of opioid adherence to ensure safe opioid delivery. This 
positive culture enabled them to feel confident, safe and supported, to challenge any 
perceived or actual opioid policy breaches, and for many this was in stark contrast to 
their previous experiences:  
I came from a culture where it was like…why would two 
people go to a bedside? But here, really promotes that...I'm 
very confident now in saying ‘you actually need to come 
with me’…because really, the culture now is that you just 
don't do that, and I've never been in a unit before where it's 
been like that (ID37_Nurse_RN_44_F). 
Participants noted and reflected on the differences between palliative care and other 
services, in relation to opioid safety, noting that the expectations and enforcing of 
independent double checking standards were much higher in the palliative care 
service compared to units they had previously worked: 
I've never worked anywhere that's been so thorough 
checking their (opioids) (ID48_Nurse_RN_44_F);  
No, neither have I, and I've got 30 years nursing 
experience. It's keeping me safe and the patients safe, and 
that's what I like about it (ID42_Nurse_RN_55_F). 
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Working as a team 
Effective inter-disciplinary team work was central to opioid safety and contributed 
positively to safety culture. The complexity of opioid prescribing and administration 
meant that participants relied on, and expected that, their interdisciplinary colleagues 
worked diligently to ensure all opioid orders/administrations were correct, or were 
open to being challenged. Participating physicians stressed that, from the medical 
perspective, inter-disciplinary team work in palliative care was essential to ‘enable 
the nurses to do their job’ (ID51_Physician_CON_37_M). They described actively 
encouraging nurses to question orders they felt were incorrect: ‘…if it’s wrong, I’m 
happy to be questioned’ (ID55_Physician_INT_34_F); and all physicians noted they 
routinely consulted with nurses to check opioid orders:  
When I'm calculating something, if it's particularly complex 
or warrants double checks I often ask one of the nurses, 
what do you think?’ (ID56_Physician_INT_28_M). 
Similarly, nurse participants described how they were confident querying opioid 
orders they perceived to be incorrect, or initiating discussions about changes to 
patients’ opioid orders:  
So I said to the doctor, are you sure this is what you want? I 
think the intention was (for administration) today, but they 
re-charted it for tomorrow morning…they're human too…if 
we see something, we question it. I think we're spoiled here, 
that we do have a good relationship with our doctors 
(ID48_Nurse_RN_44_F). 
Participants from services with full-time palliative care pharmacists greatly valued 
and noted the high level of interdisciplinary collaboration their presence afforded, 
particularly in regards to opioid management:  
We're really fortunate that we have pharmacists on site, 
they're very open to anybody spending time with them, 
clarifying anything, if the doctors are not here and the 
nurses are uncertain about why the breakthrough dose is 
such as it is (ID34_Nurse_CNE_50_F).  
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From the pharmacist’s perspective, an important outcome of the tasks they routinely 
undertook, such as opioid order review, management of opioid supply, and targeted 
opioid education, was a reduction in workload, particularly for palliative care nurses:   
A lot of what we do…also helps the nursing staff, it reduces 
the workload, to me that's very important to assist them 
(nurses) in that way, reducing their workload, (as) they 
have plenty to do (ID40_Pharmacist_60_F). 
Promoting a non-punitive approach to error  
Creating and promoting a non-punitive error reporting-culture was a key strategy 
each service had adopted to support opioid safety. Error-reporting was seen as an 
opportunity to improve individual and unit performance, and also critically assess 
and identify potential systems failures that may be contributing to error: 
We work in a unit where we certainly want to identify errors, 
but we don't want to take a punitive approach to the 
error…it's not about dragging that person over the coals, it's 
very much about improving performance, improving patient 
safety and then looking at the system and saying ‘is there 
something more than just talking to the individual about what 
we're going to do here?’ (ID32_Physician_CON_48_M).  
It was also acknowledged that a punitive reporting culture has a negative impact on, 
and was counter-productive to, a positive safety culture:  
I think there have been some times when it was a bit more 
punitive than supportive if you know what I mean, and it 
always had a negative effect on the culture 
(ID16_Physician_CON_39_F). 
Transforming a punitive culture into a positive reporting culture was noted by 
multiple participants to require significant and sustained effort. Participants, 
especially those in leadership or management roles, described the steps they had 
taken to transform the error reporting culture over time. This extended to reinforcing 
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the importance of opioid error reporting, and supporting clinicians to identify and 
report errors: 
…creating a safe reporting culture…and having a safe 
conversation together, so me making them feel safer, less 
vulnerable professionally over a period of time didn't come 
easy, but over time, I think it’s pretty much going okay now 
(ID57_Nurse_NUM_50_M). 
Ultimately, participants perceived that having a positive safety culture within their 
services, promoted a culture of error reporting:  
I don't think we have a culture where we're frightened to 
report anything. I don't think we have a culture where we're 
afraid to own up to any mistakes… I think we're all 
accepting of each other, and if a mistake is made, you have 
to do something about it, and I don't think there's a culture 
of shielding that (mistakes) from management 
(ID47_Nurse_RN_22_F). 
7.5.2 Opioid error reporting is encouraged and expected  
Participants perceived that opioid errors, on the whole, were quite accurately and 
routinely reported, compared to other medications:  
…with opioids, it's more serious, we have to do a 
report…I'm pretty sure that all opioid errors would be 
reported (ID18_Nurse_RN_28_F).  
This was perceived in part, to be related to palliative patients’ needs, whereby their 
medication orders are routinely reviewed by multiple clinicians over the course of 
the day:  
There's enough eyes looking at the medication chart over a 
period of 24 hours to think that we are, hopefully, reporting 
them all (ID16_CON_39_F).  
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Participants also suggested that the mandated 24 hourly checks of the drug book 
helped identify opioid administration errors, which were subsequently reported: 
If it’s not the person making the mistake reporting it, 
someone else will; the next shift might pick up a mistake, 
they might see something in the drug book doesn’t correlate 
and they’ll report it; or they’ll tell our manager and the 
manager will report it (ID14_Nurse_RN_53_F). 
While the overwhelming majority of participants perceived the unit had a positive 
and supportive error reporting culture, a very small number of participants described 
they were sometimes reluctant to report an opioid error as they did not perceive the 
reporting culture in their service to be non-punitive:  
…the problem I think with reporting is it becomes a bit of a 
blame thing…once it’s reported…it seems like someone 
also has to have the blame (ID08_Nurse_RN_36_F). 
Despite this reluctance, error reporting culture was considered a key element of 
opioid safety, with participants suggesting that reporting more errors did not 
necessarily reflect poor practice, but rather a positive safety culture:  
I've certainly seen that elsewhere…that it reflects badly on 
the unit, the more incidents you have. It doesn't look good, 
so you're not encouraged to (report) in other places, but 
they do encourage it here, to help highlight the issues so 
that we can rectify (ID25_Nurse_RN_29_F). 
Rectify or report? 
Mandated policies related to opioid management, such as independent second person 
checks prior to administration, were perceived to routinely intercept potential errors:  
…our safety checks pick up a lot of those (opioid) errors 
before they actually happen (ID09_Physician_CON_56_M).  
In contrast to opioid administration errors, participants suggested that not all opioid 
prescribing errors were reported. This was primarily because nurses in particular, 
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were more likely to try to rectify prescribing errors first, and, if the error was 
promptly rectified, were unliklely to report the error:  
Generally if I find a prescribing problem you just go and get (the 
doctor) to fix it, you don't put a report in (ID18_Nurse_RN_28_F).  
Participants suggested that prescribing errors were readily fixable, and timely 
administration of the correct opioid order, and effective pain management, was the 
priority for this patient population: 
I think often you can rectify the problem quite simply…you go 
to the doctor to change it, so, rather than report it, it's quicker 
just to fix it; I think we don't report it because it's fixable…we 
report falls and pressure areas because we can't fix them on 
the spot but if it's a medication error we just go and get the 
chart fixed, and it's done (ID45_Nurse_RN_29_F). 
Participants perceived that errors intercepted during the mandated two-person check, 
and before reaching the patient (‘near misses’), are rarely reported, re-iterating the 
purpose of the independent double check for minimising opioid errors:  
If you went to give it (opioid) and one of you decided ‘oh 
that’s the wrong patient’, that would be rectified, that’s why 
you’ve got two people, and I don’t know that that would 
be…that may happen, and it wouldn’t ever be reported 
(ID6_Nurse_RN_59_F). 
The exceptions were: i) incidents which resulted in a narcotic discrepancy (e.g., 
wrong opioid drawn into syringe and/or opioid discarded), which were promptly 
reported; and ii) incidents where clinicians were: ‘not happy to give (the medication)’ 
(ID04_Nurse_RN_42_F) after identifying an error, for example, an opioid order is 
wrong, or a wrong drug has been taken to the bedside:  
If your double checking identifies something before you’ve 
drawn it all up and are going to give it then you’ve 
prevented it from being a problem, but I guess if someone’s 
actually willing to go and take it to the patient, and there’s 
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the potential it would have been given without resistance, 
that would be reported (ID05_Nurse_RN_28_F). 
Reflecting and learning from error 
For the majority of participants, error reporting was seen as an opportunity for the 
clinician involved to reflect on practice, and the service to identify potential systems 
deficits:  
If someone identifies that they missed something and they 
report it, then you're reflecting on your own practice…I think 
you’re going to be much more vigilant, just from reporting it. 
Then the (service) follow through also happens. It's viewed in 
a constructive rather than a punitive fashion…but we do 
want vigilance around it (ID32_Physician_CON_48_M).  
Participants stressed ‘we're not blasé about mistakes, everyone takes it really 
seriously’ (ID38_Nurse_RN_41_F); and several participants reflected on their own 
experiences with opioid errors at a personal and professional practice level. 
Participants who shared examples of opioid errors they had made universally 
described great distress and spoke of how the experience had strengthened their 
commitment to the required safety processes: 
I think those of us, personally speaking, who have made a 
drug error with an opioid, then you know you never ever do 
it again. It was scary at the time. I thought, "Oh my God, I 
think I'm having a heart attack" but everyone was okay. It 
was fine. The patient was okay. The family was okay. At the 
time, I was like, "I think I'm going to die." But you never do 
it again. You triple check. You quadruple check 
(ID61_Nurse_RN_35_F). 
Participants also shared how they had self-reported opioid errors and reflected on 
how their practice changed following an opioid error: 
I’ve reported myself on an (opioid) error that I’ve made 
and…I was mortified by the error, it just changed my 
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practice…I’ve never felt that somebody from above has 
come down on me in a punitive way, and I have changed or 
bettered my own practice because I’ve been so upset that 
I’ve made an error that I’m fairly sure I would not do that 
again (ID6_Nurse_RN_59_F).  
7.5.3 Education is empowering  
Participants highlighted the importance of education targeting opioid use in the 
palliative care context as a strategy to reduce error. While each clinician was 
responsible for adhering to opioid practices, investing in the clinical nurse educator 
(‘CNE’) role was seen as pivotal to instilling and reinforcing safe opioid practices: 
I think (the CNE) has played a really big role in…giving 
nurses a really good base for practicing safely. They realise 
and understand that they're responsible and they're at risk 
if they don't follow those basic rules…I think (they’re) 
empowered to be able to understand that by practicing 
safely they are also protecting themselves 
(ID41_Pharmacist_42_F).  
All services provided a comprehensive orientation program for new clinical staff 
with a substantial focus on opioids. New palliative care nurses routinely spent one-
on-one time with the clinical nurse educator to familiarise themselves with the 
intricacies of opioid administration as part of orientation:  
When I first started here, [the CNE] was with me for at 
least a couple of days…at first it was like, ‘oh my gosh, I've 
got so much to learn, I'd better pay attention’; that's 
another sort of safeguard because she went through things 
as an educator, everything was explained at that time – 
‘this is how we do it’, just so it becomes a part of your 
everyday practices right from the start, that was really good 
(ID47_Nurse_RN_22_F). 
In addition to investing in opioid education at orientation, each service invested in 
ongoing education, as exemplified in this quote: ‘…there is a lot of education in 
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regards to opioids’ (ID20_Nurse_RN_28_F). Participants described both formal 
(e.g., information sessions conducted by pharmacists; weekly tutorials for junior 
medical officers; one-on-one opioid conversion exercises with the clinical nurse 
educator), and informal education that occurred within the day to day operations of 
the service: 
Informal education, obviously, happens all the time on the 
consultant teaching ward rounds. We usually have a 
combination of a registrar and a resident…if we know that it's 
a junior registrar combined with an inexperienced RMO, the 
consultants are on high alert, as are the senior members of the 
nursing staff, to be checking that things are okay, and to be 
alert for any possible issues to be reported back, so trying to 
be open, encouraging the junior doctors to know that there's 
no fear or blame, and that they should always ask, is part of 
the education process, too (ID09_Physician_CON_56_F). 
Ongoing education was also seen as critical to instilling clinician confidence to 
safely handle opioids, challenge any perceived opioid errors, and to respond 
appropriately to identify opioid errors: 
I think nurses are very happy to challenge orders…I think 
just learning about the opioid conversion, learning what 
that means and why it's important (makes them confident to 
challenge), so being empowered by education 
(ID34_Nurse_CNE_50_F). 
7.5.4 Sustaining an opioid safety culture requires ongoing, targeted attention  
While culture was seen as critical to supporting opioid safety, participants in 
managerial or dedicated patient safety roles spoke of deficits in safety culture in 
preceding years. Participants suggested that clinicians attitudes towards opioid safety 
from previous management had adversely impacted the opioid safety culture, and 
error prevalence, in the past: 
There had been a culture of under reporting, and people 
believing that by reporting, you are getting your colleague 
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in trouble, or if it didn't harm the patient you don't have to 
report it…unfortunately it was a culture that was supported 
by the (manager) so the staff didn't see anything wrong by 
under reporting…that's the culture that actually permitted 
more significant incidents to actually happen 
(ID31_Nurse_RN_38_M). 
They also described how creating a positive opioid safety culture had required 
substantial changes to clinicians’ attitudes and clinical practice, and ongoing, pro-
active measures to sustain it. Clinician complacency was a common barrier each 
service had to manage when looking to improve opioid safety culture initially:  
We've done a lot of work over two years…I think initially 
there was a complacency (about opioids)…the sheer volume 
made (clinicians) overconfident…people had a sense of 
corner cutting… (ID57_Nurse_NUM_50_M). 
Another critical part of strengthening the opioid safety culture was the open 
acknowledgement and management of opioid errors: 
That was a big cultural shift…not only looking at processes 
and trends, but also raising the profile of (errors), so 
making it very important that if an error happens that we 
need to look at that…and talk about (errors) very regularly 
(ID33_Nurse_NUM_39_F). 
7.6 Discussion 
This qualitative study identified that creating and sustaining a positive opioid safety 
culture is fundamental to mitigating opioid errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. For the palliative care clinicians in this study, opioid safety culture 
was predicated on clear and consistent expectations from leadership, clinicians 
empowered to work together and practise safely, and a non-punitive approach to 
errors when they occur.  
The clinicians in this study illustrated that a positive safety culture is created when 
there are shared values, attitudes, competencies and behaviours that reflect the 
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palliative care services’ commitment to safe opioid delivery (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). 
These factors were perceived to be critical to instilling and supporting palliative care 
clinicians’ adherence to safe opioid delivery practices, and central to reducing opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services. This is an important finding as it 
is widely accepted that a positive safety culture is fundamental to reducing or 
preventing errors in any healthcare setting (Hodgen A, Ellis L, Churruca K, & 
Bierbaum M, 2017; Kohn et al., 2000).  
Safety culture has long been believed to be a predictor of an organisation’s safety 
performance (Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 2010). In a positive safety 
culture it is recognised that errors are inevitable, and the organisation works 
proactively to identify factors that promote error causing conditions and seeks to 
rectify them (Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Reason, 2008). In this study, opioid safety was 
prioritised by unit and patient safety managers who acknowledged the risk involved 
in opioid delivery, and privileged safe opioid delivery as a fundamental component 
of quality palliative care service provision. This was reflected in the discussion with 
frontline clinicians, who reported a high level awareness of opioid safety 
expectations from management, and felt compelled and supported to adhere to the 
policies for safe opioid prescribing and administration. When opioid errors did occur, 
a non-punitive error reporting culture promoted reporting, and supported clinicians to 
reflect and learn from the error. In turn, the service endeavoured to identify error 
contributory factors from a systems perspective and implemented targeted strategies 
to address these.  
Safety culture and error reporting  
A notable finding in this study was palliative care clinicians overwhelmingly positive 
perceptions of the error reporting culture in their services. Error reporting is an 
essential component of patient safety which facilitates individual and organisational 
learning from error, and the development of error mitigating strategies (Institute of 
Medicine, 2000). Critical to effective error reporting is a non-punitive error reporting 
culture, where clinicians feel safe to report errors without fear of repercussion or 
disciplinary action (Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care, 
2001; World Health Organisation, 2005).  
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Palliative care clinicians in this study strongly perceived error reporting was 
encouraged and expected in their service, and stated they felt safe to do so. However, 
the non-punitive error reporting culture identified in this study differs from other 
studies in similar services. A Turkish study of palliative care nurses’ perceptions of 
safety culture found almost half (48%) reported hospital management response to an 
error was punitive (Dincer, Torun, & Aksakal, 2018). These nurses perceived errors 
reflected an inability to carry out their professional role and thought they would be 
judged by their peers and punished by management (Dincer et al., 2018). Similarly, a  
US study found palliative care nurses felt high levels of error reporting reflected 
negatively on the their job performance, and error reporting was associated with 
subjective feelings of incompetence and guilt (Boyer, McPherson, Deshpande, & 
Smith, 2009). These starkly contrasting perceptions of error reporting culture in 
palliative care services may reflect the personal and/or professional drivers which are 
barriers to error reporting, or they may be attributable to differences in palliative care 
services’ investment in creating an overarching positive safety culture.  
In this study it was evident that a positive safety culture did not simply ‘happen’ in 
participating palliative care services. Rather, it required targeted and deliberate 
action, and took several years to establish (Kohn et al., 2000). Managers in this 
study, tasked with elevating the opioid safety culture within their service, spoke 
openly of the challenges in changing and re-building a culture of safety, and the 
importance of a non-punitive approach to errors when they occur. Factors such as 
complacency, entrenched clinical practice, leadership that did not prioritise patient 
safety, and/or a punitive error reporting culture, were some of the key obstacles that 
needed to be addressed in the creation of a positive safety culture. However, once 
established, the organisations’ safety culture influenced perceptions of: what 
clinicians came to consider as ‘normal’ safety behaviour (e.g., two nurses go to the 
bedside to administer an opioid), what motivated clinicians to engage in ‘safe’ 
behaviours (e.g., clinicians feeling empowered to follow opioid handling policy), and 
the translation of safe behaviours into routine clinical practice (e.g., palliative care 
nurses intercepting opioid prescribing errors) (Grissinger, 2014; Weaver et al., 2013). 
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Palliative care nurses error interception practices 
Palliative care nurses in this study were pivotal in identifying and intercepting opioid 
errors, particularly prescribing errors, before they reached the patient. Nurses’ 
capacity to intercept and rectify prescribing errors has been noted to commonly occur 
in other inpatient care settings (Cullen, Bates, & Leape; Rothschild et al., 2005). 
These actions may reflect nurses’ commitment to prioritising patients’ safety and 
comfort, and ensuring patient’s pain management is not adversely impacted due to 
error (Hewitt & Chreim, 2015; McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006).  
One of the key facilitators of opioid error interception practices by palliative care 
nurses in this study was a supportive nursing practice environment. This was 
characterised by highly collaborative interdisciplinary relationships, supportive 
management, and organisational commitment to quality care (e.g., targeted opioid 
education and continuous quality improvement) (Aiken, Clarke, & Sloane, 2002; 
Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, & Suh, 2012). Cohesive interdisciplinary teams are 
critical to patient safety in any healthcare setting (Committee on Quality Health Care 
in America, 2001; Firth-Cozens, 2001), and have been shown to increase the 
interception of medication errors in acute care (Flynn et al., 2012). In a high 
functioning interdisciplinary team, trust between clinicians is high (Firth-Cozens, 
2001). This was apparent for the palliative care clinicians in this study who pro-
actively sought advice from one another if there was uncertainty about an opioid 
order, and were empowered to challenge and rectify opioid errors when they were 
identified (Firth-Cozens, 2001).  This level of collegial, interdisciplinary teamwork 
ultimately fosters the delivery of high quality, safe, patient care (Committee on 
Quality Health Care in America, 2001; Zwarenstein, Goldman, & Reeves, 2009), and 
was another key opioid error mitigating factor in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
Mitigating errors through education 
The nature of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services varies 
substantially from other healthcare settings (Heneka et al., 2019). Clinicians new to 
specialist palliative care inpatient services acknowledge the steep learning curve 
associated with opioid delivery in this setting, and experienced palliative care 
clinicians recognise the inherent risk of error with routine complex tasks such as 
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opioid conversions (Heneka et al., 2019). Hence, another facet of organisational 
support for opioid safety in this study was reflected in the in-depth opioid education 
provided at orientation to the service, and through ongoing formal and informal 
education opportunities for all disciplines.  
Clinicians in this study reported their confidence and ability to identify opioid errors 
stemmed largely from a solid opioid education, tailored to the specialist palliative 
care inpatient context. Notably, all palliative care services in this study employed a 
dedicated clinical nurse educator who was also pivotal to shaping, driving and 
reinforcing safe opioid delivery practices across the palliative care service. 
Additionally, palliative care pharmacists provided opioid specific education and 
ready support for any opioid related queries. Academic detailing (i.e., tailored 
clinical education provided peer-to-peer), is increasingly being used as a quality 
improvement tool, and is considered one of the most effective strategies to improve 
patient safety, particularly in conjunction with small group interactive education 
(Scott, 2009). Hence, the roles of the clinical nurse educator and pharmacist in the 
palliative care service are critical to supporting safe opioid delivery, which in turn, is 
essential to reducing opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
7.6.1 Strengths and limitations 
A substantial number of palliative care clinicians from multiple disciplines 
participated in this study, enabling data saturation to be reached. This study has 
provided insights into opioid safety culture in inpatient palliative care services, 
which has not been previously reported. Safety culture varies widely between and 
within organisations (Pronovost & Sexton, 2005; Singer et al., 2003) hence, these 
findings may not be generalisable to other palliative care services/settings, or other 
healthcare services handling high volumes of opioids. 
7.7 Summary 
Opioid safety is highly prioritised in inpatient palliative care services. A positive 
opioid safety culture, which empowers all clinicians to practise safely, and promotes 
a non-punitive approach to error occurrence and reporting, is fundamental to 
supporting safe opioid delivery in the palliative care context. The roles of the clinical 
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nurse educator and pharmacist appear to be pivotal in instilling and supporting safe 
opioid delivery, and this warrants further investigation. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 described how the PERISCOPE project was driven by palliative care 
clinicians’ perceptions that opioid errors in their services were contributing to 
iatrogenic patient harm, and reducing these errors was a quality improvement priority 
(Heneka, Shaw, Azzi, & Phillips, 2018a). As outlined in Chapter 2, empirical 
research into opioid errors in inpatient palliative care services is sparse, with only 
three studies having examined this phenomenon since 2010 (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, 
& Phillips, 2015). Given the paucity of this research a thorough exploration of opioid 
error scope, patient impact, contributing and mitigating factors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services was warranted. Chapters 4 to 7 presented the results of four 
studies undertaken to explore and understand this knowledge gap, and better 
understand the nature of opioid error occurrence in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services.  
This final chapter integrates the mixed methods data from the PERISCOPE project’s 
five studies to answer the research questions posed in Chapter 3. Meta-inference of 
the entire project’s data answers the final research question, and allows for a series of 
recommendations to support safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services to be generated. Joint displays for each research question, as described in 
Chapter 3 are included as appendices. 
8.2 Research Question 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact, 
and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services? 
The NSW state-wide (Study 2) and local (Study 3) retrospective review data were 
member checked during the semi-structured interviews and focus groups (Study 5) as 
medication errors are known to be widely under-reported (Westbrook et al., 2015) 
Data were then integrated to answer research Question 1: What is the prevalence, 
patient impact, and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? (refer Appendix 11 for joint display). 
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8.2.1 Opioid error prevalence 
In the PERISCOPE project opioid errors accounted for one-third of all reported 
medication errors in the three specialist palliative care inpatient services, and 
occurred at a mean rate of  0.9 (±1.5) opioid errors per 1000 occupied bed days 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018d). This reported opioid error 
prevalence rate is almost three-fold greater than what is reported in other inpatient 
specialities (Carson, Jacob, & McQuillan, 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Mc Donnell, 
2011; Prairie Research Association, 2014). Palliative care clinicians perceived this 
error prevalence rate was largely due to the high frequency of opioid delivery in their 
service. This perception was confirmed during the PERISCOPE project which found 
the frequency of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services is 
substantial, with each patient receiving approximately 12 opioid administrations per 
day. This equates to an opioid being delivered approximately every 6 minutes in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient service.  
8.2.2 Patient impact of opioid errors  
Despite the high frequency of opioid prescribing and administration, serious patient 
harm from opioid errors was exceedingly rare in the PERISCOPE project. The vast 
majority of opioid errors reported at the state-wide and local level caused minor 
harm (SAC 3) or no harm at all (SAC 4) (Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 
2018b; Heneka et al., 2018d). Clinicians in the PERISCOPE project confirmed this 
finding and suggested that serious opioid errors were a rare occurrence in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. However, approximately half of all opioid errors 
that reached the palliative inpatient in the PERISCOPE project necessitated clinical 
intervention to preclude or manage actual or potential harm(s). 
In the PERISCOPE project palliative inpatients across NSW were significantly more 
likely to experience an opioid under-dose due to opioid error than inpatients in NSW 
cancer services (Heneka et al., 2018b), despite cancer pain management being core 
business for both clinical specialties (Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management 
Guideline Working Party, 2014; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018b).  
Approximately 60% of palliative inpatients received an opioid under-dose due to 
error, with almost half experiencing an exacerbation of their previously well 
managed pain (Heneka et al., 2018b; Heneka et al., 2018d).  
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The rate of opioid under-dosing due to error identified in the PERISCOPE project is 
also much higher than that reported in the acute care setting, where opioid overdose 
following an opioid error is far more common (Dy, Shore, Hicks, & Morlock, 2007). 
In the acute care setting, less than a quarter of reported opioid errors result in an 
opioid under-dose (Dy et al., 2007).  
For palliative inpatients the predominant harms from opioid errors are attributable to 
opioid under-dosing. Iatrogenic harm due to opioid errors increases palliative 
patients burden of pain and adversely impacts previously well-managed symptoms in 
this vulnerable patient population. 
8.2.3 Opioid error characteristics 
Opioids involved 
The PERISCOPE project found that NSW palliative care services were significantly 
more likely to report hydromorphone and morphine errors compared to all other 
NSW Health services combined (Heneka et al., 2018b). In both NSW acute care 
services and acute care internationally, errors with oxycodone, morphine and 
fentanyl are the most commonly reported opioid errors (Clinical Excellence 
Commission NSW Health, 2018; Desai et al., 2013; Dy et al., 2007; Mc Donnell, 
2011). These differing patterns of opioid errors reflect the frequency with which 
these opioids are used in this specialist setting. In the seven-day snapshot audit 
undertaken in the PERISCOPE project, hydromorphone administrations accounted 
for almost half (48%) of all opioid administrations in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. The higher usage of hydromorphone in the specialist palliative 
care inpatient services is not surprising, given that these services provide care to 
palliative patients with the most complex symptom management needs, including 
complex and/or refractory pain (Palliative Care Australia, 2018; Therapeutic 
Guidelines Limited, 2016). 
Problem and error type 
Opioid administration errors accounted for three-quarters of all reported opioid errors 
in the PERISCOPE project, and prescribing errors for one-fifth of opioid errors 
(Heneka et al., 2018b; Heneka et al., 2018d). Opioid administration errors were 
perceived to be relatively accurately reported by clinicians in the PERISCOPE 
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project, particularly when compared to errors with non-high-risk medications, due to 
mandated 24-hourly checks for narcotic discrepancies in the opioid drug registers. 
(Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2019). Conversely, palliative care 
clinicians acknowledged that opioid prescribing errors, particularly opioid 
conversion errors, occurred more frequently than reflected in incident reports, 
contradicting the results from the state-wide and local retrospective reviews (Studies 
2 and 3). Clinicians acknowledged prescribing errors were more likely to be rectified 
when they were first identified, and subsequently not reported, if the error was 
readily fixable (Heneka et al., 2019). 
Problem types seen in other healthcare settings are very similar to those reported in 
the PERISCOPE project (Carson et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2013; Dy et al., 2007; Mc 
Donnell, 2011). However, opioid administration error types identified in the 
PERISCOPE project showed markedly differing patterns compared to other 
healthcare settings.  
Omitted dose errors resulting in opioid under-dosing, were the most frequently 
reported opioid error type, accounting for one-quarter of all reported opioid errors, 
and one-third of reported opioid administration errors in the PERISCOPE project 
(Heneka et al., 2018b; Heneka et al., 2018d). Omitted dose errors were reported at 
over double the rate in the PERISCOPE project compared to international acute care 
settings, where only 14% of reported opioid administration errors are due to omitted 
dose errors (Prairie Research Association, 2014). The rate of omitted dose errors 
reported by NSW palliative care services in the PERISCOPE project was also 
significantly greater when compared to NSW cancer services (Heneka et al., 2018b). 
These data suggest omitted opioid dose errors in palliative care services may be more 
prevalent than in other healthcare settings, even when opioid use is comparable (e.g., 
in the cancer care setting). The major contributor to opioid under-dosing due to error 
in the PERISCOPE project was the high proportion of omitted dose errors reported 
in palliative care services, which palliative care clinicians acknowledged 
substantially contributed to this error outcome (Heneka et al., 2019). 
Another major difference in reported opioid administration error types in the 
specialist palliative care inpatient services, compared to other inpatient settings, was 
the substantially lower number of wrong drug and wrong dose errors. In the 
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PERISCOPE project, these error types were reported at one-fifth (wrong drug) to 
one-third (wrong dose) the rate reported in acute care (Desai et al., 2013; Dy et al., 
2007; Prairie Research Association, 2014). The factors that may account for this 
lower proportion of wrong drug and wrong dose errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services are explored in greater detail in Section 8.4.1. 
There are some notable differences in opioid error prevalence, patient impact and 
characteristics in specialist palliative care inpatient services compared to other acute 
care and/or inpatient settings. These are likely attributable to the frequency of opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services, and the volume of specific 
opioids used to manage palliative patients complex pain and other symptoms. 
8.3 Research Question 2: What are the individual and systems 
factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? 
Studies 2, 4 and 5 data were integrated to answer research Question 2: What are the 
individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? (refer Appendix 12 for joint display). These studies 
examined the incident narrative of clinical incident reports, at a state-wide (Study 2) 
and local level (Study 3), to provide a preliminary understanding of reported opioid 
error contributing factors in the palliative care delivery context. Semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups (Study 5) explored opioid errors contributing factors 
from the perspective of palliative care clinicians and service managers.  
8.3.1 Individual factors 
The state-wide and local data in the PERISCOPE project found active failures (i.e., 
human error on the part of the clinician) (Lawton et al., 2012) contributed to 
approximately two-thirds of opioid errors in the palliative care setting (Heneka et al., 
2018b; Heneka, Shaw, Rowett, Lapkin, & Phillips, 2018c). Palliative care clinicians 
in the PERISCOPE project openly acknowledged human error is an inevitable aspect 
of opioid errors, and medication errors generally, which cannot be entirely 
eliminated, despite every effort to mitigate it (Heneka et al., 2019). 
By far the most prominent individual factor contributing to opioid error in the 
PERISCOPE project was perceived to be clinician inexperience. This finding reflects 
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the international literature which suggests that, regardless of the clinical setting or 
specialty, clinician inexperience is a known medication error risk factor (Brady, 
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Coombes, Stowasser, Coombes, & Mitchell, 2008; Keers, 
Williams, Cooke, & Ashcroft, 2013). The higher frequency of opioids administered 
on a daily basis in specialist palliative care inpatient services compared to other care 
settings, combined with substantially higher opioid doses and diverse opioid 
combinations, was perceived to increase the risk of errors with opioids for 
inexperienced palliative care clinicians (Heneka et al., 2019). Additionally, the 
inherent complexity of palliative patient management and rapid fluctuation of 
palliative inpatients symptom management needs posed additional challenges for 
inexperienced palliative care clinicians (Heneka et al., 2019). In the PERISCOPE 
project, junior doctors, and nurses new to palliative care, all acknowledged the steep 
learning curve associated with opioid delivery in the specialist palliative care 
context, compared to other acute care settings, and the resultant heightened risk of 
opioid error for inexperienced clinicians (Heneka et al., 2019).  
While palliative care clinicians in the PERISCOPE project acknowledged the role of 
human error and clinician inexperience as opioid error contributing factors, clinicians 
also stressed it was essential to consider the systems factors that may be contributing 
to human error and causing opioid errors to occur (Heneka et al., 2019). 
8.3.2 Systems factors 
The systems factors contributing to opioid errors identified in the retrospective 
reviews of clinical incident narratives involving opioids (Studies 2 and 4) were 
limited to staff workload and clinical communication factors (Heneka et al., 2018b; 
Heneka et al., 2018c). This is not a wholly unexpected finding as incident reporting 
is often skewed towards active failures and individual factors, and rarely considers 
the broader systems factors that may have contributed to the error (Lawton et al., 
2012; Mahajan, 2010). While clinicians in the PERISCOPE project confirmed the 
results from the retrospective reviews, they identified multiple additional systems 
factors they perceived directly contributed to opioid errors in the specialist palliative 
care inpatient setting. The confirmatory and enhanced findings from the quantitative 
and qualitative data relating to opioid error contributing factors in the PERISCOPE 
project, are illustrated in Figure 8.1.  
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Figure 8.1 Opioid error contributory factors reported in clinical incident reports 
(orange) and identified by palliative care clinicians (red) in the PERISCOPE project, 
categorised per the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) 
Adapted from: Development of an evidence-based framework of factors contributing to patient safety 
incidents in hospital settings: a systematic review, Lawton R, McEachan RR, Giles SJ, Sirriyeh R, Watt 
IS and Wright J. 21:369-80 ©2012 with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. (Appendix 3) 
The systems factors contributing to opioid errors in the PERISCOPE project 
encompassed: i) suboptimal management of skill mix and registered nurse ratios; ii) 
the nature of opioid administration in specialist palliative care inpatient services; iii) 
absence of a pharmacist in the multi-disciplinary team; and iv) clinical 
communication factors. These factors are discussed in detail below. 
Suboptimal management of skill mix and registered nurse ratios  
The most pervasive opioid error contributing factor in the PERISCOPE project 
related to sub-optimal skill mix and registered nurse ratios. These factors, in turn, 
underpinned almost all the other error contributory factor domains identified by 
clinicians. Poor skill mix, from a nursing perspective, was seen to increase the 
number of patients and volume of opioid administrations that senior nurses had to 
manage, increasing their workload and the subsequent risk of error (Heneka et al., 
Opioid error contributory factors 
documented in incident reports  
Opioid error contributory 
factors identified by clinicians  
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2019). In the current era of cost containment, medication errors have been noted to 
increase as the proportion of registered nurses on a unit decreases, and the number of 
less qualified nursing staff (i.e., Enrolled Nurses, Assistants in Nursing) and/or 
agency staff, increases (Breckenridge-Sproat, Johantgen, & Patrician, 2012; Frith, 
Anderson, Tseng, & Fong, 2012; Picone et al., 2008). From an interdisciplinary 
perspective, experienced palliative care nurses were pivotal in the identification of 
opioid prescribing errors, particularly when junior doctors, or non-palliative care 
specialists were initiating opioid orders. Subsequently, when inexperienced nurses 
and doctors were rostered together, the risk of opioid error was perceived to be much 
greater (Heneka et al., 2019).  
The need for optimal interdisciplinary skill mix is heightened in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services as the palliative inpatient population has very complex 
symptom management needs (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018b; 
Palliative Care Australia, 2018). As such, palliative care clinicians require 
increasingly complex, specialised, knowledge and skills to provide comprehensive 
patient care, and continuity of care, with no single clinician likely able to meet all the 
complex needs of the palliative patient (Hall & Weaver, 2001; Nancarrow et al., 
2013).  
The PERISCOPE project identified that the error risks due to workforce skill mix 
was amplified when the specialist palliative registered nurse to inpatient ratio was 
insufficient (Heneka et al., 2019). There has been compelling evidence for over two 
decades that a lower proportion of registered nurses to patients is associated with 
significantly higher rates of medication errors (Frith et al., 2012; McGillis Hall, 
Doran, & Pink, 2004; Patrician et al., 2011), including in specialist units, such as 
intensive care, intermediate care, and medical-surgical units (Whitman, Kim, 
Davidson, Wolf, & Wang, 2002). Lower registered nurse ratios, have also been 
shown to decrease nurse surveillance of medication errors, resulting in poorer patient 
outcomes following an error (Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, & Suh, 2012).  
The continuously rotating nature of less experienced doctors, into and out of the 
specialist palliative care inpatient service (e.g., junior medical officers, out of hours 
non-specialist prescribers), also substantially increases the risk of opioid prescribing 
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errors if experienced clinicians are absent, and prescribing errors are not intercepted 
(Heneka et al., 2019). 
Nature of opioid administration in specialist palliative care inpatient services 
The process of opioid administration itself in the specialist palliative care inpatient 
context was identified as an error contributory factor in the PERISCOPE project. 
Palliative care clinicians highlighted the considerable differences in opioid 
administration in specialist palliative care inpatient services, compared to other 
inpatient settings (Heneka et al., 2019). Both the frequency of opioid administration 
and high opioid doses routinely delivered in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, posed a substantial opioid error risk for palliative patients. The high 
frequency of opioid administration resulted in palliative care nurses spending a large 
part of each shift preparing and administering opioids (Heneka et al., 2019). The 
independent double checking process mandated for opioid delivery, while highly 
effective in reducing errors with these high-risk medicines, (Institute for Safe 
Medication Practices, 2013) is a time consuming process. Additionally, the 
fluctuating pain management needs of the palliative inpatient population means that 
opioid administration is not restricted to defined medication rounds, and palliative 
care nurses can spend several hours each shift administering PRN opioids to meet 
clinical need, and recording to meet regulatory requirements (Heneka et al., 2019). 
Opioid preparation and administration is also a complex task that requires 
considerable concentration. However, interruptions during the opioid administration 
process were common in the PERISCOPE project, and palliative care nurses 
acknowledged these interruptions increased their risk of making an error (Heneka et 
al., 2019). Although all local participating services strove to create a ‘quiet’ space in 
the drug room to minimise interruptions and allow nurses to focus on opioid 
preparation, in reality, drug rooms were busy hubs which were often cramped and 
noisy.  
Additionally, all local services had also trialed a ‘do not interrupt’ approach to 
medication rounds which has been widely adopted across the globe (Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2013; Freeman, McKee, Lee-
Lehner, & Pesenecker, 2013; Relihan, O'brien, O'hara, & Silke, 2010). However, this 
formalised process was not perceived to have meaningfully reduced the number of 
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interruptions during opioid preparation. These findings are reflected in the literature 
which confirms the challenges of significantly reducing interruptions during 
medication administration, and identifying the complex relationship between 
interruptions and medication error (Raban & Westbrook, 2014; Westbrook et al., 
2017). Palliative care nurses in the PERISCOPE project acknowledged that, 
ultimately, interruptions were inevitable in their day-to-day clinical practice, and 
were one of many competing priorities that they actively endeavoured to manage 
(Heneka et al., 2019). 
Absence of a pharmacist in the multi-disciplinary team 
One of the most notable differences in the error prevalence rates between specialist 
palliative care inpatient services was attributed to the absence of a dedicated clinical 
pharmacist in the palliative care unit. The single specialist palliative care inpatient 
service in the PERISCOPE project that did not employ a palliative care pharmacist, 
reported all bar one prescribing error in the local retrospective review (Heneka et al., 
2018d). Clinicians in this service suggested that the lack of opioid order review by a 
clinical pharmacist directly contributed to opioid prescribing errors, in the palliative 
care unit (Heneka et al., 2019). This finding is reflected in the international literature, 
where the median prescribing error rate (all drug types) is almost three times higher 
in medications administered in the inpatient setting prior to pharmacist review 
compared to orders screened by pharmacists prior to administration (9.9% versus 
2.7%) (Lewis et al., 2009).  
In relation to palliative care service delivery, pharmacists have long been accepted as 
an integral part of the interdisciplinary palliative care team (Lee & McPherson, 2006; 
Lucas, Glare, & Sykes, 1997; Wilson, Wahler, Brown, Doloresco, & Monte, 2011). 
In Australia, palliative care pharmacists are actively involved in medication review 
(Gilbar & Stefaniuk, 2002)  Palliative care pharmacists’ recommendations regarding 
medications are well accepted by palliative care physicians and nurses, particularly 
for pain management (Wilson et al., 2011), and the proportion of palliative patients 
who achieve the desired therapeutic outcome following pharmacist input is high (Lee 
& McPherson, 2006). Hence, without a clinical pharmacist in the interdisciplinary 
palliative care team, the risk of opioid error, and resultant palliative patient harm, is 
considerably higher. 
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Clinical communication factors 
Communication systems: The PERISCOPE project identified a lack of standardised 
electronic medical record systems that allows the patients’ medical information to be 
seamlessly transferred between the inpatient unit, the community/outreach service, 
primary care and non-palliative care specialists. The lack of an integrated electronic 
medical record system heightened the risk of error when patients were first admitted 
to the inpatient unit, as opioids were often ordered without the prescriber being able 
to access all of the relevant information in a timely manner (Heneka et al., 2019).  
Care transitions are a known medication error risk issue (National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009), with a recent Australian study suggesting that 
two medication errors occur for every three patients at the time of their inpatient 
admission (Roughead, Semple, & Rosenfeld, 2016). A recent USA nursing home 
study found that the risk of opioid prescribing errors for patients transitioning into 
nursing homes was significantly higher than for non-opioid medications (11.3% vs. 
8.1%, p=.001) (Desai et al., 2013). Although the nursing home population differs in 
many respects from the inpatient palliative care population, there are some notable 
similarities. Palliative patients, like nursing home residents, are typically elderly, 
frail, have multiple co-morbidities, and experience persistent pain (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018a; Hunnicutt, Ulbricht, Tjia, & Lapane, 2017; 
Kasper J & O’Malley M, 2007). While a third (32%) of nursing home residents have 
an opioid prescription for pain management (Hunnicutt et al., 2017), nearly all (98%) 
of patients in the PERISCOPE project had at least one opioid order following 
admission to the palliative care unit. Hence, it is highly likely that the combination of 
patient characteristics, the aforementioned deficits in integrated electronic medical 
record systems, and the proportionally higher frequency of opioid orders, contributes 
to opioid prescribing errors in inpatient palliative care services. 
Interpersonal communication: Poor written or verbal clinical communication was a 
contributory factor to opioid error in the PERISCOPE project (Heneka et al., 2018b; 
Heneka et al., 2018c, 2019). In healthcare settings generally, clinical communication 
deficits have been well documented as factors contributing to medication errors 
(Manojlovich & DeCicco, 2007; Parry, Barriball, & While, 2015; Redley, Botti, 
Wood, & Bucknall, 2017). In palliative care settings specifically, deficits in 
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interdisciplinary communication and unclear medication documentation are also 
reported as common causes of errors (Dietz et al., 2013; Dietz, Plog, Jox, & Schulz, 
2014). As written communication deficits were generally quickly resolved in the 
PERISCOPE project (Heneka et al., 2019), the most problematic communication 
deficit was the lack of consistent contemporaneous handover of changes to opioid 
orders, from the ordering physician to the palliative care nurse. From the palliative 
care nurses’ perspective, these deficits contributed to the already high rate of omitted 
opioid doses. Further exploration of clinical handover practices in inpatient palliative 
care services is needed to fully understand the barriers and facilitators to timely 
handover of medication order changes. 
There are multiple systems level factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. While some contributory factors are intrinsic to the 
process of opioid delivery itself, other factors reflect gaps in staffing and resource 
management. 
8.4 Research Question 3: What are the opioid error mitigating 
factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services?  
Study 5 (semi-structured interviews and focus groups) explored the specific 
strategies specialist palliative care inpatient services in the PERISCOPE project had 
implemented to mitigate opioid errors. Data from this study were integrated with the 
Study 3 (local retrospective review) and Study 4 (retrospective review of error 
contributing factors) to answer research Question 3: What are the opioid error 
mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? (Refer Appendix 
13 for joint display). 
Many of the strategies to mitigate opioid errors in the PERISCOPE project were 
developed in direct response to specific errors, or patterns of errors, the service had 
identified following internal review of reported opioid errors. Underpinning these 
strategies was evidence of a positive opioid safety culture in all participating 
specialist palliative care inpatient services, which has been detailed in Chapter 7. In 
addition to an over-arching positive safety culture in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, five opioid error mitigating factors were consistently evident in 
the PERISCOPE project: i) palliative care nurses’ ability to identify and intercept 
opioid errors; ii) palliative care pharmacists in the interdisciplinary team iii) targeted 
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and ongoing opioid education; iv) strong interdisciplinary collaboration; and v) use 
of an electronic medication management system. These factors are reported in detail 
below. 
8.4.1 Opioid error mitigating factors 
Applying the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012) (refer 
Chapter 3) to the PERISCOPE project data revealed that the majority of opioid error 
mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services aligned with systems 
factors related to supervision and leadership, management of staff/staffing levels, 
training and education, and support from central functions (refer Figure 8.2).  
Most notably, the PERISCOPE project identified two opioid error mitigating factors 
which, if not present, were considered to be error contributory factors. Poor skill-mix 
(management of staff/staffing levels) and the absence of pharmacy input (support 
from central functions) directly contributed to opioid errors in the PERISCOPE 
project (Heneka et al., 2019), however, optimal skill-mix (nursing and 
interdisciplinary) and a full-time clinical pharmacist in the palliative care unit, 
appeared to directly reduce opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services (Heneka et al., 2018c, 2018d, 2019).  
Palliative care nurses’ ability to identify and intercept opioid errors 
Checking opioid orders was a routine part of palliative care nurses’ opioid 
administration practices in the PERISCOPE project. As medication administrators, 
nurses are well positioned to safeguard against medication errors, and are thought to 
intercept up to 86% of prescribing or dispensing errors (Leape et al., 1995). In the 
PERISCOPE project palliative care nurses were pivotal in intercepting prescribing 
errors, as evidenced in incident reports (Heneka et al., 2018c) and from the 
perspective of palliative care clinicians (Heneka et al., 2019). This may account for 
the discrepancy between clinicians’ perceptions that prescribing errors are relatively 
common, and the comparatively low prevalence (approximately 20%) of reported 
prescribing errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services (Heneka et al., 
2018d, 2019).  
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Figure 8.2 Comparison of opioid error mitigating (green) and contributory (red) 
factors identified in specialist inpatient palliative care services in the PERISCOPE 
project, categorised per the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (Lawton et 
al., 2012) 
Adapted from: Development of an evidence-based framework of factors contributing to patient safety 
incidents in hospital settings: a systematic review, Lawton R, McEachan RR, Giles SJ, Sirriyeh R, Watt 
IS and Wright J. 21:369-80 ©2012 with permission from BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. (Appendix 3) 
 
The role of the nurse in intercepting errors before they reach the patient has been 
explored for over a decade (Balas, Scott, & Rogers, 2004; Flynn et al., 2012; 
Gaffney, Hatcher, & Milligan, 2016; Rothschild et al., 2006). A significant 
association between registered nurses’ error interception practices and rates of 
medication error has been identified in medical-surgical units (Flynn et al., 2012). 
Critical care nurses have also been found to intercept two or more harmful medical 
errors per patient, per day, the majority (73%) of which are medication errors 
(Rothschild et al., 2006). While data in the palliative care context could not be 
identified, it is highly likely that nurses’ interception practices in palliative care 
directly prevent prescribing, and other opioid errors, such as wrong drug and wrong 
dose errors, from reaching the patient.  
Similar to studies in acute care (Cullen, Bates, & Leape; Hewitt & Chreim, 2015; 
McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006), palliative care nurses in the PERISCOPE project 
Opioid error mitigating factors  
Opioid error contributory factors  
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reported being confident asking for opioid orders to be changed if an error was 
identified, and acknowledged they prioritised timely administration of opioids to 
ensure effective pain management, over error reporting. Driving nurses’ confidence 
to identify and challenge opioid errors in the PERISCOPE project was a safety 
culture where nurses felt empowered to speak up when an error was identified, felt 
confident and supported to adhere to opioid handling/management policies, and had 
ready access to opioid related training and education (Heneka et al., 2019).  
Palliative care pharmacists in the interdisciplinary team  
As previously mentioned, the two services in the PERISCOPE project whose 
interdisciplinary team included a palliative care pharmacist reported considerably 
fewer opioid prescribing errors than the service that did not, irrespective of the 
medication management system used (electronic versus paper-based) (Heneka et al., 
2018d). In these two services pharmacists were highly valued members of the 
interdisciplinary team and palliative care physicians and nurses routinely sought 
advice from them. Additionally, pharmacists tailored opioid education to meet the 
needs of the unit, and pro-actively identified and conducted opioid safety related 
quality assurance activities.  
The inclusion of a pharmacist in the interdisciplinary team in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services appears integral to mitigating opioid errors, driving the 
services’ education and quality assurance activities to further support safe opioid 
delivery practices, and improving palliative patient outcomes (Gilbar, 2006; Herndon 
et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2011).  
Targeted and ongoing opioid education 
Opioid related education was seen as pivotal to nurses’ capacity to identify and 
intercept opioid errors in the PERISCOPE project. As reported in Chapter 7, each of 
the local palliative care services in the PERISCOPE project utilised a suite of opioid 
education options for all disciplines. Palliative care nurses reported feeling 
empowered to practice safely, largely driven by learning opportunities provided by 
the Clinical Nurse Educator, and the ongoing formal and informal education within 
the day-today operations of the unit. 
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Harnessing medication safety education to reduce medication errors and prevent 
error related harms has been a widely employed approach for over two decades 
(Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2017; Institute for 
Safe Medication Practices, 2009; Leape, 1994). However, in isolation, education 
strategies are not a reliable approach to consistently mitigate medication errors. 
Rather, education is best employed in combination with strategies that are less reliant 
on human vigilance to be successful (e.g., forcing functions and constraints in 
electronic medication management systems, standardised protocols, and independent 
double check systems) (Institute for Safe Medication Practices, 2009).  
Strong interdisciplinary collaboration 
Palliative care clinicians in the PERISCOPE project acknowledged the existence of 
strong and collegial interdisciplinary relationships in their services. Collaboration 
with palliative care pharmacists was greatly valued by nursing and medical staff, and 
afforded additional checks of opioid orders and guidance with opioid management. 
Palliative care physicians reported routinely consulting with nurses to check opioid 
conversions, and were open to being questioned if they had made and error. Equally, 
palliative care nurses felt empowered to challenge opioid orders they perceived to be 
ambiguous, illegible or incorrect. Interdisciplinary collaboration extended to 
situational awareness of, and increased vigilance around, less experienced palliative 
care clinicians in the PERISCOPE project, particularly junior doctors, and non-
palliative care specialists prescribing out of hours.  
In a recent integrative review of 30 studies, interdisciplinary collaboration was 
shown to substantially contribute to the identification, interception and reduction of 
medication errors across a broad range of hospital settings (Manias, 2018). While 
none of the setting in this integrative review included palliative care services, 
qualitative data from the PERISCOPE project strongly suggests effective 
interdisciplinary collaboration is a key factor in mitigating opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services.  
Use of an electronic medication management system 
An electronic medication management system was used in one palliative care service 
in the PERISCOPE project. A notable difference in opioid errors prevalence in this 
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service was the absence of reported omitted dose errors. Palliative care clinicians in 
this service perceived that electronic medication management systems directly 
reduced omitted dose errors by virtue of prompting clinicians to administer the 
missed dose, and preventing progression to the next due opioid administration. In 
contrast, omitted dose errors in the two palliative care services using paper based 
medication charts ranged from 29% to 69% of reported opioid administration errors 
(Heneka et al., 2018d).  
Electronic medication management systems have been reported to significantly 
reduce the risk of medication errors in acute health care settings (13% to 99% 
relative risk reduction) (Ammenwerth, Schnell-Inderst, Machan, & Siebert, 2008; 
Redley & Botti, 2013). However, the impact of electronic medication management 
systems on omitted dose errors is varied. In one Australian study omitted dose errors 
occurred at less than half the rate in an acute care hospital using an electronic 
medication management system compared to a similar hospital service using paper-
based medication charts (14% versus 33%) (Redley & Botti, 2013). Similar results 
were seen in a general surgery ward in the UK, with a 35% decrease in omitted dose 
errors following the introduction of an electronic medication management system 
(Franklin, O'Grady, Donyai, Jacklin, & Barber, 2007). However, a more recent 
Australian study found that, while the introduction of an electronic medication 
management system did not reduce the rate of omitted doses overall, it did lower the 
rate of non-therapeutic omissions from 26% to 4.4% of total omitted doses 
(Munzner, Welch, & Richardson, 2012). Given that omitted dose errors are the most 
frequently reported error type in specialist palliative care inpatient services, 
transitioning to electronic medication management systems for inpatient palliative 
care services currently using paper-based medication charts is an important 
consideration. 
8.5 Research Question 4: What is required to support and 
strengthen safe opioid delivery practices in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services? 
This final research question is answered through meta-inference of the collective 
PERISCOPE project data. The meta-inference process applied in the PERISCOPE 
project has been reported in detail in Chapter 3.   
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8.5.1 Understanding opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services 
In order to support and strengthen safe opioid delivery practices in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services, it is essential to first understand that opioid delivery 
in this setting is complex and time consuming. In specialist palliative care inpatient 
services opioids are frequently administered, using high doses and opioid 
combinations that differ substantially from opioid usage in other inpatient settings. 
Integral to palliative inpatients’ symptom management is palliative care clinicians’ 
capacity to undertake opioid conversions, which, in itself, is a complex and error 
prone task. Preparing and administering a single opioid dose for a palliative inpatient 
is time consuming as safe opioid administration requires adherence to independent 
double checking and documentation, in accordance with high-risk medicine 
management policies (Ministry of Health NSW, 2013, 2015). Hence, the complexity 
and fluctuating symptom management needs of the palliative care inpatient means 
palliative care clinicians, particularly nurses, spend a large proportion of their shift 
primarily attending to administering regular and PRN opioids. 
There are over 30 steps in the opioid delivery process in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services and each step is prone to human error (Heneka et al., 2018c; 
Leape, 2006). Having multiple processes in place to pro-actively identify and 
intercept opioid errors across the opioid delivery process, and before the error 
reaches the patient, is a critical starting point in supporting and strengthening safe 
opioid delivery in this setting. The PERISCOPE projects’ meta-inferences of the data 
has revealed that arriving at this point is contingent on the following four elements:  
i) embedding a positive opioid safety culture; 
ii) enabling optimal skill mix and staffing; 
iii) providing comprehensive opioid related education; and 
iv) empowering clinicians to identify, intercept and report opioid errors.  
Each element is described in the next section and the  conceptual framework 
illustrating the relationships between the elements is depicted in Figure 8.3.  
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Figure 8.3 Conceptual framework of factors to support and strengthen safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services 
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8.5.2 EMBED a positive opioid safety culture 
An organisation’s safety culture has long been considered the most fundamental 
predictor of safety performance (Clarke, 1999; Scott, Mannion, Marshall, & Davies, 
2003; Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 2010). Highly evident in the 
PERISCOPE project was a strong commitment to creating, and sustaining, a positive 
safety culture, which included: 
• Leadership commitment to opioid safety: acknowledgement of opioid 
delivery as a high-risk, time-intensive activity; opioid safety is a key 
organisational priority; strong leadership drives opioid safety culture (Flin, 
Burns, Mearns, Yule, & Robertson, 2006); 
• Awareness of opioid error potential: acknowledgement at all staff levels 
that opioid errors can and will occur; awareness of individual and systems 
causes of opioid error (Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, & Lackan, 2010); 
• Awareness and perceptions of opioid safety: managerial expectations of 
opioid safety/opioid handling are consistent and clearly communicated; 
actions/behaviors that promote opioid safety (e.g., strict adherence to two-
person check); perceptions of behavioral norms related to opioid safety (e.g., 
querying opioid orders perceived to be incorrect, challenging non-compliance 
with opioid delivery policy and/or unit safety culture) (Grissinger, 2014; 
Wakefield et al., 2010; Weaver et al., 2013); 
• A non-punitive response to error: a ‘no blame’ response when opioid errors 
occur and/or are reported; a systems approach to error investigation and 
resolution (Sammer et al., 2010); 
• Opioid error recognition, reporting, feedback and communication: 
clinicians empowered to identify and challenge opioid errors; encouraging 
error reporting; individual and organisational learning from opioid error; 
errors are followed up by management and used to inform quality 
improvement strategies (Hodgen, Ellis, Churruca, & Bierbaum, 2017); 
• Organisational support for opioid safety: comprehensive opioid education 
at orientation to unit; ongoing formal and informal clinician education, 
including group learning and one-on-one learning opportunities; dedicated 
Clinical Nurse Educator role in unit; palliative care pharmacist as essential 
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member of interdisciplinary team; positive safety culture integrated into unit 
education activities (Flin et al., 2006; Sammer et al., 2010); 
• Team work within and across units: high level interdisciplinary 
collaboration (nurses, doctors, pharmacists); interdisciplinary awareness of 
clinician inexperience; proactive provision of opioid related education and 
quality assurance activities by pharmacist (Flin et al., 2006); and 
• Job satisfaction: adequate unit staffing and skill mix (Hodgen et al., 2017; 
Sammer et al., 2010). 
Creating a systems wide approach that supports palliative care clinicians to safely 
navigate the complexities of opioid delivery in the specialist palliative care inpatient 
services delivery context, and promotes a non-punitive approach to error occurrence 
and reporting, is essential to minimising opioid errors. Embedding and sustaining a 
positive safety culture must be at the core of any initiatives to support and strengthen 
safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services. Hence this element 
lies at the foundation of the conceptual framework developed from the PERISCOPE 
project data. A positive safety culture shapes clinicians’ opioid safety behaviours, 
values and attitudes, and drives the palliative care services’ commitment to opioid 
safety management (Wakefield et al., 2010).  
RECOMMENDATION 1: That palliative care inpatient services strive to 
establish and embed a positive opioid safety culture within their services 
that is: driven by leadership, promotes a non-punitive approach to error, 
provides strong organisational support for opioid safety, and fosters strong 
interdisciplinary collaboration. 
8.5.3 ENABLE optimal skill mix, staffing and resources 
Skill mix and staffing 
From an organisational perspective, it is essential to acknowledge that opioid 
delivery in the palliative care inpatient setting is a high-risk clinical activity which 
consumes a large amount of time each shift, and differs substantially to delivery in 
other inpatient settings. The fluctuating needs of palliative care patients, and the task 
characteristics of opioid delivery place considerable time and workload burdens on 
palliative care clinicians. Appropriate ratios of registered nurses to palliative patients, 
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and optimal interdisciplinary skill mix, are fundamental to supporting safe opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services. As opioid delivery comprises 
a large proportion of the palliative care nurses’ shift, budgetary consideration for the 
provision of supportive staff to alleviate palliative care nurses’ non-clinical workload 
are also worth considering. 
In the PERISCOPE project, the challenge of training and sustaining an agile 
palliative care workforce was noted as a direct contributor to sub-optimal staffing 
and skill mix, which, in turn, were the most pervasive opioid error contributing 
factors. The Australian palliative care workforce is ageing rapidly with 
approximately 70% of the total palliative care workforce over 40 years of age, and 
one-third over 50 years (Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2012). It 
is likely that over the next decade, the number of palliative care clinicians retiring 
will lead to an inadequate workforce to meet the demands of an ageing, and growing, 
Australian population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2018b; Victorian 
Healthcare Association, 2011). Workforce planning needs have been acknowledged 
in the recently released 3rd national palliative care strategy and need to be driven at a 
national level (Australian Government Department of Health, 2018).  
The absence of a palliative care pharmacist in the specialist palliative care inpatient 
services interdisciplinary is detrimental to opioid safety. Palliative care pharmacists’ 
review of opioid orders is an important error safeguard for these high-risk medicines. 
Palliative care pharmacists also play an integral role in opioid education and quality 
assurance activities in the specialist palliative care inpatient service. 
RECOMMENDATION 2: That palliative care inpatient services ensure 
optimal medical and nursing ratios and interdisciplinary skill mix, 
appropriate to palliative patients’ acuity, each shift.  
RECOMMENDATION 3: That a minimum ratio of palliative care 
pharmacist hours be mandated for all specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
Resources 
The complexity of opioid delivery in specialist palliative care inpatient services 
demands clinicians have ready access to resources that support clinical decision 
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making and help mitigate opioid errors. Omitted does errors were, by far, the most 
frequently reported opioid error type, and substantially contributed to opioid under-
dosing and iatrogenic patient harm. Electronic medication management systems 
appear to considerably reduce omitted does errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, and their implementation should be a key consideration for 
palliative care services using paper-based medication charts.   
RECOMMENDATION 4: Prioritise the transition to electronic medication 
management systems from paper-based charts to reduce omitted opioid dose 
errors. 
8.5.4 EDUCATE 
Education was the foundation for safe opioid delivery practices in the PERISCOPE 
project. Given the substantial differences in opioid delivery in palliative care, 
compared to other acute care services, a comprehensive orientation to opioid delivery 
in the palliative care context is essential for all clinicians first starting in palliative 
care. Education was seen one of the key drivers that empowered clinicians to 
recognise and challenge opioid errors. This was achieved through fostering an 
inclusive and safe learning environment that supported interdisciplinary learning, and 
ongoing formal and informal learning opportunities. Clinicians from all disciplines 
valued one-to-one education with the Clinical Nurse Educator, and the palliative care 
pharmacist. For palliative care nurses, the Clinical Nurse Educator was seen as 
pivotal to instilling and maintaining safe opioid delivery practices in the nursing 
team. In keeping with the characteristics of a strong opioid safety culture, error 
reporting was used as a powerful learning tool, giving clinicians the opportunity to 
reflect on and better their clinical practice, and facilitating system-wide change. 
Incorporating the services’ approach to safety culture within the education program 
was integral to embedding and sustaining a positive opioid safety culture throughout 
the palliative care service. 
RECOMMENDATION 5: That palliative care inpatient services ensure that 
a dedicated Clinical Nurse Educator is employed in the specialist palliative 
care inpatient service to: consistently instill safe opioid delivery practices 
for new and existing palliative care clinicians, and drive a coordinated 
opioid education program across the palliative care service. 
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RECOMMENDATION 6: That palliative care inpatient services provide 
opportunities for one-on-one, tailored learning as required, in addition to 
regular group-based learning activities. 
8.5.5 EMPOWER 
It was evident the large majority of clinicians in the PERISCOPE project felt 
empowered to identify, challenge and report opioid errors. Given the perceived 
number of opioid prescribing errors that occur in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, empowering clinicians to recognise and intercept these errors is a key 
opioid error mitigating factor. However, empowerment requires the requisite 
knowledge and skills to identify when an error occurs, and a safety culture where 
clinicians feel supported to query errors and/or ask their colleagues for assistance 
when needed. In the PERISCOPE project this was achieved through a combination 
of targeted opioid education, a non-punitive error reporting culture, and strong 
interdisciplinary collaboration, underpinned by a positive opioid safety culture where 
the risks inherent with the opioid delivery process were acknowledged and respected.  
RECOMMENDATION 7: That palliative care inpatient services empower 
clinicians to identify challenge and report opioid errors by providing 
comprehensive opioid education and fostering a positive, non-punitive 
opioid safety culture. 
8.6 Significance of the PERISCOPE project  
The PERISCOPE project is the first body of work to comprehensively explore opioid 
errors in the specialist palliative care inpatient service delivery context. The project 
aligns with multiple national standards, strategies and polices targeting medication 
safety, quality use of medicines, and palliative care delivery standards (Australia, 
2018; Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2017; 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care and NSW Therapeutic 
Advisory Group Inc., 2014) (refer Appendix 10).  
8.7 Strengths and Limitations  
The PERISCOPE project has a number of strengths. Data were drawn from both a 
state-wide clinical incident reporting system and within local services, enabling 
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direct comparisons and benchmarking of opioid errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. A large number of clinicians from multiple disciplines enabled 
data saturation to be reached in the qualitative component of the PERISCOPE 
project, and facilitated comprehensive member checking within and across 
participating specialist palliative care inpatient services.  
Limitations 
While the limitations of each of the PERISCOPE project studies have been described 
in the relevant chapters, there are several limitations that need to be highlighted in 
this section. The PERISCOPE project focused on specialist adult palliative care 
inpatient services in metropolitan NSW only. However, palliative care in Australia is 
delivered in multiple generalist and specialist settings, including outpatient care and 
community-based/home care and paediatric palliative care. Hence the findings from 
this project may not be generalisable to other palliative care settings or geographical 
locations (e.g., regional, rural and remote services).  
Although two dedicated cancer inpatient services had initially expressed interest in 
participating in the PERISCOPE project, a change in management and competing 
research priorities, saw both services decline participation when recruitment for the 
project commenced. A key challenge in recruiting additional cancer services to the 
PERISCOPE project lay in the nature of cancer service delivery outside of the 
inpatient context. There are few dedicated cancer inpatient services in NSW, with 
cancer patients generally dispersed throughout multiple wards in a hospital, 
depending on their reason for admission (e.g., surgical ward) and cancer type (e.g., 
respiratory ward). Hence, only palliative care services were included in the 
PERISCOPE project. 
The PERISCOPE project recruited palliative care clinicians from multiple 
disciplines, and achieved strong participant engagement at each site, however, 
participation in this project was voluntary and the characteristics of participants, 
versus non-participants may have biased the study findings. 
It is well known that medication errors are widely under-reported in hospitals 
(Levinson, 2012; Munzner et al., 2012; Westbrook et al., 2015) and emerging 
research suggests the same is true of palliative care units (Boyer, McPherson, 
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Deshpande, & Smith, 2009; MacLeod, Fletcher, & Ogles, 2011; Taylor, Fisher, & 
Butler, 2010). Although the PERISCOPE project sought palliative care clinicians 
perceptions of opioid error reporting practices in their services to verify the clinical 
incident report data, it is highly likely these data do not accurately reflect the actual 
prevalence of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services. 
Finally, research into patient safety and medication errors in palliative care is still an 
emerging area of research, with multiple gaps in published empirical data. Thus, one 
of the overarching challenges in the PERISCOPE project lay in the dearth of 
comparable literature in the palliative care context, which limited the conclusions 
that could be drawn.  
8.8 Conclusion 
Opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services rarely have a single 
cause. Rather, opioid errors occur as a result of differing combinations of individual, 
team, environmental and organisational factors (Heneka et al., 2018b; Heneka et al., 
2018c, 2018d). In order to support safe opioid delivery in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, a systems approach to error management recognises that 
healthcare services themselves are subject to latent failures, which manifest as error 
promoting conditions in the workplace (Lawton et al., 2012). Hence, focusing solely 
on the actions of the palliative care clinician when opioid errors occur, will not 
prevent error recurrence, if, in fact, failings within the system itself are the issue 
(Lawton et al., 2012; McBride-Henry & Foureur, 2006). Importantly, a systems 
approach to opioid errors does not take away individual accountability for opioid 
safety, but expands accountability across the organisation to anyone who influences 
the medication use process (Cohen, 2007). 
The PERISCOPE project identified opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services differ in prevalence, characteristics and patient impact to other health care 
settings, and contribute to iatrogenic patient harm. Opioid error contributing factors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient services are multifactorial, encompassing a 
spectrum of factors from individual to latent systems factors. Accordingly, any 
strategies to reduce opioid errors must apply an integrated systems approach in order 
to be of impact.  
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Implications for practice  
The PERISCOPE project has highlighted that opioid underdosing, not overdosing, 
was the most common patient outcome following an opioid error, and that omitted 
dose errors substantially contribute to this phenomenon in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. It is important to recognise the dosing cascades that might follow 
from inadequate pain relief from such errors, the implications of worsening pain and 
distress for patients at the end of life, and their families/caregivers, and the additional 
nursing workload resulting from PRN analgesia administration. 
A key finding of the PERISCOPE project was the evidence of a positive opioid 
safety culture in participating palliative care services which drove safe opioid 
delivery practices in specialist palliative care inpatient services. Assessing safety 
culture within the specialist palliative care inpatient service to identify areas of 
strength and areas for improvement, is an essential first step for any services 
considering strategies to support and improve this aspect of care. Pro-actively 
embedding and sustaining a culture of opioid safety is a critical practice component 
that empowers clinicians to safely deliver opioids in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. 
Implications for future research 
Further exploration of safety culture in inpatient palliative care services is warranted 
to identify the similarities and differences in culture across a greater number of 
palliative care services, including services in differing geographical regions. In 
anticipation of the growth of palliative care delivery in the community/home setting, 
a systematic exploration of opioid errors by clinicians in these settings is also 
warranted. Given the unique features of paediatric palliative care it is worth 
extending this program of research into this setting to better understand how 
paediatric palliative care services manage opioid safety, and how opioid errors 
impact paediatric patients. With increasingly greater integration of palliative and 
cancer care services, understanding barriers and facilitators to opioid safety in the 
cancer care setting is equally important to ensuring these vulnerable patients are 
protected from iatrogenic harm due to opioid errors. Conducting rigorous studies in 
these multiple care settings will facilitate greater generalisability and applicability of 
study findings. 
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The absence of a standardised opioid error taxonomy may be a barrier to consistent 
reporting and effective benchmarking of opioid errors and patient impact within and 
across palliative care services. This will be explored in a future Delphi consensus 
process to develop and formalise the proposed taxonomy. 
Finally, as the PERISCOPE project has established clinicians perceptions of opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services, exploring the impact of opioid 
errors from the palliative patients’ and family/caregiver perspective is a critical next 
step. Partnering and collaborating with consumers to develop this research will 
privilege their experiences and care needs following an opioid error, and better 
understand how to effectively facilitate their engagement in opioid safety throughout 
the patient and family/caregiver journey.  
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Appendix 4: Study 3a - snapshot audit data extraction tool 
Variables: 
1. Study ID 
2. Date of admission 
3. Date of discharge  
4. Number of days on ward in snapshot audit period 
5. Opioid regular order 1-5 (opioid, route, dose, timing) 
a. date ordered 
b. time commenced 
c. number of times administered in audit period (n) 
d. ceased (if applicable) 
6. PRN opioid order 1-5 (opioid, route, dose, timing) 
a. date ordered 
b. time commenced 
c. number of times administered in audit period (n) 
d. ceased (if applicable) 
7. STAT opioid order 1-5 (opioid, route, dose, timing) 
a. date/time ordered 
b. time administered 
c. number of times administered in audit period (n)
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Appendix 5: Study 3b data collection tool (retrospective 
audit) 
1. Patient data sheet 
Patient Demographics 
RiskMan/IIMS 
Incident # 
 Study Code  
Age in years  Gender M  /  F 
Reason for 
admission 
 Primary diagnosis  
Length of stay (days)  Died during 
admission 
Y  /  N 
Opioid Error Data 
Date of incident  Opioid  
Route  Dose  
Timing  Indication  
Site ID  Error type  
Error made by [clinician role only] Identified/reported by [clinician/
staff role 
only] 
Details of patient outcome following incident: 
 
 
Action by service following incident:  
 
 
Other notes: 
 
1. Incident as recorded in patient chart: 
 
2: Incident notes from RiskMan/IIMS: 
 
3. Contributing factors per RiskMan/IIMS: 
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Appendix 6: Audit summary exemplar for qualitative study 
(Study 5) 
Opioid Error Audit - Main Messages 
• Over a three year audit period (2013-2015), opioid incidents were the major medication 
related clinical incident reported at [site] accounting for two thirds of all reported 
medication incidents.  
• Three quarters of reported opioid incidents reached the patient at [site] with almost 
40% of these patients requiring clinical intervention to manage symptoms directly 
related to the incident. 
• Opioid administration and prescribing problems were the most frequently reported 
incident category at [site]. 
• Omitted opioid doses were the major reported administration incident type reported at 
[site]. 
• Nurses were instrumental in identifying and rectifying potential prescribing 
incidents, or alerting medical staff to other incidents that had already reached the 
patient. 
• Patients were more likely to receive an under-dose of opioid as a result of opioid 
prescribing or administration incidents than an over-dose. 
• Whereas administration incidents were more likely to result in an opioid under-dose, all 
reported prescribing incidents that reached the patient resulted in an opioid over-dose 
at [site]. 
Figure 1: [site] - Percentage of reported opioid incidents by problem type 
 
 
Administration
51%
Prescribing
24%
Patient factors
9%
Documentation
7%
Near miss 
5%
Drug storage
2% Drug discrepancy
2%
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Table 1: Reported opioid incidents by problem and incident type 
Problem type % (n) Incident type  (N=45) (100%)   
Administration 51.1% 
(n=23) 
 
Omitted dose 10 (43.5) 
Wrong dose 4 (17.4) 
Wrong drug 4 (17.4) 
Wrong patient 3 (13.0) 
Wrong route 1 (4.3) 
Device – wrong rate 1 (4.3) 
Prescribing 24.4%     
(n=11)         
Medication charting 4 (36.4) 
Opioid conversion 
error 
3 (27.3) 
Wrong dose  2 (18.2) 
Wrong drug 2 (18.2) 
Patient factors 8.9%     
(n=4)      
Patient self-
administered opioid 
2 (50.0) 
Drug discrepancy 2 (50.0) 
Documentation 6.7%     
(n=3)     
Withheld drug not 
documented 
1 (33.3) 
Administered dose not 
signed in med chart 
1 (33.3) 
Medication entry error 
in drug register 
1 (33.3) 
Near miss 4.4% (n=2)      Wrong patient 2 (100) 
Controlled drug 
discrepancy 2.2% 
(n=1)         
Medication entry error 
in drug register 
1 (100) 
Drug storage/wastage/ 
security 2.2% (n=1)  
Patient S8 drug 
storage 
1 (100) 
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Appendix 7: Participant information sheet and consent 
form (master) Study 5 
 
Part 1  What does my participation involve? 
 
1 Introduction 
 
You are invited to take part in this research project, which is called: Specialist palliative care 
clinicians’ and health service managers’ perceptions and experiences of opioid errors within 
their service: a mixed methods study. 
 
You have been invited because you are a clinician involved in the prescribing, dispensing or 
administration of opioids in a specialist palliative care service and/or you are a manager 
involved with the opioid medication process/patient quality and safety.  
 
This Participant Information Sheet/Consent Form tells you about the research project. It 
explains the processes involved with taking part. Knowing what is involved will help you 
decide if you want to take part in the research. 
 
Please read this information carefully. Ask questions about anything that you don’t 
understand or want to know more about. Before deciding whether or not to take part, you 
might want to talk about it with a relative, friend or colleague. 
 
Participation in this research is voluntary. If you don’t wish to take part, you don’t have to.  
 
If you decide you want to take part in the research project, you will be asked to sign the 
consent section. By signing it you are telling us that you: 
 
• Understand what you have read 
• Consent to take part in the research project 
• Consent to be involved in the research described 
• Consent to the use of your personal and health information as described. 
 
You will be given a copy of this Participant Information and Consent Form to keep. 
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2  What is the purpose of this research? 
 
Aim of the project 
The aim of this project is to explore clinician (registered nurses, doctors, pharmacists) and 
health service managers (managers) perceptions of and attitudes towards opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care services. This includes: error type and incidence; reporting 
practices; patient and clinician impact; barriers and facilitators to safe opioid medication 
processes, e.g., ordering, dispensing, administration; and identification of priority areas for 
strategies to address local opioid errors. 
 
Project background 
Specialist palliative care services oversee a higher volume of opioid orders and 
administrations compared to other acute care services, with a corresponding increased 
potential for error. Addressing opioid errors in palliative care services has been identified as 
a quality improvement priority by senior clinicians, however, there is very little research on 
opioid error types and strategies to reduce opioid errors in specialist palliative care services. 
This project is an opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of the contributing and 
mitigating factors to opioid errors so that tailored intervention and implementation strategies 
that address these errors in adult specialist palliative care services can be developed. 
 
The results of this research will be used by the researcher, Nicole Heneka, to obtain a 
Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
3 What does participation in this research involve? 
 
This project is being conducted as a series of focus groups and semi-structured interviews 
conducted at [Insert site name]. Focus groups and semi-structured interviews will run for 
approximately 30-60 minutes. If you consent to participate, you will be asked to provide your 
preferred email address so the focus group and/or interview details can be sent to you. You 
will also be asked complete a short demographic survey (approximately 5 minutes to 
complete). No study activities (e.g, survey completion, provision of contact details), will occur 
before you have signed the consent form. 
 
During the focus groups and semi-structured interviews, a facilitator will guide the discussion 
to explore the groups’ perceptions of opioid error type and incidence; reporting practices; 
patient and clinician impact; barriers and facilitators to safe opioid medication processes, 
e.g., ordering, dispensing, administration; and identification of priority areas for strategies to 
address opioid errors in your service. Focus group discussions and semi-structured 
interviews will be audio recorded. 
 
This research project has been designed to make sure the researchers interpret the results 
in a fair and appropriate way and avoids study doctors or participants jumping to 
conclusions.   
 
 There are no costs associated with participating in this research project, nor will you be 
paid. 
 
4 Other relevant information about the research project 
 
This project follows on from a quality audit of opioid errors in your service. The results of this 
audit will be presented at the start of the focus groups. There are three specialist palliative 
care services taking part in this research project, with approximately 30 participants in total. 
 
Focus groups will be structured by roles in the opioid medication process, i.e., opioid 
ordering, opioid administration, opioid dispensing and/or quality and safety. For example, 
participants involved primarily in opioid administration (nurses) will be grouped together. 
 
Semi-structured interviews can be conducted: face to face at [Insert site name]; by phone; or 
via Skype, at a time that suits you and the researcher(s). 
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5 Do I have to take part in this research project? 
 
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part, you do not 
have to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to withdraw from 
the project at any stage. 
 
If you do decide to take part, you will be given this Participant Information and Consent Form 
to sign and you will be given a copy to keep. 
 
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will 
not affect your relationship with professional staff or your relationship with [Institution]. 
 
6 What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this research; 
however, possible benefits may include: a better understanding of why opioid errors occur in 
this service and how they could be prevented; recommendations for future quality 
improvement projects to support and re-enforce safe opioid medication processes; an 
opportunity to reflect on your role in the medication process and identify strategies that 
support you in safe opioid medication processes; an opportunity to explore the impact of 
opioid errors on patients and identify practices which support patient safety.  
 
7 What are the possible risks and disadvantages of taking part? 
 
The risks associated with this study are perceived to be low. In the focus groups and semi-
structured interviews we will be exploring opioid medication practices. You may feel that 
some of the questions we ask make you feel uncomfortable due to previous exposure to or 
awareness of medication errors. If you do not wish to answer a question, you do not need to 
answer. If you become upset or distressed as a result of your participation in the research 
project, the research team will be able to arrange for counselling or other appropriate 
support. Any counselling or support will be provided by qualified staff who are not members 
of the research team. This counselling will be provided free of charge. 
 
Whilst all care will be taken to maintain privacy and confidentiality in the focus groups, you 
may experience embarrassment if one of the group members were to repeat things said in a 
confidential group meeting. 
 
8 What if I withdraw from this research project? 
 
If you do consent to participate, you may withdraw at any time.  If you decide to withdraw 
from the project, please notify a member of the research team before you withdraw. A 
member of the research team will inform you if there are any special requirements linked to 
withdrawing.  If you do withdraw, you will be asked to complete and sign a ‘Withdrawal of 
Consent’ form; this will be provided to you by the research team. 
 
If you decide to leave the research project, the researchers will not collect additional 
personal information from you, although personal information already collected will be 
retained to ensure that the results of the research project can be measured properly and to 
comply with law. You should be aware that data collected up to the time you withdraw will 
form part of the research project results.  If you do not want your data to be included, you 
must tell the researchers when you withdraw from the research project. 
 
9 Could this research project be stopped unexpectedly?  
 
This research project may be stopped unexpectedly for a variety of reasons. These may 
include unforseen events that affect the researchers capacity to complete the project. 
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10 What happens when the research project ends? 
 
If you give us your permission by providing your consent, we plan to publish the results in a 
peer reviewed journal. In any publication, information will be provided in such a way that you 
and your place of work cannot be identified. The purpose of the published information is to 
inform the development of strategies to reduced opioid errors for health services in Australia 
and overseas. Results of the study will be provided to you, if you wish. Additionally, a report 
summarising the study findings will be prepared and/or presented in your service within 12 
months of project completion. 
 
Part 2 How is the research project being conducted? 
 
11 What will happen to information about me? 
 
By signing the consent form you consent to the research team collecting and using personal 
information about you for the research project. The personal information that the research 
team collect and use is limited to the questions found in the demographic survey. Any 
information obtained in connection with this research project that can identify you, e.g., as 
disclosed in the focus groups, will remain confidential. Any identifiable information that is 
collected form you in the demographic survey will also remain confidential. 
 
Your information will only be used for the purpose of this research project and it will only be 
disclosed with your permission, except as required by law. Only the researchers named 
above will have access to your identifiable details. Information you provide will be non-
identifiable prior to data analysis and held securely at the University of Technology Sydney 
under password protection. 
 
It is anticipated that the results of this research project will be published and/or presented in 
a variety of forums. In any publication and/or presentation, information will be provided in 
such a way that you cannot be identified, except with your express permission. Any reports 
or publications resulting from this study will not identify your place of work. 
 
In accordance with relevant Australian and/or New South Wales privacy and other relevant 
laws, you have the right to request access to the information about you that is collected and 
stored by the research team. You also have the right to request that any information with 
which you disagree be corrected. Please inform the research team member named at the 
end of this document if you would like to access your information. 
 
12 Complaints and compensation 
 
If you suffer any distress as a result of this research project, you should contact the research 
team as soon as possible.  You will be assisted with arranging appropriate treatment and 
support. 
 
13 Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research project is being conducted by Prof Jane Phillips and Ms Nicole Heneka 
(University of Notre Dame Australia). No member of the research team will receive a 
personal financial benefit from your involvement in this research project (other than their 
ordinary wages). 
 
14 Who has reviewed the research project? 
   
All research in Australia involving humans is reviewed by an independent group of people 
called a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).  The ethical aspects of this research 
project have been approved by the HREC of St Vincent’s Hospital (Darlinghurst). The HREC 
reference for this study is: LNR/16/SVH/321: This project will be carried out according to the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This statement has been 
  
A62  
developed to protect the interests of people who agree to participate in human research 
studies. 
15 Further information and who to contact 
 
The person you may need to contact will depend on the nature of your query.  If you want 
any further information concerning this project or if you have any problems which may be 
related to your involvement in the project, you can contact the following people: 
 
Research contact person 
Name Nicole Heneka 
Position Co-ordinating investigator 
Telephone 0400 674 378 
Email nicole.heneka1@my.nd.edu.au 
 
Name  
Position Site Principal Investigator 
Telephone  
Email  
 
For matters relating to research at the site at which you are participating, the details of the 
local site complaints person are: 
 
Complaints contact person 
Name [Name] 
Position [Position] 
Telephone [Phone number] 
Email [Email address] 
 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about being a research participant in general, then you may contact: 
 
Reviewing HREC name: St Vincent’s Hospital HREC 
HREC Executive Officer HREC Executive Officer 
Telephone 02 8382 4960 
Email SVHS.Research@svha.org.au 
Reviewing HREC approving this research and HREC Executive Officer details 
 
Local HREC Office contact 
Name [Name] 
Position [Position] 
Telephone [Phone number] 
Email [Email address] 
 
University HREC Office contact 
Name Dr. Natalie Giles 
Position Research Ethics Officer 
Telephone 08 9433 0964 
Email Natalie.Giles@nd.edu.au 
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Demographic questions accompanying participant information and 
consent forms 
This study has been approved by the St Vincent’s Hospital Human Research Ethics 
Committee (LNR/16/SVH/321). Please ensure you have read and signed the consent form 
before completing this survey and providing your contact information. The following 
questions assist the research team in data analysis and interpretation of the focus 
groups/interviews. All responses to these questions will be non-identifiable. Only global data 
will be reported in the publishing of the results, individuals and the service they work at will 
not be identified. The last section asks you to select whether you would like to participate in 
a focus group, a semi-structured interview, or both; and to provide contact details so the 
research team can set up a time that suits you. Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
1. What is your age in years? ________ 
 
2. What is your gender? (Tick one answer only) 
 Male 
 Female 
 
3. What is your discipline? (Tick one answer only) 
 Nursing 
 Medical 
 Pharmacy 
 Quality and Safety - Please specify your 
role:_______________________________ 
 Service Management- Please specify your 
role:_____________________________ 
 Other (please specify): 
________________________________________________ 
 
4. What is your classification (clinicians)? (Tick one answer only) 
Nursing Medical Pharmacy 
 Enrolled Nurse 
 Endorsed Enrolled 
Nurse 
 Registered Nurse 
 Clinical Nurse 
Educator 
 Clinical Nurse 
Consultant 
 Clinical Nurse 
Specialist 
 Nurse Practitioner 
 Nurse Unit Manager 
 Intern 
 Resident Medical 
Officer 
 Senior Resident 
Medical Officer 
 Registrar – Basic 
Trainee 
 Registrar – Advanced 
Trainee 
 Consultant 
 Pharmacy Assistant 
 Pharmacy Technician 
 Senior Pharmacist 
 Deputy Director of 
Pharmacy 
 Director of Pharmacy 
 OTHER (Please specify): 
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5. What is highest level of education you have attained (nurses and pharmacists only)? 
(Tick one answer only) 
 Certificate IV 
 Diploma 
 Advanced Diploma 
 Bachelor Degree 
 Graduate Certificate 
 Post Graduate Diploma  
 Masters Degree 
 Other (please specify): ______________________________ 
 
6. How many years have you been a nurse/doctor/pharmacist? (question tailored to 
discipline) (Tick one answer only) 
 < 1 year 
 1-2 years 
 3-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-15 years 
 16-20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
7. How many years of experience do you have specifically caring for patients in 
palliative care? (Tick one answer only) 
 < 1 year 
 1-2 years 
 3-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-15 years 
 16-20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
8. How many years have you worked in this unit? (Tick one answer only) 
 < 1 year 
 1-2 years 
 3-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-15 years 
 16-20 years 
 21 years or more 
 
9. What is your primary role in the opioid medication process? 
 Prescribing 
 Dispensing 
 Administration 
 Quality and Safety 
 Other: Please specify: 
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10. How often do you prescribe/administer/dispense opioid medications (question 
tailored to discipline)? 
 frequently (daily) 
 occasionally (several times per week) 
 rarely (several times per month) 
 never 
 
11. What is your employment status: 
 Full-time 
 Part-time 
 Causal 
 Agency 
 Rotation 
 Other - please specify: 
 
12. Which shift(s) do you usually work? 
 Day 
 Afternoon 
 Night 
 Combination – please specify: 
 Other  - please specify: 
 
[This section starts on new page which will be removed from the demographic data above]. 
• Preference for participation (can select both):  
 Semi-structured interview 
 Focus Group 
• Format:  
 face to face 
 telephone 
 Skype  
Please provide your email address so an interview can be scheduled and/or details of the 
focus groups can be sent to you: 
Name: 
Email: 
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Appendix 8: Exemplar data report provided to each 
participating service 
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Appendix 9: Ethics and site specific approvals 
Table A9: Ethical and site specific approval overview 
Study Ethical approval reference Site specific approval reference 
Study 1 Not applicable – systematic review Not applicable 
Study 2 NSW Population and Health Services 
Research Ethics Committee:                                 
AU/RED Reference: LNR/16/CIPHS/8                            
Cancer Institute NSW reference 
number: LNR 2016/02/041 
University of Notre Dame Australia: 
017390S 
Not applicable, included in ethical 
approval 
Study 3 and 
Study 4 
St Vincent’s Hospital HREC: SVH File 
Number: 15/033; HREC Reference 
LNR/15/SVH/51 
University of Notre Dame Australia: 
015115S 
St Vincent’s Hospital HREC: 
LNRSSA/15/SVH/60 
Hunter New England Local Health 
District HREC: LNRSSA/15/HNE/536 
Calvary Health Care Kogarah 
Research and Ethics Committee: 
2015.10.01  
Study 5 St Vincent’s Hospital HREC: SVH File 
Number: 16/230; HREC Reference 
LNR/16/SVH/321 
University of Notre Dame Australia: 
017042S 
St Vincent’s Hospital HREC: 
LNRSSA/17/SVH/243 
Hunter New England Local Health 
District HREC: LNRSSA/17/HNE/188 
Calvary Health Care Kogarah 
Research and Ethics Committee: 
Reciprocal approval for Catholic 
Ethical requirements met and 
acknowledged via correspondence; no 
separate approval number 
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Study 2 
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Study 3 and Study 4 
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Study 5 
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Appendix 10: PERISCOPE project alignment with national  
standards 
The PERISCOPE project was developed to align with the following standards at the 
commencement of the project (2014): 
(i) Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care: 
−  Safety and Quality Improvement Guide Standard 4: Medication Safety - 
(Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care) 
particularly: 
• Standard 4.4.1 - Medication incidents are regularly monitored, 
reported and investigated  
• Standard 4.5.2 - Quality improvement activities are undertaken 
to reduce the risk of patient harm and increase the quality and 
effectiveness of medicines use  
• Standard 4.11.1 - The risks for storing, prescribing, dispensing 
and administration of high-risk medicines are regularly reviewed  
• Standard 4.11.2 - Action is taken to reduce the risks of storing, 
prescribing, dispensing and administering high-risk medicines  
− Guidelines for use of the National Inpatient Medication Chart  
− Recommendations for terminology, abbreviations and symbols used in 
medicines documentation 
(ii)   Clinical Excellence Commission  
− Medication Safety Self Assessment for Australian Hospitals ®  
(iii)  Ministry of Health (NSW) Policy Directives and Safety Information: 
− Patient Safety and Clinical Quality Program PD2005_608  
− Medication Handling in NSW Public Health Facilities PD2013_043 (ref) 
− Incident Management Policy PD2014_004  
− High-Risk Medicines Management Policy PD2015_029  
− Safety Information 003/11 - Safe Storage of Accountable Medicines  
(iv) Australian Adult Cancer Pain Management Guidelines 
(v)  Therapeutic Guidelines 
− Palliative care  
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(vi)  The National Strategy for Quality Use of Medicines (Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care and NSW Therapeutic 
Advisory Group Inc., 2014):  
− Using medicines safely and effectively  
− Providing facilities, systems, training opportunities and structures that 
support health practitioners and avoid medication errors  
(vii) Palliative Care Australia’s National Standards Assessment Program 
(NSAP) (Palliative Care Australia, 2005): 
− Standard 11 - The service is committed to quality improvement and 
research in clinical and management practices
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Appendix 11: Joint display for Research Question 1 
Joint display A11.1 representing quantitative data integration, convergence and inference for Research Question 1: What is the 
prevalence, patient impact, and characteristics of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data – State-wide data 
(Study 2) 
Quantitative data – Local data 
(Study 3) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
Prevalence     
Prevalence Could not be identified in quantitative 
data 
Opioid errors accounted for 32% of all 
reported medication errors 
Prevalence: 0.9 (±1.5) opioid errors 
per 1000 occupied bed days 
Rate of reported opioid errors almost 
three-fold higher than in other 
healthcare settings 
Could not 
determine – follow-
up with qualitative 
data 
The higher prevalence of reported 
opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, compared to 
other inpatient settings, may be 
related to the high volume of opioid 
delivery in inpatient palliative care. 
Volume of opioid 
administration over 24 
hours 
Could not be identified in quantitative 
data 
Snapshot audit findings: 
- mean 82.5 (SD±44.8) opioid 
administrations per 24 hours/per 
unit 
- equivalent one opioid administration 
every 5.8 minutes 
Could not 
determine – follow-
up with qualitative 
data 
Patient Impact      
SAC Data set 1: Four year trend search of 
reported opioid incidents (N=467) 
-  SAC 1: n=0 
Reported opioid errors over two years 
(N=55) 
-  SAC 1: n=0 
Confirmed – 
follow-up with 
qualitative data 
Serious patient harm due to opioid 
error is exceedingly rare in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data – State-wide data 
(Study 2) 
Quantitative data – Local data 
(Study 3) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
-  SAC 2: n=4 (0.9%) 
-  SAC 3: n=133 (28.5%) 
-  SAC 4: n=314 (67.2%) 
-  SAC not allocated: n=16 (3.4%) 
Data set 2: Analysis of case reports 
(N=241) 
-  SAC 1: n=0 
-  SAC 2: n=2 (<0.1%) 
-  SAC 3: n=73 (30.3%) 
-  SAC 4: n=159 (66.0%) 
-  SAC not allocated: n=16 (6.6%) 
-  SAC 2: n=0 
-  SAC 3: n=21 (38.2%) 
-  SAC 4: n=34 (61.8%) 
 
 
NCC MERP Index Data set 2: Case reports (N=241) 
- Category B – error occurred, did 
not reach patient n=15 (6.2%) 
- Category C – error reached patient, 
no patient harm: n=11 (4.6%) 
- Category D - patient required 
monitoring and/or intervention to 
preclude harm: n=72 (29.9%) 
- Category E - error resulting in 
temporary patient harm which 
required intervention: n=37 (15.4%) 
- Category F - error resulting in 
temporary patient harm which 
required initial or prolonged 
hospitalisation: n=2 (0.8%) 
Reported opioid errors  (N=55) 
- Category B – error occurred, did not 
reach patient n=6 (16.4%) 
- Category C – error reached patient, 
no patient harm: n=11 (20.0%) 
- Category D - patient required 
monitoring and/or intervention to 
preclude harm: n=11 (20.0%) 
- Category E - error resulting in 
temporary patient harm which  
required intervention: n=18 (32.7%) 
- Category F - error resulting in 
temporary patient harm which  
required initial or prolonged 
hospitalisation: n=0  
Confirmed 
 
Approximately half of opioid errors 
that reach the palliative inpatient will 
require clinical intervention to 
preclude or manage harm. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data – State-wide data 
(Study 2) 
Quantitative data – Local data 
(Study 3) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
- Error reached patient - patient 
impact/outcome not documented: 
n=104 (43.2%) 
- Error reached patient - patient 
impact/outcome not documented: 
n=6 (10.9%) 
Dose outcome following 
error 
Data set 2: Case reports – error that 
reached patient (N=223, 92.5%) 
- Opioid underdose: n=134 (60.1%)  
- Opioid overdose: n=66 (29.6%)  
- Could not determine: n=23 (10.3%) 
Palliative patients were significantly 
more likely to receive an opioid under-
dose due to error (𝒳𝒳12=11, p=.001), 
than an opioid overdose compared to 
patients in cancer services 
Reported opioid errors that reached 
patient (N=46, 83.6%) 
-  Opioid underdose: n=26 (56.5%) 
-  Opioid overdose: n=18 (39.1%) 
-  Could not determine: n=2 (4.3%) 
 
Confirmed 
 
Opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services are more 
likely to result in opioid underdose 
than overdose. 
Opioid underdose due to error in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services is almost three times higher 
than in acute inpatient care (23%). 
 
Error characteristics     
Problem type Data set 2: Case reports (N=241) 
- Administration: 181 (75.1%) 
- Prescribing: n= 45 (18.7%) 
- Dispensing: n=7  (2.9%) 
- Near miss: n=4  (1.7%) 
Reported opioid errors (N=55) 
- Administration: n=42  (76.4%) 
- Prescribing: n= 8 (14.5%) 
- Dispensing: n=2  (3.6%) 
- Near miss: n=3  (5.5%) 
Confirmed 
 
Approximately three-quarters of 
reported opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services are 
administration errors. 
Prescribing errors account for 
approximately one-fifth of reported 
opioid errors. 
Dispensing errors and near miss 
incidents are rarely reported. 
The proportion of reported 
administration and prescribing errors 
in specialist palliative care inpatient 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data – State-wide data 
(Study 2) 
Quantitative data – Local data 
(Study 3) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
services is similar to reported opioid 
errors in other healthcare settings.  
Administration error types Data set 2: Case reports – 
administration errors (N=181) 
- Omitted dose: n=66 (36.5%) 
- Wrong dose: n=22 (12.2%) 
- Transdermal patch error: n=14 
(7.7%) 
- Wrong drug: n=13 (7.1%) 
Data set 1: Four year trend search of 
reported opioid incidents  
- Omitted dose errors with opioids 
significantly higher in palliative care 
services compared to cancer 
services (𝒳𝒳12=15, p<.001) 
Reported opioid administration errors 
(N=42) 
- Omitted dose: n=14 (33.3%) 
- Wrong dose: n=10 (23.8%) 
- Transdermal patch error: n=8 
(19.1%) 
- Wrong drug: n=6 (14.3%) 
 
Confirmed – 
follow-up with 
qualitative data 
Omitted dose errors are the most 
frequently reported error type in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, accounting for approximately 
one-quarter of all reported opioid 
errors. 
Omitted dose errors are also the 
leading administration error type in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, accounting for one-third of 
reported administration errors. 
Specialist palliative care inpatient 
services report more omitted dose 
errors, but fewer wrong dose and 
wrong drug errors with opioids, 
compared to other healthcare settings. 
Omitted dose errors with opioids occur 
more frequently in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services than other 
healthcare settings, including settings 
where opioid use is similar (i.e., 
cancer services). 
Reported omitted dose errors in 
palliative care services are more than 
double the rate than identified 
internationally (14%). 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data – State-wide data 
(Study 2) 
Quantitative data – Local data 
(Study 3) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
Omitted dose errors are the primary 
contributors to opioid under-dosing 
due to error in palliative care patients. 
Prescribing error types Data set 2: Case reports – prescribing 
errors (N=181) 
- Medication charting: n=20 (44.4%) 
- Conversion error: n=2 (4.4%) 
- Wrong drug: n=8 (17.8%) 
- Wrong dose: n=10 (22.2%) 
Reported opioid prescribing errors 
(N=8) 
- Medication charting: n=4 (50.0%) 
- Conversion error: n=2 (25.0%) 
- Wrong drug: n=2 (25.0%) 
Unclear due to 
small numbers at 
local sites – follow-
up with qualitative 
data 
Medication charting errors account for 
half of reported opioid prescribing 
errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. 
Opioid involved Data set 1: Four year trend search 
- Palliative care services State-wide 
significantly more likely to report 
hydromorphone (𝒳𝒳12=787, p<.001) 
and morphine (𝒳𝒳12=17, p<.001) 
errors compared to all other NSW 
Health services combined 
Reported opioid errors (N=55) 
Two thirds of reported opioid errors 
involved morphine (n=19, 34.5%) or 
hydromorphone (n=16, 29.0%) 
Confirmed Morphine and hydromorphone errors 
are the most commonly reported in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
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Joint display A11.2 representing data integration, convergence and inference for Research Question 1: What is the prevalence, patient 
impact, and characteristics of opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
Prevalence     
Prevalence The higher prevalence of reported 
opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, compared to 
other inpatient settings, may be 
related to the high frequency of opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. 
The frequency of opioid delivery in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services impacts opioid error 
prevalence 
‘‘I think that that (the number of opioid 
errors) is partially related to the 
volume of opioid use here in the 
specialist inpatient unit’ 
(ID1_Physician) 
Confirm The higher prevalence of reported 
opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, compared to 
other inpatient settings, is likely 
related to the high frequency of 
opioid delivery in inpatient palliative 
care. 
Frequency of opioid 
administration in specialist 
palliative care inpatient 
services  
In specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, an opioid is administered 
approximately every 6 minutes. 
The frequency of opioid delivery in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services is high 
‘We roughly calculated an average of 
over 3000 opioid administrations in 
one month (in the unit), and there was 
one error… I'm not minimising the 
seriousness of a drug error, any error 
is dangerous, and needs to be treated 
extremely seriously, but given the 
volume of (opioid) administrations in 
this unit (this is actually low) 
(ID19_Nurse) 
Confirm The frequency of opioid delivery in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services is high. 
Given the frequency of opioid 
delivery in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, palliative care 
clinicians perceive the prevalence of 
opioid errors to be low. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
Error reporting culture Could not be determined from 
quantitative data 
Opioid error reporting – 
encouraged and expected  
‘I've certainly seen that 
elsewhere…that it reflects badly on 
the unit, the more incidents you have. 
It doesn't look good, so you're not 
encouraged to (report) in other places, 
but they do encourage it here, to help 
highlight the issues so that we can 
rectify’ (ID29_Nurse). 
Enhance A non-punitive approach to error 
reporting was evident in the local 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services in the PERISCOPE project. 
The higher prevalence of reported 
opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, compared to 
other inpatient settings, may also be 
due to a positive error reporting 
culture. 
Patient impact of opioid errors    
Patient harm Serious patient harm due to opioid 
error is exceedingly rare in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. 
 
Opioids pose a high risk for error, 
but serious errors are rare  
‘I think serious opioid errors are 
uncommon, minor issues of all 
descriptions are relatively common’ 
(ID 1_Physician). 
Confirm Serious patient harm due to opioid 
error is exceedingly rare in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. 
 
Dose outcome following 
error 
Opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services are more likely 
to result in opioid underdose than 
overdose. 
 
Opioid underdosing due to error 
‘So we worry about the overdose, 
obviously, because that's a life 
threatening problem, but patients 
under-dosed is also a major problem’ 
(ID4_Physician). 
‘They don't always choose too large (a 
dose), sometimes I think the dose is 
dangerously small…we had one case 
recently where sub-cut morphine was 
Confirm Opioid errors in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services are more 
likely to result in opioid underdose 
than overdose. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
changed to sub-cut hydromorphone, 
but in my estimation they gave about a 
1/3 of the dose needed’ 
(ID11_Physician). 
Opioid error characteristics and error reporting practices    
All opioid errors Reported opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services 
reflect opioid error prevalence in other 
healthcare settings. 
Mandated controlled drug 
management policy prompts error 
recognition and reporting 
 ‘…with opioids, it's more serious, we 
have to do a report…I'm pretty sure 
that all opioid errors would be 
reported’ (ID18_Nurse).  
Enhance Opioid errors are perceived to be 
more accurately reported in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services them medication errors with 
non-high risk medicines. 
The mandated management policy 
for controlled drugs (opioids) 
appears effective in facilitating 
reporting of opioid errors. 
Opioid administration 
errors - general 
Three-quarters of reported opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services are administration 
errors. 
 
Mandated controlled drug 
management policy prompts error 
recognition and reporting 
‘If it’s not the person making the 
mistake reporting it, someone else 
will; the next shift might pick up a 
mistake, they might see something in 
the drug book doesn’t correlate and 
they’ll report it…’(ID14_Nurse). 
Enhance The mandated management policy 
for controlled drugs (opioids) 
appears effective in facilitating 
recognition of opioid administration 
errors and prompts error reporting. 
Opioid administration errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services are perceived to be 
accurately reported. 
Opioid administration 
errors - omitted dose 
errors  
Omitted dose errors are the most 
frequently reported opioid error type in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services, accounting for 
Missed doses and miscalculations 
‘…the missed dose is quite 
frequent...there is no doubt there's an 
element of human error that we 
Confirm 
Enhance 
Omitted dose errors are the most 
prevalent opioid administration error 
in specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
approximately one-quarter of all 
reported opioid errors, and one-third 
of opioid administration errors. 
haven't been able to eliminate entirely’ 
(ID5_Physician). 
Opioid prescribing errors One-fifth of reported opioid errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services are prescribing errors 
Rectify or report? 
‘I think often you can rectify the 
problem quite simply…you go to the 
doctor to change it, so, rather than 
report it, it's quicker just to fix it; I think 
we don't report it because it's 
fixable…we report falls and pressure 
areas because we can't fix them on 
the spot but if it's a medication 
(prescribing) error we just go and get 
the chart fixed, and it's done’ 
(ID34_Nurse). 
Contradict Opioid prescribing errors that are 
readily fixable are rarely reported. 
The prevalence of opioid prescribing 
errors is likely substantially higher 
than reported. 
Opioid prescribing errors - 
charting errors 
Opioid charting errors account for half 
of reported opioid prescribing errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
Error contributory factors: Clinical 
communication 
(Right now) there's one (chart)...that 
has everything on that page ceased, 
and not a nice, neat, it's, you know, 
scribble-scribble-scribble…at first 
glance at that chart, you go, ‘that's all 
ceased’…and right in the middle of it, 
there's an oxycontin. That doesn't give 
us much of a chance, does it?’ 
(ID45_Nurse). 
‘So I said to the doctor, are you sure 
this is what you want? I think the 
Enhance Medication charting errors, including 
illegible or ambiguous written orders, 
are common in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services, however, 
they are usually promptly rectified. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
intention was (for administration) 
today, but they re-charted it for 
tomorrow morning…they're human 
too…if we see something, we question 
it’ (ID48_Nurse). 
Opioid prescribing errors - 
opioid conversion errors 
Less than 3% of reported opioid 
prescribing errors were attributed to 
conversion errors in NSW palliative 
care services. 
Missed doses and miscalculations 
 ‘…opioid conversions are the huge 
danger area…and that happens many 
times when you're trying to stabilise 
pain, we're changing routes and we're 
changing drugs’ (ID22_Physician). 
Rectify or report? 
Generally if I find a prescribing 
problem you just go and get (the 
doctor) to fix it, you don't put a report 
in (ID18_Nurse). 
Contradict Opioid conversion errors are 
perceived to be the most commonly 
occurring opioid prescribing error 
type in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services.  
However, as with opioid prescribing 
errors generally, opioid conversion 
errors are often intercepted by 
palliative care nurses, rectified and 
not reported. 
 
Opioid dispensing errors Dispensing errors were rarely 
reported (3%-4%). 
Not identified in qualitative data Could not 
determine 
It is unclear why the rate of opioid 
dispensing errors is so low in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services than in other settings, and 
this warrants further exploration in 
the palliative care context. 
Near miss incidents Near miss incidents were rarely 
reported (2%-5%). 
Rectify or report? 
If your double checking identifies 
something before you’ve drawn it all 
up and are going to give it then you’ve 
prevented it from being a problem, but 
Enhance Near miss incidents are generally 
only reported if the potential for 
patient harm was high, or if the 
incident resulted in a narcotic 
discrepancy. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What is the prevalence, patient impact , and characteristics of opioid errors reported in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Mixed methods inference from 
Study 2 (State-wide review) and 
Study 3 (local review) 
Qualitative data  
(Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
I guess if someone’s actually willing to 
go and take it to the patient, and 
there’s the potential it would have 
been given without resistance, that 
would be reported (ID5_Nurse). 
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Appendix 12: Joint display for Research Question 2 
Joint display A12 representing data integration, convergence and inference for Research Question 2: What are the individual and 
systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS     
Active failures (human 
error) 
 
[ACTIVE FAILURES] 
Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- 59% (n=222) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to active failures 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 68% (n=53) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to active failures 
 
Human error is inevitable 
‘We are aware that human error plays 
a part in medication administration, I 
don't think there's any way around 
that, completely; we can be as diligent 
as you want, but at times (errors will 
still happen)’ (ID36_Nurse). 
‘I really do believe in improving 
systems rather than looking so much 
at people, because if systems are 
improved then people also improve 
automatically’ (ID31_Nurse). 
Enhance Human error is an inevitable aspect 
of opioid errors, that cannot be 
completely eliminated. However, it is 
essential to also consider the 
systems factors that may facilitate 
human error.  
 
 
Inexperience 
 
[SITUATIONAL FACTORS] 
Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- 8% (n=31) of reported opioid errors 
attributed to clinician inexperience 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 3% (n=3) of reported opioid errors 
attributed to clinician inexperience 
 
Situational factors: clinician 
inexperience 
‘I think we've got to realise that we 
have a lot of new and young registrars 
that haven't seen, you know, someone 
on fentanyl and hydromorphone and 
methadone, and then being converted 
to a syringe driver…’(ID10_Nurse)  
When we have to make after hours 
calls…(the doctors) often they're going 
Confirm 
Enhance 
The nature of opioid delivery in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services (high frequency, high doses, 
unusual opioid combinations) poses 
considerable challenges for 
inexperienced clinicians such as: 
clinicians who are new to the 
palliative care unit; junior doctors; 
and non-specialist palliative care 
prescribers. 
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Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
by what we (nurses) see…if it's a 
more junior doctor, or a doctor from 
(another service), there could be so 
much room for an error there 
(ID18_Nurse). 
I think…when we have casual 
(staff)...or people who aren't familiar 
(with opioids)…there just seem to be a 
number of errors if we use 
inexperienced staff (ID37_Nurse).   
SYSTEMS FACTORS    
Skill-mix and workload 
 
[LOCAL WORKING CONDITIONS] 
Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- 2% (n=5) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to sub-
optimal skill mix 
- 7% (n=17) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to workload 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- nil reported opioid errors 
attributed to sub-optimal skill 
mix 
10% (n=8) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to workload 
Nursing skill-mix and ratios 
‘If you are the only senior (nurse), you 
have to make the decisions. You have 
to help the new staff, the new grad, 
you have to guide them, help them to 
even (administer). You have to check 
not only twice, you have to check five 
times to make sure they’re all on the 
right track. That is time consuming, 
and takes away your energy as well, 
that's how errors can come easily’ 
(ID57_Nurse).  
Interdisciplinary skill-mix 
‘If an inexperienced doctor charts a 
wrong dose, an inexperienced nurse is 
far less likely to pick that up, and 
sometimes the safeguard is having 
experienced nurses, so if there's a 
combination of inexperienced junior 
Enhance Sub optimal skill mix and nurse 
ratios directly increases palliative 
care nurses’ workload and heightens 
the risk of opioid error.  
 
  
A131  
Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
doctors and inexperienced nursing 
staff, I think that is where the potential 
for error is high’ (ID9_Physician). 
Workload and errors 
‘I think most of the prescribing errors 
happen at admission - they're 
(palliative care medical team) 
understaffed for admissions and the 
complexity of our patients has 
increased, the constant turnover 
means complex patients are being 
admitted daily and their (clinicians) 
proportional workload to manage 
those admissions I think is too high’ 
(ID21_Physician). 
‘…of course, it's workload that could 
be contributing to errors, time is a big 
contribution to errors’ (ID61_Nurse). 
Task characteristics of opioid delivery 
[SITUATIONAL FACTORS] 
Opioid delivery in palliative care is 
different 
  
Time spent on opioid 
delivery 
 
Not identified in quantitative data ‘We just said to each other the other 
day, ‘how's your day?’, she said, ‘I 
didn't get out of the (drug) cupboard 
the whole shift’ and I said, my shift 
was the same. And you'd hear it all the 
time...because…you can literally be 
standing in that (drug) room and not 
leave. Yesterday, we did five (infusion 
pumps) in a row…and then the time 
doing the drug check, and all the 
Enhance Opioid delivery consumes a large 
part of each shift for specialist 
palliative care nurses. 
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Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
breakthroughs…it’s hours, hours, 
hours’ (ID30_Nurse). 
Opioid doses  Not identified in quantitative data ‘It’s different, totally different, in 
another hospital you wouldn’t use this 
dosage (of opioids)’ (ID1_Nurse). 
Enhance Opioid doses in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services are 
considerably higher than in other 
care settings. 
Complexity of opioid 
delivery 
Not identified in quantitative data ‘…when they're doing complicated 
dose conversions, not only are they 
converting from one variety of opioid 
to another, but they're converting the 
route or the formulation, so oral to 
subcutaneous, or long-acting to fourth 
hourly, or subcut morphine to 
hydromorphone, methadone rotations; 
the more the complexity of the dosing, 
the more chance there is for error, if 
there's multiple steps, is my 
experience’ (ID1_Physician). 
‘What's expected of our nurses (is) 
…the concentration required with 
some of the medications (opioids’) 
(ID41_ Pharmacist). 
Enhance Opioid delivery in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services routinely 
involves complex tasks, with error 
potential at each step.   
Interruptions Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- Nil reported 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 5% (n=4) of reported opioid errors 
attributed to interruptions and/or 
distractions 
‘I think a point that’s critical is when 
you’re there at the drug cupboard and 
you’re drawing something up and 
people are talking to you and 
everything is busy…you know you’re 
trying to do your drug calculations, 
draw up the right dose…and it only 
takes that really quick thing for you to 
Confirm 
Enhance 
Preparing opioids for administration 
is a complex and time consuming 
task that requires concentration. 
Interruptions during the opioid 
preparation process are common, 
however, are seen as routine 
occurrences in the context of opioid 
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Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
 pick the wrong thing, for something to 
happen’ (ID2_Nurse). 
‘Things happen and they can’t just wait 
half an hour for us to finish the drug 
round, we get interrupted all the time 
and we just have to deal with it, that’s 
what I think anyway, the reality of it’ 
(ID15_Nurse). 
delivery, that palliative care clinicians 
endeavour to actively manage. 
Patient factors 
[ 
SITUATIONAL FACTORS] 
Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- >1% (n=2) of reported opioid errors 
attributed to patient factors 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- Nil reported 
 
Patient factors and opioid errors  
‘…the patient that is being looked after 
in palliative care, is very complex with 
a lot of co-morbidities…and 
polypharmacy… it leaves the more 
junior staff in a very difficult situation 
because they have to provide care, 
and when they do that, often times this 
is where errors tend to happen’ 
(ID31_Nurse). 
‘… there's a lot of unstable patients, or 
deteriorating patients that need a lot of 
breakthroughs, the doctors are 
changing orders frequently, you have 
anxious families, that all adds up…and 
you could really do with extra staff 
numbers then’ (ID11_Nurse) 
Enhance Although palliative inpatient care is 
increasingly complex, patient factors 
rarely contribute directly to opioid 
errors in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services. Rather, clinician 
inexperience and increased workload 
due to the fluctuating needs of 
palliative patients heightens the risk 
of error. 
Physical environment 
 
[LATENT ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS] 
Not identified in quantitative data Local working conditions 
‘In our treatment room it gets super 
busy and super noisy, so when you're 
trying to draw up a complicated 
(subcutaneous infusion pump), or 
Enhance The physical environment of the drug 
preparation area contributes to 
opioid error. 
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Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
even you're just trying to move 
because someone's got to get into the 
cupboard, you can (make an error)’ 
(ID45_Nurse). 
Absence of pharmacist 
input  
 
[LATENT ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS] 
Study 3 - Local retrospective review:  
- palliative care services without a 
clinical pharmacist reported the 
highest number of opioid 
prescribing errors 
 
 
Gaps in support from central 
functions  
‘We don’t have enough clinical 
pharmacists on the ward so they don’t 
come to review the charts frequently, 
that is a concern…you know if the 
medication route is wrong but no-one 
checks, or the doctor charted for bd 
but only put down one time in the 
chart’ (ID01_Nurse) 
Confirm Absence of a clinical pharmacist in 
the specialist palliative care inpatient 
service increases opioid prescribing 
errors. 
    
Clinical communication factors 
[OVERARCHING FACTOR] 
   
Communication systems Not identified in quantitative data Errors on admission 
‘I think (there’s a risk) in the transition 
from community to inpatient, because 
there may be more than one 
prescriber of the opioid and what the 
actual patient has been taking may be 
different from what's being 
prescribed…and that there's not a 
uniform medication list between GP, 
the community team, and the inpatient 
team necessarily’ (ID48_Physician). 
Enhance A lack of centralised patient 
information increases the risk of error 
during palliative patient care 
transitions. 
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Domain  
[ALIGNMENT WITH 
YORKSHIRE CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTORS FRAMEWORK]  
Quantitative data 
(Studies 2 - 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence 
Mixed methods inference 
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: What are the individual and systems factors that contribute to opioid errors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Interpersonal 
communication 
Study 2 - State-wide data: 
- 15% (n=36) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to clinical 
communication deficits (written 
communication 70%, clinical 
handover 30%) 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 17% (n=13) of reported opioid 
errors attributed to clinical 
communication deficits (written 
communication 39%, clinical 
handover 61%) 
 
Contemporaneous handover 
‘So if anything for a patient changes, 
as a nurse, our job is to then let the 
doctor know that this has just 
changed, the patient's in more pain, or 
whatever. It'd be really nice if that was 
reciprocated, in terms of, they've 
charted a new drug for a patient, 
especially an opioid, can you let us 
know that that has been charted? Just 
a quick tap on the shoulder and say 
“Hey, we've just charted this”’ 
(ID12_Nurse). 
 
Rectify or report? 
We’re generally pretty good in going 
and saying: Can you rewrite this 
again? We can't read it!’(ID44_Nurse). 
Confirm 
Enhance 
Clinical communication deficits, 
particularly with clinical handover, 
result in opioid errors in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services.  
In local services, ambiguous or 
illegible written orders are promptly 
challenged and clarified.  
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Appendix 13: Joint display for Research Question 3 
Joint display A13 representing data integration, convergence and inference for Research Question 3: What are the opioid error 
mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: What are the opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data 
(Studies 3 and 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
Safety culture    A positive, non-punitive, safety 
culture, underpins opioid safety in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
Supervision and 
leadership 
Not identified in quantitative data Clear expectations regarding safe 
opioid delivery 
We've said that because we do so 
many (opioids) instead of expecting 
that we would, as a result of that, 
have a high rate (of errors), we've 
said…we should be experts at it and 
we should be the best at it…we've 
continued to raise the profile in 
suggesting that it's a really pivotal part 
of what we do. I think it's that culture 
of, ‘this is important’ (ID33_Nurse Unit 
Manager). 
‘For me [the safety culture] is from the 
top down, definitely management has 
a huge influence on the culture…’ 
(ID36_Nurse). 
Enhance A commitment to opioid safety from 
leadership is evident in specialist 
palliative care inpatient services. 
Policies and procedures Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 5% (n=4) of opioid error reports 
specifically identified adherence to 
Empowering clinicians to practise 
safely 
We're very strict…and again, it's just 
policy. We've had a lot of new staff 
Confirm 
Enhance 
Current opioid management/handling 
polices are effective in reducing 
opioid errors, and mitigating patient 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 3: What are the opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data 
(Studies 3 and 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
opioid management/handling policy 
had prevented the error from 
reaching the patient, or mitigated 
patient harm following an error  
 
start over the last year or two, and I 
think because they've come into that 
culture as existing, with all the 
strictness around doing things the 
right way (following policy)...that's the 
funny thing, we're just doing it the 
right way, it's not like we're re-
inventing the wheel.  
harm from error, when they are 
consistently implemented. 
 
Error reporting culture Not identified in quantitative data Promoting a non-punitive approach 
to error 
I don't think we have a culture where 
we're frightened to report anything. I 
don't think we have a culture where 
we're afraid to own up to any 
mistakes… I think we're all accepting 
of each other, and if a mistake is 
made, you have to do something 
about it, and I don't think there's a 
culture of shielding that (mistake) from 
management (ID47_Nurse). 
Enhance A non-punitive error reporting culture 
is evident in specialist palliative care 
inpatient services, and promotes a 
systems approach to error 
management. 
Palliative care nurses’ 
error interception 
practices 
Study 4 - Local review of error 
contributing factors:  
- 10% (n=8) of identified opioid 
errors were intercepted by palliative 
care nurses and subsequently 
reported  
 
Working as a team 
So I said to the doctor, are you sure 
this is what you want? I think the 
intention was (for administration) 
today, but they re-charted it for 
tomorrow morning…they're human 
too…if we see something, we 
question it’ (ID48_Nurse). 
Confirm 
Enhance 
Palliative care nurses routinely 
identify and intercept opioid errors, 
particularly prescribing errors. 
Palliative care 
pharmacists in the 
interdisciplinary team 
Study 3 - Local retrospective review: 
- All bar one opioid prescribing error 
(88%, n=7) was reported in the 
Working as a team 
We're really fortunate that we have 
pharmacists on site, they're very open 
to anybody spending time with them, 
Confirm 
Enhance 
A palliative care pharmacist in the 
interdisciplinary team appears to 
considerably reduce opioid 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 3: What are the opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data 
(Studies 3 and 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
service without a palliative care 
pharmacist. 
 
clarifying anything, if the doctors are 
not here and the nurses are uncertain 
about why the breakthrough dose is 
such as it is (ID34_Clinical Nurse 
Educator). 
prescribing errors, and is a valued 
team member. 
Interdisciplinary 
collaboration 
Not identified in quantitative data Working as a team 
‘When I'm calculating something, if it's 
particularly complex or warrants 
double checks I often ask one of the 
nurses, what do you think?’ 
(ID56_Physician). 
It's that combination of alertness, 
awareness, everyone being aware of 
inexperience, and an open, blame-
free culture (ID09_Physician). 
Enhance Effective interdisciplinary 
collaboration in specialist palliative 
care inpatient services is an 
additional error safeguard. 
Interdisciplinary collaboration is 
essential to mitigate the risk of opioid 
error by less experienced clinicians. 
Education and training Not identified in quantitative data Education is empowering 
I think nurses are very happy to 
challenge orders…I think just learning 
about the opioid conversion, learning 
what that means and why it's 
important (makes them confident to 
challenge), so being empowered by 
education (ID55_Clincal Nurse 
Educator). 
Enhance Targeted and ongoing opportunities 
for opioid education empowers 
clinicians to identify and intercept 
opioid errors. 
 
Electronic medication 
management system 
Study 3 - Local retrospective review: 
- Nil reported omitted dose errors in 
service using electronic medication 
management system 
- Omitted dose errors ranged from 
29% to 69% of reported opioid 
administration errors in specialist 
Quality process and risk 
management 
‘I worked in (other palliative care 
service) and the main issue there was 
we missed lots of drug. And that was 
because of the paper chart. Since I 
came here (electronic medication 
chart), I can't think of going back to a 
Confirm  Electronic medication management 
systems appear to substantially 
reduce omitted opioid dose errors in 
specialist palliative care inpatient 
services. 
Given that omitted dose errors are 
the most frequently reported opioid 
error type in specialist palliative care 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 3: What are the opioid error mitigating factors in specialist palliative care inpatient services? 
Domain 
Quantitative data 
(Studies 3 and 4) 
Qualitative data theme and sample 
quote (Study 5) 
Data 
convergence Mixed methods inference 
palliative care inpatient services 
using paper based medication 
charts 
paper chart…because it (the 
electronic chart) alerts us all the time. 
We can't miss it’ (ID57_Nurse) 
inpatient services, and substantially 
contribute to iatrogenic patient harm, 
transitioning to electronic medication 
management systems for services 
currently using paper-based 
medication charts is warrants 
consideration. 
 
 
 
